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The world’s lower-income countries face an urgent need for public revenue to 
build social and economic infrastructure. These countries, however, face a 
dilemma in seeking to tax the income of multinational companies operating 
within their borders. On the one hand, because lower-income countries face 
substantial limitations on their ability to raise revenue from broad-based taxes 
like personal income tax and value added tax, corporate taxes represent a 
large potential source of additional revenue. On the other hand, governments 
of lower-income countries often perceive international competition for 
investment as limiting their ability to levy taxes on multinationals. 
 
This book seeks to explore this dilemma and to recommend policy measures 
that might enable lower-income countries to increase revenue from corporate 
tax in a world that is likely to remain characterised by tax competition. The 
book seeks to shed light on the complicated historical, economic and political 
roots of today’s global corporate tax system – roots that have produced tax 
laws that all countries, but especially developing countries with resource-
constrained tax administrations, have difficulty administering effectively. The 
book concludes by offering: (i) specific policy initiatives for governments to 
consider, and (ii) observations concerning the social responsibility faced by 
multinational companies, the governments of countries at all levels of 
economic development, and international organisations like the OECD and 
United Nations, in addressing the pressing revenue needs of lower-income 
countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michael C. Durst is a long-time tax practitioner, an author on international 
taxation and developing countries, a former government official and law 
professor, and a senior fellow at the ICTD. He is based in the USA. 
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Chapter 1 Taxing multinational business in 
lower-income countries 
 
 
 
Motivation for this book 
 
As the 2008 financial crisis sparked widespread public anger towards the 
world’s large companies, investigative news reporters and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) revealed that the world’s multinational business groups 
were routinely avoiding hundreds of billions of dollars of corporate income tax 
each year in the countries where they conduct business.1 Multinationals were 
accomplishing this by shifting profits from countries where they earned their 
income to zero- and low-tax countries where the groups often appeared to 
conduct little if any business activity. The profit-shifting payments were not 
being made secretly – on the contrary, tax agencies around the world had 
been aware of them for many years. However, under the system of 
international tax laws that has been adopted by virtually every country in the 
world, and has been coordinated globally by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD),2 countries’ revenue-protection 
agencies could not prevent the income shifting. 
 
The reports by news media and NGOs tended to focus on the effects of tax 
avoidance in two different groups of countries. Media reports generally 
emphasised the effects of profit shifting on wealthier industrialised countries. 
The governments of many of these countries were experiencing fiscal 
shortfalls following the financial crisis. Some especially widely-noted news 
reports focused on well-known US companies, including Starbucks, Amazon 
and Google, which were earning large revenue from sales in the United 
Kingdom while paying little if any corporate tax there.3  
 
The reports by NGOs, on the other hand, focused largely on the effects of 
profit shifting from the world’s poorer developing countries. These countries 
typically face a chronic shortage of public infrastructure to meet people’s 
most basic human needs, in areas like the supply of clean drinking water, 
health care and primary education. The NGOs argued that, by depriving 
                                                 
1  See, e.g., Christian Aid (2009); ActionAid (2010; updated 2012) (reports by NGOs); and Duhigg and 
Kalinowski (2012), Drucker (2013a) and Duncan and Cohen (2012) (news articles). 
2  The OECD is a Paris-based organisation consisting mainly of the world’s wealthiest governments. OECD 
member countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States. 
3  See, e.g., Duncan and Cohen (2012) and BBC (2012). 
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countries of the financial means to build infrastructure in these and other 
areas, corporate tax avoidance was effectively perpetuating widespread 
personal suffering. One report, for example, suggested that if corporate tax 
avoidance were to be eliminated, the deaths of tens of thousands of children 
annually might be prevented.4 The media and NGO reports typically 
acknowledged that the profit shifting they were describing was generally 
legal, in the sense that it was permissible under the tax laws of the countries 
that were involved. Nevertheless, the authors of the reports made no attempt 
to conceal their belief that the tax avoidance reflected moral failure on the 
part of a number of politically powerful actors – the multinational companies 
that engaged in the avoidance; the lawyers, accountants and other tax 
professionals who advised them; the OECD and other intergovernmental 
groups that had perpetuated ineffective tax laws; and national governments 
that seemed content to retain those laws on their statute books despite their 
apparent failure to contain revenue losses. 
 
The media and NGO reports generated a strong public reaction, especially in 
the economically developed world. Parliamentarians in some countries 
conducted inquiries at which legislators were highly critical of the world’s 
most prominent multinational corporations. In one widely reported instance, 
for example, a senior UK Member of Parliament (MP) criticised US 
multinationals Starbucks, Amazon, and Google as having fallen short of basic 
ethical standards in engaging in tax-avoidance practices, notwithstanding 
that the avoidance appeared legally permissible. ‘We’re not accusing you of 
being illegal’, the MP declared, ‘we’re accusing you of being immoral’ (BBC 
2012).  
 
In response to these developments, in 2012 the finance ministers of the G20 
group of countries directed the OECD to conduct a multi-year inquiry into the 
phenomenon of what the OECD labelled base erosion and profit shifting, or 
BEPS.5 Senior officials of both the G20 and the OECD expressed the view 
that BEPS-style tax planning around the world was eroding public confidence 
in national and global economic institutions, and should no longer be 
tolerated. The OECD began its study of base erosion and profit shifting in 
2013, promising a thorough reassessment of the body of international tax 
laws that the OECD had historically been responsible for articulating and 
maintaining. 
                                                 
4  Christian Aid (2008: 2). The report claims that if tax revenue lost in developing countries to two forms of 
corporate behaviour could be recovered – ‘legal’ avoidance of the kind addressed in this book, and certain 
criminal tax avoidance consisting of the falsification of trade documents – ‘then the lives of 350,000 children 
under the age of five would be saved every year – including 250,000 babies’ (emphasis in original). The 
quantitative analysis of the Christian Aid study has been criticised, and the report may substantially 
overstate the revenue losses that countries experience from corporate tax avoidance - see Fuest and Riedel 
(2009); and M. Forstater (2015). Moreover, it must be remembered that increased corporate tax revenue 
alone will not necessarily improve social well-being in a country. It is also necessary that the revenue be 
used to meet unmet social needs, rather than being misappropriated through corruption and inefficiency. 
See, e.g., Besley and Persson (2014: 113). It is, of course, important to recognise that effective tax policy 
represents only one among many requirements for the alleviation of poverty in the world’s poorest countries. 
5  The G20 countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. 
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Although it draws much of its membership from the world’s wealthiest 
countries, the OECD acknowledged that revenue losses from base erosion 
and profit shifting were affecting developing countries especially acutely. The 
OECD therefore invited governments of developing countries to participate in 
the BEPS studies. In addition, intergovernmental organisations active in the 
field of international development, including the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), World Bank and United Nations, collaborated with the OECD and 
produced several extensive analyses that focused particularly on the 
situation of developing countries with respect to corporate profit shifting. 
 
The OECD issued final reports from its BEPS studies in late 2015, 
recommending a number of legislative and administrative measures that 
governments might take to curtail the shifting of income by multinational 
groups. In addition, a consortium of intergovernmental organisations, 
including the OECD, World Bank, IMF and United Nations, pledged to join in 
a sustained programme of technical assistance to help the world’s 
developing countries implement the BEPS recommendations and otherwise 
improve the performance of their tax systems. 
 
This book seeks to provide a critical, and in some ways novel, assessment of 
base erosion and profit shifting as it affects the world’s lower-income 
countries,6 and of the current efforts of the OECD and other international 
organisations to curtail the phenomenon. I write this book in the belief that 
the advocacy of NGOs and others, described above, performed a valuable 
service in bringing the tax situation of lower-income countries to greater 
public attention. I also believe, however, that the problems of corporate 
taxation in lower-income countries reflect a longstanding complex and 
stubborn mix of political and economic influences, and that the post-2008 
public exposure represented only the beginning of a still incomplete process 
of understanding the roots of the problems that have been identified. As 
discussed below, progress has been made towards improving the 
performance of corporate income tax in lower-income countries, largely 
through the OECD’s BEPS process – but the process of reform has only 
begun. The BEPS process has to date been unable to address some of the 
most central difficulties faced by lower-income countries, and some of the 
fundamental political and economic causes of those difficulties have not yet 
been sufficiently aired and confronted. 
 
 
                                                 
6  A note is in order about the use by this book of the term lower-income countries. It might be possible instead 
to use the term developing countries, but that is used popularly to describe countries at many different 
levels of per capita income, some of which are relatively wealthy by global standards. The World Bank uses 
the terms low-income (per capita income of $1,005 or less for fiscal year 2017/18); lower-middle-income 
(per capita income of $1,006 to $3,955), upper-middle-income (per capita income of $3,956 to $12,235) and 
high-income (per capita income of at least $12,236). I use lower-income to denote countries falling roughly 
within the low- and lower-middle-income groups. (For the World Bank classification, see World Bank, ‘World 
Bank Country and Lending Groups’.) It should be recognised that each World Bank category includes 
countries of widely varying levels of per capita income and social conditions, and my use of the term lower-
income inevitably encompasses countries that differ from one another in many important ways. 
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The book’s fundamental argument 
 
This book addresses three fundamental questions: 
 
 Would curtailing base erosion and profit shifting in lower-income countries 
be in the interests of the people of those countries, especially in 
facilitating the alleviation of poverty? 
 What are the political and economic roots of BEPS-style corporate tax 
planning? 
 What policies might lower-income countries realistically pursue to reduce 
their vulnerability to base erosion and profit shifting? 
 
With respect to the first of these questions, the book concludes that BEPS-
style tax planning does properly demand the continuing attention of 
policymakers around the world. The world’s poorer countries are chronically 
short of the public revenue needed to combat persistent severe poverty, and 
as a practical matter the income generated by multinational companies within 
those countries represents one of the few realistically accessible sources of 
additional public funding, at least for the foreseeable future. As will be 
discussed, there are, of course, limits to the extent that lower-income 
governments should seek to increase corporate tax revenue above current 
levels: at some level of increased corporate taxation, the social costs of 
reduced inbound investment will override the social benefits of generating 
additional revenue. As discussed in Chapter 2, however, profit shifting has 
become so pervasive in lower-income countries that corporate tax revenue 
today is almost certainly below socially optimal levels. 
 
Therefore, curtailing BEPS-style tax avoidance should increase the likelihood 
of gains in social welfare for people in lower-income countries. This is not to 
say that increases in government revenue will inevitably lead to 
improvements in social conditions – many obstacles, including corruption and 
other shortfalls in governance, can obstruct the path between the collection 
of revenue and its successful use in promoting social well-being. 
Nevertheless, enhanced revenue should make badly needed social 
improvements more feasible than they are today, and for this reason 
curtailing tax avoidance in lower-income countries appears to represent a 
desirable policy goal. 
 
The conceptual core of this book consists of a historical interpretation of the 
phenomenon of BEPS-style tax planning. This history is a remarkably long 
one: all the techniques by which multinational groups currently use 
subsidiaries in zero- and low-tax countries in avoidance planning were 
already in use within a few years after the end of World War II, when the 
cessation of hostilities and wartime technological innovations permitted a 
flowering of cross-border trade and investment. I argue in this book that 
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BEPS-style tax avoidance can be understood most usefully, not primarily as 
a product of corporate wrongdoing, but rather as a consequence of the 
longstanding desire of: (i) taxpayers to minimise their liabilities, and (ii) the 
governments of countries at all levels of economic development to encourage 
investment by offering companies full or partial exemption from corporate 
taxation. 
 
To some extent, countries offer investors tax exemptions through explicit 
means, for example by enacting laws permitting tax holidays for investments 
in new businesses, or tax exemptions for starting businesses in economically 
disadvantaged areas within a country. All governments, however, face some 
degree of political resistance to the use of explicit tax exemptions to attract 
investment, on the grounds that the governments are showing excessive 
largesse to corporate interests. I argue in this book that the techniques that 
multinational companies employ to avoid taxes, and the international system 
of tax laws that protects the avoidance from successful challenge by revenue 
authorities, evolved as a means by which companies could obtain, and 
governments could tacitly provide, de facto exemptions from taxation with 
less political visibility than is entailed in explicit tax incentives. 
 
My interpretation of base erosion and profit shifting as reflecting not only the 
desire of multinational companies to avoid taxes, but also the desire of 
governments to facilitate that avoidance to encourage inbound investment, 
raises the question of whether the recommendation that the international 
community take steps to curtail the avoidance incorporates an undesirable 
element of paternalism. After all, if governments of lower-income countries 
have tolerated high levels of avoidance for many years, with the view that the 
resulting encouragement of investment outweighs the potential social value 
of increased investment, what standing do NGOs, journalists, tax scholars 
and international organisations like the OECD, IMF, and World Bank have to 
encourage lower-income governments to try to curtail avoidance? 
 
An answer to this question is found, I believe, in the nature – indeed, in the 
elementary mathematics – of international tax competition. If lower-income 
countries did not see themselves as competing with their neighbours to 
attract inbound investment, they could presumably drive a tougher tax deal 
with investing multinationals, increasing the amount of corporate tax revenue 
closer to socially optimal levels. But, in fact, virtually all countries are eager to 
attract inbound investment. Whatever level of taxation a country might be 
willing to offer a potential investing multinational, often one or more other 
countries will be willing to offer a lower level of taxation. The result is in effect 
a kind of auction, a ‘race to the bottom,’ in which governments perceive little 
practical alternative but to permit investing companies to engage in some 
measure of tax avoidance. 
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The indispensable role of corporate social responsibility  
 
In view of all this, it seems clear that a successful mix of policy initiatives to 
enhance corporate tax revenue in lower-income countries will need to include 
measures by which countries can to some extent be shielded from the 
pressure of tax competition. There really is only one way in which market 
competition, of which international tax competition is an example, can be 
mitigated, and that is by some degree of coordination among market 
competitors. Thus, for example, if lower-income governments could bargain 
with multinational groups as a bloc instead of individually, they could in 
theory obtain agreement on a level of corporate taxation that would optimally 
balance the competing goals of raising public revenue and maintaining a 
favourable environment for investment. Currently, there is little coordination 
of tax policies among lower-income countries, and, given the persistent 
pressure of tax competition, the degree of coordination that is possible is 
likely to remain limited for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, it seems 
unavoidable that lower-income countries will need to achieve some degree of 
additional policy coordination, especially on a regional basis, if they are to 
implement policies to better shield themselves from BEPS-style tax 
avoidance. 
 
Achieving this degree of enhanced market coordination is unlikely to occur 
without assistance and encouragement from other parties, in addition to 
lower-income countries. We see today the inevitable result of leaving lower-
income countries to counter the presence of tax competition without the 
support of outside intervention – the race to the bottom continues to operate 
largely unimpeded, leading to a very high volume of corporate income 
shifting. Better results will require more effective political counterweights to 
the forces of international tax competition. Those counterweights will need to 
be provided, not only by the world’s lower-income countries themselves, but 
also by other politically-empowered groups that are involved in the 
international tax lawmaking process. 
 
In other words, it seems inescapable that a substantial increase in corporate 
tax revenue for lower-income countries will require the political acquiescence, 
and even proactive political support, of multinational companies and the 
governments of their home countries. This will involve the willingness of 
business interests, acting in concert, to refrain from exercising the full 
measure of economic power that tax competition affords them in their 
dealings with lower-income countries. In doing so, companies will need to be 
motivated by both economic and normative goals. Essentially, a political 
consensus will need to be reached that current corporate tax laws and 
practices generate revenue at levels below those that can support socially 
desirable programmes for the alleviation of poverty. Companies would 
therefore acquiesce to measures to increase the tax bases of lower-income 
countries for the same reason that they cooperate in, for example, 
international efforts to prohibit child labour or harmful environmental 
practices. 
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As discussed later in this book, the idea that multinational companies should 
voluntarily acquiesce to laws that limit their exercise of economic power in 
the tax context is bound to elicit political opposition. Asking for companies’ 
partial voluntary forbearance from tax competition could be seen as 
interfering with global market mechanisms, which to some may be 
objectionable in itself. In addition, self-restraint by companies in the reduction 
of their tax liabilities could be seen as effecting a redistribution of income 
from the shareholders of multinational companies to populations of lower-
income countries, which may also meet opposition. Nevertheless, some 
degree of forbearance on the part of business interests, from taking full 
advantage of the opportunities presented by tax competition, seems to me 
indispensable if the performance of corporate tax in lower-income countries 
is to be meaningfully improved. 
 
The search for effective policy instruments 
 
I will defer detailed comment on the third question of specific corporate tax 
policy initiatives that might prove most useful to lower-income countries until 
forthcoming chapters have provided additional background. Even at this 
preliminary stage, however, one common-sense prerequisite for effective 
international tax policies can be mentioned. Above all else, successful policy 
initiatives must be far less complicated than those that currently govern the 
taxation of cross-border trade and investment around the world. Later 
chapters of this book will argue that today’s international laws have evolved 
over decades to generate, rather than reduce, complexity and unpredictability 
of application, and that this tendency has greatly impaired efforts to enforce 
the law and reform it legislatively in countries around the world. The undue 
complexity of current law is problematic in countries at all levels of economic 
development, but the difficulties are especially serious for lower-income 
countries that have limited resources to support both tax administration and 
legislative analysis. 
 
There will be limits to the simplification of international tax laws. The many 
different kinds of business transactions engaged in by multinational 
companies are often inherently complex, and therefore require a certain 
irreducible amount of complexity in tax laws. Moreover, the enactment of tax 
laws typically requires political compromise, and compromise often results in 
legal provisions that, because of ambiguity, can be difficult to apply. 
Nevertheless, current international tax rules have evolved towards 
obscurantism as an end in itself. A new generation of international tax laws 
should be judged in significant part by the simplicity and transparency of their 
structure. 
 
The main policy recommendations of this book will all involve simplification. 
For example, when examining the OECD’s recent BEPS process, I will focus 
on two initiatives that the OECD has either recommended or addressed 
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sympathetically in its work: proposals to simplify the manner in which tax 
authorities may apply transfer pricing rules,7 and rules placing quantitative 
limits on the amount of interest payments that corporations are permitted to 
deduct. These BEPS-related initiatives represent well-conceived attempts to 
reduce the complexity of current laws, and can, I think, offer lower-income 
countries meaningful practical benefits. 
 
I would extend the principle of simplification, however, beyond the policy 
initiatives that have figured during recent BEPS discussions. In particular, I 
explore in Chapter 5 the possibility of a relatively simple statutory ‘overlay’ 
that a country might place atop the more complex body of existing 
international tax rules, to ensure that reasonable minimum levels of tax 
revenue can be collected even from companies that engage heavily in profit 
shifting. Precedent for this kind of overlay is provided by ‘alternative 
corporate minimum taxes’, based on gross revenue (turnover) rather than net 
income, that some developing country governments have been applying for 
decades. Revenue yields from the minimum taxes could be calibrated to 
generate significant benefits to lower-income countries, while remaining 
below levels that would be expected to unduly discourage inbound 
investment. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the minimum-tax approach has potential 
drawbacks and limitations. Among other things, its use of gross revenue as a 
base poses some economic disadvantages, particularly in placing some 
taxpayers at risk of taxation even in the absence of profits. Also, 
implementation of the minimum tax could, like all potential measures that 
would increase tax revenue, be impeded by the pressure of tax competition. 
In addition, more must be learned about countries’ experience to date with 
alternative corporate minimum tax. Given that it has been in use for many 
years, surprisingly little research is available on how it has performed in 
practice. Nevertheless, under current political and economic circumstances, 
more widespread use of the tax may offer promise for lower-income 
countries, and it should be given careful consideration in international reform 
efforts. This book will suggest how minimum-tax proposals might be 
effectively researched, developed and possibly implemented by more 
countries on an internationally coordinated basis. 
 
This book’s intended audience 
 
I hope that this book will be useful to both specialists in the field of 
international taxation and, probably more importantly, non-specialists who 
are generally conversant with questions related to public finance and 
international development, but who are not familiar with the complexities of 
                                                 
7  Transfer pricing laws govern the question of whether the different companies within multinational groups 
deal fairly with one another (on an arm’s-length basis), so that income is not shifted artificially to affiliates in 
low-tax jurisdictions. Transfer pricing laws have become especially complicated over the years; they are 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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international tax laws and practice. The body of laws that protects the 
institution of base erosion and profit shifting has survived for more than 60 
years, in part because it is protected by an impressive layer of verbal 
camouflage. The legal guidelines and other official documents that 
memorialise the current system reach remarkable heights of verbosity and 
circumlocution, raising forbidding obstacles to newcomers who desire to 
approach the system and understand it. Professional insiders, therefore, 
have enjoyed a near monopoly on policymaking in the field of international 
corporate taxation. Non-initiates need to be able to see through the law’s 
protective covering of complexity and gain an understanding of how the tax 
laws function in practice, if the range of actors who can participate effectively 
in policymaking is to be widened. Therefore, although I try in this book to 
avoid oversimplification, I also try to avoid the unnecessary use of 
specialised terminology. I try to summarise legal rules and corporate 
business transactions in relatively straightforward language, with technical 
details consigned to footnotes. 
 
There is a limit, however, to the extent to which the discussion in this book 
can be simplified (at least by me). Even if spurious complexity is pushed 
aside, corporate income taxation, especially in the international setting, 
remains an intrinsically complicated topic. I have therefore found the effort to 
keep this book accessible to non-specialists challenging, and I am certain 
that at best I have succeeded only partially in doing so. Non-specialists (and 
maybe even specialists), therefore, are bound to encounter prickly tangles of 
verbal complexity in journeying through this book. For this I apologise, and 
hope that the rewards of the trip outweigh any pain experienced along the 
way. 
 
For those international tax specialists who might read this book, I hope that 
you will find the discussions stimulating and useful, even though much of the 
analysis that I present is likely to be familiar to you. We who make careers in 
the tax field tend to spend much of our time and intellectual energy probing 
the law’s minute complexities. We can focus so intently on relatively 
confined, technical topics that we risk losing sight of the overall political, 
economic and ethical matrix in which we work. I hope that even the most 
sophisticated international tax specialists will find this book helpful in gaining 
insights into the broad policy implications of the work that we do, and 
possibilities for applying our expertise in new and helpful ways. 
 
The forthcoming chapters 
 
This book develops its argument in five chapters that follow this introduction. 
 
Chapter 2, ‘The corporate tax dilemma faced by lower-income countries’, 
examines the basic economic dilemma faced by lower-income countries with 
respect to corporate tax, describing the trade-off between the conflicting 
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desires to enhance public revenue and encourage inbound investment. The 
chapter explores the central policy question raised by tax competition in 
lower-income countries – whether it can be said with confidence that 
increasing corporate tax revenue in lower-income countries is likely to 
promote social well-being. 
 
Chapter 2 also offers a historical overview of BEPS-style corporate tax 
planning, describing the origins of the phenomenon in the years following 
World War II and its remarkable durability over more than six decades. I 
argue that BEPS practices arose largely because they permitted both 
multinational companies and governments to afford companies de facto tax 
reductions on income derived from cross-border investment, but to do so in a 
relatively non-transparent manner. Chapter 2 offers what I hope will be a 
reasonably accessible, but not overly simplified, explanation of the 
mechanics of tax avoidance based on profit shifting, outlining four basic 
transactional formats that are present in virtually all BEPS-style planning 
structures. 
 
Chapter 3, ‘The historical evolution of base erosion and profit shifting’, 
surveys the various principles of international tax law that are intended 
ostensibly to control profit shifting among members of multinational groups. I 
argue that these measures have in fact evolved over decades, not primarily 
in order to curtail profit shifting, but instead in practice to insulate profit 
shifting from successful legal challenge by national tax administrations 
around the world. The discussion in Chapter 3 focuses in large measure on 
the arm’s-length principle that underlays international transfer pricing law, as 
that law is codified in guidelines issued by the OECD and followed by 
national governments around the world. Transfer pricing laws are supposed 
to provide tax authorities the means of limiting, to economically reasonable 
levels, the amount that companies can deduct for payments made to foreign 
affiliates. Chapter 3 argues, however, that today’s arm’s-length transfer 
pricing rules contain obvious conceptual and technical anomalies that limit 
their usefulness to tax authorities in many real-life tax audits. Chapter 3 
reviews the historical development of the OECD’s transfer pricing laws in an 
effort to pinpoint the political origin of those parts of the rules that are most 
problematic in developing countries. 
 
In addition to transfer pricing laws, Chapter 3 explores other areas of tax law 
that are important to an understanding of base erosion and profit shifting. 
These include ‘controlled foreign corporation’ (CFC) rules, by which 
governments have sometimes sought to prevent their home-based 
multinationals from availing themselves of profit-shifting avoidance 
techniques in countries where the multinationals conduct business. In theory, 
CFC rules offer a means by which the home countries of multinationals 
could, by coordinating their legislation, effectively end BEPS-style avoidance 
by prohibiting their multinationals from participating in it. Historically, though, 
there has been little, if any, collaboration among capital-exporting 
governments to prevent their multinationals from engaging in tax avoidance 
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around the world. Governments instead have feared that, by subjecting their 
home-based multinationals to effective CFC legislation, they might place 
those multinationals at a competitive disadvantage with respect to 
multinationals based in other countries, where effective CFC legislation is not 
in effect. As a result, although many countries maintain CFC rules on their 
statute books, the rules tend to be riddled with exceptions and other 
vulnerabilities, so that BEPS-style avoidance has been permitted to flourish 
despite the existence of these laws. 
 
Chapter 3 addresses a recently prominent variation of the CFC approach, the 
minimum tax on companies’ foreign income (the global intangible low-tax 
income (GILTI) tax), which is included in recently-enacted US tax reform 
legislation. Chapter 3 considers whether the enactment of the GILTI tax by 
the United States may trigger what amounts to an international revival of the 
CFC approach – this might reduce the pressure of international tax 
competition on lower-income countries to some extent. 
 
Chapter 3 also examines the remarkably permissive laws that for decades 
have permitted companies operating around the world to deduct from their 
taxable incomes interest that they pay on obviously tax-motivated loans 
extended by zero- and low-tax affiliates. Chapter 3 considers why historical 
attempts to control profit shifting through interest payments have generally 
failed, and examines recent efforts by some countries – which during the 
BEPS process were endorsed by the OECD – to adopt more effective 
legislation to limit loan-based corporate tax avoidance. 
 
Chapter 4, ‘The OECD’s BEPS project and lower-income countries’, builds 
on Chapter 3’s examination of the legal and political foundations of base 
erosion and profit shifting, assessing the extent to which the OECD’s recent 
BEPS efforts offer practical promise for the curtailment of corporate profit 
shifting from lower-income countries. I argue that, inevitably, the BEPS 
process was heavily affected by political pressure from various quarters to 
retain the historically evolved structure of international corporate tax law. The 
BEPS project has therefore refrained from recommending fundamental 
revision of the legal principles that currently govern international corporate 
taxation. In particular, while the OECD has devoted considerable critical 
attention to the difficulties posed historically by arm’s-length transfer pricing 
laws, recommendations in the BEPS reports leave some of the most 
important problems of current law unaddressed. 
 
I nevertheless argue in Chapter 4 that the BEPS project has generated a 
number of policy recommendations that offer the prospect of significant 
improvement in the generation of corporate tax revenue in lower-income 
countries. First, in an effort to reduce profit shifting through the payment of 
interest on loans from affiliates, the OECD has recommended that countries 
adopt rules disallowing interest deductions that exceed a specified 
percentage of the borrowing company’s net income. A number of relatively 
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wealthy countries have already adopted limitations of this kind – they are 
relatively simple to administer, and probably could lead to significant revenue 
gains in lower-income countries that are willing to adopt them. In addition, 
notwithstanding the BEPS reports’ hesitancy in addressing some central 
shortcomings of transfer pricing laws, I believe that plans of the OECD and 
other donor groups to provide technical assistance in simplifying the 
administration of transfer pricing rules – particularly the transactional net 
margin method under existing OECD guidelines – offer some practical 
benefits for lower-income countries and should be pursued. Similarly, I argue, 
the plans of the OECD and other organisations to engage in capacity building 
in the area of transfer pricing administration, while limited in their potential 
effect by remaining deficiencies in underlying laws, nevertheless offer 
promise for net benefits in lower-income countries and should be pursued. 
 
I also argue in Chapter 4 that the OECD’s recommendations for improving 
the performance of international tax treaties offer limited, but significant, 
potential benefits to lower-income countries. 
 
Finally in Chapter 4, I consider the extent to which various developments 
related to but not part of the BEPS process might reduce demand for BEPS-
style tax planning among multinational groups, thereby reducing the pressure 
of tax competition on lower-income countries. These developments include 
growing concerns by multinational companies regarding the reputational 
effects of BEPS-style tax planning, actions within the European Union to limit 
member countries’ participation in tax planning structures, and the recently 
enacted GILTI tax in the US, which may reduce US groups’ tax benefits from 
overseas profit-shifting arrangements. 
 
Chapter 5, ‘A corporate tax policy agenda for lower-income countries’, seeks 
to build on the analysis in prior chapters by suggesting a programme of 
potentially useful policy instruments for lower-income countries. My 
recommendations are based on the overall assessment that the problem of 
profit shifting is extraordinarily complicated, politically as well as technically. 
Meaningful progress against it is likely to arise from a combination of 
incremental legal reforms, rather than a ‘big fix’ consisting of a fundamental 
redesign of the prevailing system of international tax laws. In accordance with 
this view, Chapter 5 considers how countries might best implement those of 
the OECD’s recommended initiatives that are discussed in Chapter 4: (i) 
limitations on interest deductions; (ii) simplification of transfer pricing 
methods; (iii) capacity building, mainly in the area of enforcing transfer 
pricing; and (iv) the adjustment of national policies relating to income tax 
treaties. 
 
In addition, Chapter 5 considers the potential benefits and limitations of the 
use, by additional countries, of an alternative corporate minimum tax (ACMT) 
applied at a low rate (e.g. 1%) applied to a taxpayer’s gross revenue 
(turnover), rather than its net income. Because no deductions are allowed 
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under a turnover-based tax, it would be immune from avoidance through 
BEPS-style deductible payments of any kind, including royalties and service 
fees, and also interest. A turnover-based ACMT should also be effective 
against tax planning based on the undervaluation of products shipped from a 
country, including natural resource and agricultural products. Further, the 
relative simplicity of a minimum tax suggests that it might be well-suited to 
coordinated implementation among groups of countries, thereby to some 
extent relieving pressure from tax competition. 
 
Chapter 5 concludes by offering brief comments on the taxation of some 
industries that are often of particular importance to the economies of lower-
income countries. These include natural resource extraction, electronic 
commerce, mobile telecommunications, and banking and insurance. There 
has been a great deal of specialised study of taxation of these industries, and 
this book cannot attempt to discuss their taxation in detail. Nevertheless, 
Chapter 5 offers a brief explanation of the special problems that taxation of 
these industries presents, as well as ways that have been considered to 
alleviate these problems. 
 
Chapter 6, ‘BEPS in lower-income countries: a social responsibility 
perspective’, concludes this book with observations on the possibility of 
generating the political will among various interested actors that will be 
needed to implement even limited measures to curtail profit shifting as it 
currently affects lower-income countries. Today’s virtually universal use of 
BEPS-style tax planning among multinational companies reflects the 
operation over many decades of two mutually reinforcing kinds of competition 
– competition among countries to attract business investment, and 
competition among multinational businesses to minimise their tax burden in 
countries where they operate. Together, these two kinds of competition have 
constrained corporate tax receipts in lower-income countries at levels that 
seem significantly lower than would be socially optimal. 
 
In light of the persistence of both kinds of competition, it seems inevitable 
that meaningful enhancements of corporate tax revenue in lower-income 
countries will require a supportive consensus among the major stakeholders 
in the global corporate tax system. These include businesses and business 
organisations, the national governments of both industrialised and developing 
countries, intergovernmental organisations like the OECD, IMF, World Bank 
and United Nations, and regional associations of governments of developing 
countries. What is needed, essentially, is an extension of the recent BEPS 
negotiations, but with a focus specifically on the needs of lower-income 
countries. 
 
Chapter 6 considers, from an ethical perspective, both the desirability of this 
kind of effort, and the likelihood that support for it can be gathered from both 
the governmental and private sector actors who would need to implement it. 
Does there exist a moral duty to assist lower-income countries in improving 
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the performance of their corporate tax systems, even at the financial expense 
of both the governments of other countries and multinational companies 
themselves? Further, if a duty of this kind exists, who specifically bears the 
responsibility for seeking to implement it, and in what ways? No piece of 
writing, including this book, can pretend to answer questions like these 
definitively, or to all readers’ satisfaction. Nevertheless, I hope that the 
observations offered in Chapter 6 will prove helpful to those who seek to 
build a pragmatic policy framework for improving the performance of 
corporate income taxation in lower-income countries. 
  
  15 
Chapter 2 Poverty, tax competition and  
base erosion  
 
 
 
The corporate tax dilemma faced by lower-income countries  
 
The need for public revenue 
 
This book is, at its heart, about the alleviation of poverty. The last 20 years 
have seen a reduction of poverty in many areas of the world.8 Despite this 
improvement, however, living conditions for millions of people in the world fall 
short of minimally-acceptable levels of dignity and personal security. As of 
2015, approximately 700 million people, about 10 per cent of the world’s 
population, were trying to live on less than the equivalent of $1.90 per day, 
which is the World Bank’s indicator of extreme poverty. 
 
High levels of poverty are reflected in dramatic differences in health and 
other social indicators between lower-income and wealthier countries. In 
Australia, for example, average life expectancy at birth is 82.8 years; in 
Malawi it is 58.3 years.9 In Equatorial Guinea, 342 women die in childbirth for 
every 100,000 births; in France the comparable number is 8. In Myanmar, 50 
of every 1,000 children who are born die by the age of 5; in Norway the 
mortality rate for children under age 5 is 2.6 per 1,000. The disparities also 
extend to education, even at the most basic level. For example, in Japan, as 
of 2013, virtually all primary-school-aged children were enrolled in school; in 
West and Central Africa, about 25 per cent were not.10  
 
This book is motivated by the inescapable fact that lower-income countries 
will need to invest heavily in public infrastructure – in schools, hospitals and 
clinics, roads, water and sanitation systems, electricity-generating facilities, 
police, fire and ambulance departments, and many other kinds of facilities – if 
the lower-income residents of those countries are to have hope for dignified 
and reasonably secure lives. Moreover, the skilled personnel needed to staff 
this infrastructure will need to be trained and compensated. Funding these 
needs will require the governments of lower-income countries to generate 
substantially more public revenue.
                                                 
8  See generally World Bank Group and IMF (2016), which is the source of statistics in this paragraph. 
9  The health statistics in this and the following sentence are from World Health Organization (2017). 
10  Data from UNICEF (2018). 
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Special reliance of lower-income countries on corporate tax revenue 
 
Lower-income countries, however, are typically far more limited in their ability 
to raise government revenue than the world’s wealthier countries.11 The bulk 
of government revenue in wealthier countries comes from broadly applied 
forms of personal taxation, including personal income tax and consumption 
taxes like value added tax (VAT). In poorer countries, however, low per 
capita earnings in themselves limit the amount of revenue potentially 
available from personal income and consumption taxes. Moreover, a large 
proportion of economic activity tends to be informal in lower-income 
countries, in the sense that many business transactions are conducted in 
untraceable cash, and many employment arrangements are not formally 
documented.12 The combination of low per capita income and economic 
informality limits the ability of many developing countries to raise revenue 
from ‘workhorse’ taxes like personal income tax and VAT. 
In addition to personal income and consumption taxes, corporate income tax 
exists in virtually every country in the world. Over time, corporate income tax 
has fallen out of favour politically in many of the world’s wealthy countries. 
Many believe that, as a general matter, taxes on corporate income unduly 
discourage business investment and therefore economic growth. This 
concern has been magnified by the increase in the mobility of capital in 
recent decades, causing countries at all levels of economic development to 
engage in tax competition. In wealthier countries, the percentage of total 
government revenue raised by corporate tax is accordingly relatively low. 
Lower-income countries, however, generally have not been able to reduce 
the relative importance of corporate income tax in their fiscal systems. As of 
2012, the IMF estimated that in the world’s high-income countries corporate 
tax revenue accounted for slightly over 8 per cent of total government 
revenue, not including social contributions, whereas in both low- and lower-
middle-income countries reliance on corporate taxation was about twice as 
high, at approximately 16 per cent of total government revenue less social 
contributions (IMF 2014: 7).  
 
What level of corporate taxation is desirable for lower-income 
countries? 
 
Despite the relatively large role that corporate income tax plays in their fiscal 
systems, lower-income countries face strong economic pressure to minimise 
the tax burdens they impose on corporations. Chronically high levels of 
unemployment, as well as other factors like the inability to offer investors the 
attractions of a trained workforce and well-developed physical infrastructure 
like roads and other transportation facilities, typically place pressure on 
                                                 
11  See generally IMF (2014: 7). 
12  A high rate of subsistence agriculture, which does not generate taxable cash flows, contributes to the large 
proportion of informality in the economies of poorer countries. See, e.g., Bird (2012: 8). 
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lower-income countries to sacrifice potential corporate tax revenue in order to 
attract foreign direct investment.13 The tension between (i) the apparent need 
for lower-income governments to rely heavily on corporate income tax for the 
generation of revenue, and (ii) the pressure on lower-income governments to 
limit corporate tax burdens in order to encourage investment and economic 
growth, stands at the heart of the unresolved problem of BEPS-style tax 
avoidance that this book seeks to explore. How vigorously should the 
government of a lower-income country seek to increase tax revenue by 
removing opportunities for companies to benefit from tax planning, if one of 
the possible effects of doing so is a reduction in foreign direct investment? 
 
Development economists generally approach this question in two conceptual 
stages. First, they ask whether a lower-income country’s aggregate revenue 
– revenue from all sources of taxation, including corporate income tax – is 
too low. That is, does the revenue generated by a country appear too low to 
finance the minimum level of public infrastructure and public services needed 
to give the country’s residents a realistic promise of eliminating extreme 
poverty and creating opportunities for dignified and secure lives? 
 
Economists try to get some sense of the answer by comparing the ratio of tax 
revenue to the overall size of the economy (measured by gross domestic 
product (GDP)) in countries at different levels of economic development. As 
of 2015, the median ratio of tax-revenue-to-GDP was 14 per cent in low-
income countries, 17 per cent in lower-middle-income countries, 21 per cent 
in upper-middle-income countries, and 32 per cent in high-income 
countries.14 It is clear that tax revenue per capita in lower-income countries 
tends to be far below the level in wealthier countries. These numbers, 
coupled with the obviously inadequate level of public infrastructure in the 
poorest countries, lead many development economists to conclude that 
significant increases in the ratio of tax-to-GDP in lower-income countries 
would make possible benefits in social well-being.15  
 
Of course, raising additional revenue will not in itself generate greater social 
well-being. It will also be necessary to translate the additional revenue into 
high quality social infrastructure, which means avoiding misappropriation 
through, for example, corruption and governmental inefficiency.16 Thus, 
achieving the goal of substantially enhanced social welfare in lower-income 
countries will require initiatives in areas of governmental function in addition 
to raising revenue. Nevertheless, even if not sufficient in themselves to 
                                                 
13  Foreign direct investment (FDI) refers to cross-border investments representing controlling interests in 
business operations, such as the formation by a multinational company of a new subsidiary to be active in a 
country, or the acquisition of an ongoing business by merger or cash acquisition. FDI is distinguished from 
portfolio investment, meaning the acquisition by investors of non-controlling (minority) interests in business 
operations. See Investopedia, ‘Foreign Direct Investment — FDI’. 
14  Source: ICTD/UNU-WIDER, Government Revenue Dataset (Nov. 2017). The author is grateful to Kyle 
McNabb of UNU-WIDER for compiling the data reported in the text. 
15  See generally IMF (2011). 
16  See, e.g., Besley and Persson (2014). 
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promote welfare gains in lower-income countries, additional tax revenue 
seems to be a prerequisite for lower-income governments to achieve 
significant alleviation of poverty within their jurisdiction. Provided it is 
recognised that additional policy initiatives are also required for the alleviation 
of poverty, especially in the area of governance, it seems right to conclude 
that increasing government revenue represents a desirable and even urgent 
policy goal for lower-income countries. 
 
The next question is the extent to which the government of a particular lower-
income country would be rational in seeking enhanced revenue from 
corporate income tax as opposed to other forms of taxation. For purposes of 
analysis, it is useful first to consider this question on the concededly 
unrealistic assumption that the country is not subject to forces of tax 
competition – that is, potential inbound investors are not able to redirect their 
investments to other countries that might be able to offer a more attractive 
tax environment. 
 
In the absence of tax competition, a rational government will choose to 
impose corporate income taxes up to the point at which the perceived social 
benefits from additional revenue collected (in terms of ability to meet social 
needs within a country) just balances the social detriment to the country from 
expected suppression of inbound investment due to an additional increment 
of corporate taxation. This level of corporate taxation can be described as the 
level that would be optimal for the country in the absence of tax 
competition.17 The notion of an optimal level of taxation is largely theoretical 
– there is, of course, no exact way in which a government can determine its 
optimal level of corporate taxation. Both the social benefit and social harm 
from a given level of taxation cannot be qualified precisely, a great deal of 
subjectivity is involved, and the views of political actors will differ. 
Nevertheless, despite the practical limitations, all rational governments must 
make at least an implicit comparison between social benefits and costs when 
deciding the level at which to impose corporate income tax (or any other kind 
of taxation). 
 
In weighing the social costs and benefits of corporate income taxation, it is 
important to bear in mind that all forms of taxation, including personal income 
and consumption as well as corporate taxation, impose costs on society 
through the distortion of economic activity. For example, personal income 
taxes, and even to some extent consumption taxes, suppress both work 
effort and savings in an economy. It is often argued, however, that corporate 
income tax imposes more serious economic distortions than most other kinds 
of taxes. Corporate income tax is imposed entirely on income from capital 
investment, whereas most other forms of taxation, like personal income and 
                                                 
17  The study of the extent to which it is rational for governments to attempt to raise revenue from different 
kinds of taxation is called optimal tax theory, and there is an extensive literature on the topic. Important 
statements of the theory include Boadway and Keen (1993); and Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). 
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consumption taxation, are imposed largely on income derived from 
individuals’ labour. Many economists believe that if corporate tax burdens are 
increased corporations are likely to cut back on their level of investment to a 
greater extent than individuals are likely to reduce their labour effort if 
personal income and consumption taxes are increased. Therefore, it is often 
argued that corporate income taxation, by the suppression of investment and 
economic growth, imposes more serious welfare costs than other commonly 
used forms of taxation, including personal income and consumption taxation. 
 
The literature on the extent, if any, to which corporate income taxation in fact 
constricts investment is very extensive, and there is legitimate room for 
disagreement among scholars as to its interpretation.18 I can offer no 
resolution of this longstanding debate. Leaving aside disagreements over the 
interpretation of data, however, my professional experience provides 
anecdotal reason to believe that, even aside from the influence of tax 
competition, corporate income taxation imposed by a country generally does 
reduce capital investment into that country, probably to a significant extent. 
Companies typically base investment decisions on required threshold rates of 
return. That is, a company evaluates whether the after-tax rate of return from 
an investment is likely to exceed a minimum threshold level, based on the 
company’s cost of capital and the risk that the company perceives in the 
investment.19 Because imposition of corporate income tax lowers companies’ 
anticipated after-tax rates of return, it seems likely that the tax prevents 
otherwise profitable investments from being made in at least some cases. 
 
Corporate income taxation does not suppress investment in all 
circumstances, or equally for different kinds of companies. Some businesses, 
particularly those owning high-value intangible property like patents, 
copyrights and trademarks, enjoy unusually high levels of profitability (which 
economists call rent or quasi-rent) for extended periods of time. These 
businesses will be less likely to reduce investment in response to corporate 
tax increases than businesses earning only normal levels of profit. Even the 
most highly profitable businesses, however, will base their new investment 
decisions on expected after-tax rates of return, and there may be levels of 
corporate tax at which they will decline to invest. Therefore, I think it 
reasonable to assume that as a general matter there is some inverse 
relationship between the effective corporate tax rate imposed by a country 
and demand for inbound investment into that country. 
                                                 
18  For analyses with extensive collections of citations, see, e.g., Djankov et al. (2010); and Department of 
Finance, Government of Ireland (2014). 
19  For example, a company might consider opening a new manufacturing plant. The company estimates, that 
given the risk of the investment as well as the company’s cost of raising funds, the factory will need to 
generate after-tax profit at the rate of at least 11% per year over the factory’s useful life in order to represent 
a prudent investment. The company projects that the factory will generate a before-tax return of 15% per 
year. If the company’s effective corporate income tax rate is 20%, the anticipated after-tax rate of return will 
be 0.80 x 15%, or 12%, and the company will decide to proceed with the envisioned investment. If, 
however, the effective corporate income tax rate is increased to 30%, then the company’s anticipated after-
tax return from building the factory will be 0.70 x 15%, or 10.5%. Because this is below the company’s 
threshold anticipated return, the investment will not be made. 
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Economists have sought to approximate from empirical data the overall 
social cost of suppression of capital investment that results from corporate 
income tax. The analysis involves too many variables for results to be 
estimated with any real degree of confidence.20 Nevertheless, the notion that 
corporate income taxation imposes significant costs in terms of social 
welfare, by suppressing demand for corporate investment and therefore 
constraining employment and economic growth, seems reasonably well 
grounded. 
 
Of course, the effect on demand for capital investment is not the only 
criterion on which corporate income tax should be compared with other 
available forms of taxation. For well over a century, proponents and 
opponents of corporate income taxation have differed as to the desirability of 
the tax according to several additional criteria.21  
Perhaps most importantly, it is often argued that corporate income tax brings 
additional fairness (progressivity) to a country’s tax system, since the burden 
of the tax appears to be borne by the owners of corporate shares, who are 
likely to fall among the wealthiest persons in society. This argument may 
have special weight in the context of cross-border investment by 
multinationals in lower-income countries, since the shareholders who are 
taxed are likely to reside abroad, in countries wealthier than that in which the 
investment is being made. Some therefore view corporate income tax as 
desirable in reducing economic inequality on a global scale. 
 
As an empirical matter, the distribution of the economic burden of corporate 
income taxation (its incidence), like so much else about corporate tax, is 
uncertain.22 It seems clear that corporate shareholders bear a substantial 
part of the tax’s burden; but workers also bear part of the burden because of 
the tax’s suppression of capital investment and hence employment. 
Measurements of the relative extent to which the burden is shared between 
capital and labour, however, are obstructed by the same difficulties 
encountered in measuring the tax’s effects on demand for capital investment. 
Indeed, the debates over the incidence of corporate tax, and the extent to 
which the tax suppresses capital investment, are largely co-extensive. 
Therefore, definitive answers to questions concerning the incidence of 
corporate tax have long been elusive and will probably remain so. 
 
                                                 
20  For insights into the complexity of seeking to measure welfare costs of taxation, see, e.g., Gravelle (2014) 
and Hines (2007). 
21  Arguments for and against corporate income taxation on various grounds have been debated especially 
intensively in the United States, where the origins of the corporate tax, in the late 1800s and early 1900s, 
involved deep disagreement over fundamental political ideologies. See generally Kornhauser (1990); and 
Mehrota (2010). See also Avi-Yonah (2004). 
22  See, e.g., Clausing (2012); Gentry (2007); Harberger (1962). 
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Another factor to be weighed in determining a desirable level of corporate 
income taxation in lower-income countries is the social value to be placed on 
encouraging foreign direct investment. On one hand, the persistence of 
extreme poverty in lower-income countries entails low levels of productive 
capital in those countries, resulting in a paucity of opportunities for 
employment. Encouraging inbound investment, in part through limiting 
corporate income tax burdens, would therefore seem to be a logical 
component of a national development policy. Against this, however, some 
have argued that FDI sometimes inflicts net social damage on a country. 
Among the concerns raised have been that FDI can: (i) confer excessive 
political influence on investing companies, leading, for example, to lax labour 
and environmental regulation; (ii) create opportunities for official corruption; 
and (iii) inhibit the growth of (crowd out) locally-owned businesses. These 
and other asserted drawbacks of FDI have been, and are likely to remain, the 
subject of extensive debate.23 Despite the valid concerns regarding negative 
spillover effects of inbound investment, however, I believe the probable view 
among most residents of lower-income countries, including most political 
leaders in those countries, is that overall inbound investment is desirable in 
providing employment and increased per capita income. Certainly, most 
political leaders in lower-income countries would express this sentiment, and 
governments generally seem to make policy decisions in keeping with a 
perception of net social benefit from incremental inbound investment. 
 
Many additional factors are relevant in seeking to judge a country’s optimal 
rate of corporate taxation (continuing to leave the factor of tax competition 
out of the analysis for now). These include: (i) the feasibility of increasing 
yields from sources other than corporate taxation, like personal income and 
consumption taxes; (ii) whether a country offers special advantages to 
potential investors, like large consumer markets or valuable mineral deposits, 
which might reduce the dampening effect of corporate taxation on inbound 
investment; (iii) whether a country possesses the administrative capacity to 
translate additional tax revenue into socially-beneficial expenditure; and (iv) 
the extent to which a country is able to manage external costs, like 
environmental damage, from the kind of investment that will be made. There 
is, of course, no quantitatively precise way for the necessary balancing to be 
made – a great deal of subjective judgement is involved. Leaving aside the 
factor of tax competition, conceptually the point is that a rational country 
would make a judgement on the optimal level of corporate taxation to impose 
through its political system. This would be based (broadly speaking) on 
weighing the social value of revenue to be collected under corporate income 
tax against the social cost of the tax’s anticipated inhibition of investment. 
 
 
 
                                                 
23  For a useful collection of essays on this topic, see Moran et al. (2005). See also, e.g., Brauner (2013: 25); 
Dagan (2013: 57); and Almfraji and Almsafir (2014). 
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The central role of tax competition 
 
In all countries of the world, even the wealthiest, the level of revenue from 
corporate income tax is almost certainly lower than the country’s government 
would find optimal in a world without tax competition. In recent decades, 
improvements in communications and transportation technology, and 
reductions in political obstacles like currency exchange controls and 
restrictions on foreign ownership of local assets, have combined to 
dramatically ease the process of cross-border investment. Today, 
multinational companies have substantial latitude in choosing in which 
country to locate a project or venture. This includes shopping among 
potential host countries for the most attractive total investment package, one 
important element of which will be the tax regime that is offered. 
 
Investors do not have the opportunity to shop among countries in every 
instance, since sometimes circumstances dictate that an investment be made 
in a particular place. A country might have uniquely valuable and accessible 
deposits of a mineral that the investor seeks to exploit, or may be so 
populous that a seller of consumer products has little practical choice but to 
establish distribution operations within the country. Situations in which a 
company can only make an envisioned investment in one country are 
relatively unusual. For example, although possessing rich natural resource 
endowments does seem to provide governments with some insulation from 
tax competition,24 natural resource developers cannot exploit all opportunities 
simultaneously, and governments may be eager to provide natural resource 
companies with tax or other financial incentives to encourage the prompt 
exploitation of local deposits. Similarly, companies selling consumer products 
need to prioritise among various available markets in which to establish 
distribution networks, and tax incentives might well influence the choice of 
which markets to enter first. Tax competition seems to play a strong role in 
virtually all negotiations between investing companies and the governments 
of potential host countries. Empirical evidence strongly supports that tax 
competition is an important influence on government policymaking 
throughout the world.25  
 
This is not to suggest that relative tax burdens are the only factor that 
companies consider in deciding where to locate investments. A large variety 
of other factors are also influential, including the presence of infrastructure in 
a country, like roads, ports, communications facilities, and safety and law 
enforcement resources; political stability, including the reliability of legal 
                                                 
24  See Mansour and Swistak (2017) (observing based on the limited available empirical data that tax 
competition probably plays a relatively limited role in extractive industries, but that it nevertheless is a factor 
relevant to sound policymaking). It is my personal impression that tax competition plays an important role in 
circumstances involving natural resource deposits of relatively ordinary size and profit potential, like iron ore 
deposits in some parts of the world, although it is of probably limited significance in connection with deposits 
of unique or nearly unique potential profit potential, like the North Sea oilfields in the 1970s. 
25  See, e.g., Devereux et al. (2008); and Crivelli et al. (2015). 
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process; the availability of a trained workforce; and proximity to intended 
markets. Nevertheless, the different tax regimes that countries offer can also 
be an influential factor, and when countries are roughly similar with respect to 
the non-tax advantages they offer investors, differences in tax regime might 
well determine a company’s choice of where to locate a proposed 
investment. 
 
The presence of tax competition fundamentally alters a host government’s 
estimation of the most desirable effective tax rate to offer potential inbound 
investors. In the presence of tax competition, a government does not 
possess the market power to insist upon a level of taxation that reaches an 
optimal balance among competing factors, like the social desirability of 
enhanced government revenue and the social cost of deterring investment. 
Instead, an investor may explicitly or implicitly insist upon a lower effective 
rate of taxation, on threat of redirecting the proposed investment to another 
country. What amounts to an auction – a race to the bottom – tends to ensue, 
in which the winning government in one way or another offers the investor a 
corporate tax rate of zero or near-zero (and might sweeten the pot with other 
incentives, like exemption from customs duties on imported supplies). As 
discussed below, the incentives offered might involve explicit exemptions 
from taxation, or tacit assurances that the government will in practice tolerate 
a substantial reduction of the investor’s tax burden through the kind of base 
erosion and profit shifting on which this book focuses. Whichever route to 
effective exemption the government chooses, the bottom line is that tax 
competition is likely to greatly reduce the burden of corporate tax on 
companies engaged in foreign direct investment, below the level that would 
appear socially optimal in the absence of tax competition. 
 
The picture of an inevitable race to the bottom is, to some extent, overly 
simplified. Not all countries are equally vulnerable to international tax 
competition.26 A country that offers investors uniquely attractive geophysical 
advantages – for example, especially promising natural resource deposits or 
unusually favourable natural harbours – may have the economic power to 
refrain from pursing the race all the way to the bottom. Similarly, if a country 
already has developed infrastructure that offers advantages to investing 
businesses, such as a well-educated workforce, efficient transportation 
facilities and electricity-generating capacity, the country may have sufficient 
bargaining power to insist on an effective corporate income tax rate that is 
significantly higher than zero. In addition – and this factor is especially 
important for populous countries like India, China, Indonesia and Brazil – the 
presence of a large domestic consumer market might enable some countries 
to insist on positive corporate income tax rates on investment for companies 
that seek to exploit the local market. 
 
                                                 
26  Useful discussions of the factors influencing countries’ differing degrees of vulnerability to tax competition 
include Madies and Dethier (2012); and Crivelli et al. (2015). 
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Even when countries do not enjoy this kind of bargaining advantage, it is 
likely that the race to the bottom will not result in zero effective tax rates for 
foreign investors. In order to protect their reputation for social responsibility, 
or perhaps to promote comity with host governments, companies might not 
demand full exemption from taxation. Investors may accept explicit 
exemptions that are partial rather than complete, or companies engaging 
heavily in BEPS-style tax planning may refrain from reporting zero income on 
their corporate returns, even though they probably could prevail in that 
position under applicable law. In fact, tax competition does not appear to 
reduce any country’s corporate tax collection all the way to zero. 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that tax competition significantly limits the ability 
of governments around the world to levy corporate income taxes. Owing 
largely to their limited existing infrastructure to support the activities of 
inbound investors, lower-income countries are especially vulnerable to the 
pressure of international tax competition.27  
 
To summarise, while its effects will vary among countries and among 
different kinds of business investment, international tax competition seems 
almost certain to result in lower levels of corporate income tax revenue than 
governments would find socially optimal in the absence of tax competition. 
Therefore, policies that enable lower-income countries to increase corporate 
tax revenue to (or closer to) the levels that would prevail in the absence of 
tax competition should increase social well-being in the world’s poorest 
countries. The reduction of corporate income tax avoidance as it currently 
affects lower-income countries therefore should be seen as a desirable policy 
goal – and, given the persistence of extreme poverty in these countries, as a 
humanitarian imperative. This is not to say that curtailing corporate tax 
avoidance can in itself reduce poverty in a country – but it could serve as an 
important step in that direction.28  
 
The historical origins of BEPS-style corporate tax avoidance 
 
Introduction 
International tax competition is not a new phenomenon.29 On the contrary, it 
has strongly affected governmental policies, in countries at all levels of 
                                                 
27  Although this book is concerned particularly with the effects of tax competition in lower-income countries, it 
is important to recognise that tax competition has to varying degrees affected public revenue in countries of 
all levels of economic development, and has important social and political implications for every country. 
See especially Avi-Yonah (2000).In addition to Professor Avi-Yonah’s contribution, other thoughtful 
reflections on the nature and social consequences of international tax competition include Roin (2000); 
Dietsch (2015); Dagan (2018); and Faulhaber (2018). 
28  An important point should be raised to put the discussion in this book in proper perspective. Although this 
book urges continuing and serious efforts to improve the performance of corporate income tax in lower-
income countries, improvements to corporate taxation represent only one of many policy initiatives, in and 
outside the field of taxation, that are needed to assist lower-income countries in mobilising revenue. The 
concentration in recent years on the BEPS problem, including the attention paid in this book, should not be 
permitted to divert policymakers from promising initiatives outside the area of corporate taxation. See, e.g., 
Forstater (2018); Moore and Prichard (2017); and Durst (2015). 
29  It is concededly anachronistic to use ‘BEPS-style’ in a discussion of events occurring in the immediate 
aftermath of World War II, as base erosion and profit shifting and BEPS did not come into common usage 
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economic development, from at least the start of the flowering of cross-
border investment after the end of the Second World War. As amplified 
below, this book and its policy recommendations are based on the premise 
that governments have sought to encourage inbound investment through two 
parallel kinds of tax policy since the end of the Second World War. First, 
governments have offered inbound investors numerous kinds of explicit tax 
exemptions, for example tax holidays that exempt income from new inbound 
investments for a specified number of years. Explicit exemptions typically are 
authorised by statute, and governments generally grant them on a 
discretionary basis to multinational groups that apply for the exemptions on a 
project-by-project basis. 
 
In addition, very soon after the War, multinational corporations began to use 
global tax avoidance structures centred on the use of subsidiaries in zero- 
and low-tax countries, in formats virtually identical to those used in BEPS 
transactions today, to reduce the global corporate tax burden on their 
growing international operations. As discussed in Chapter 3, governments of 
the countries from which income was being shifted might have raised various 
legal arguments against the new planning structures. In the immediate post-
War decades, however, few if any host governments of cross-border 
investment would have felt much incentive to challenge companies’ use of 
the new tax-planning structures. On the contrary, countries typically saw 
themselves as competing with one another for foreign direct investment, and 
many were already offering investing companies explicit tax exemptions. By 
refraining from serious challenges to companies’ profit-shifting techniques, 
host countries could effectively expand the scope of tax incentives offered 
investors without the formal legislative action and possible political 
controversy entailed in offering additional explicit tax exemptions. I believe 
that in this manner tacit policies were adopted in many countries to refrain 
from seriously challenging companies’ tax avoidance arrangements.30  
 
Explicit tax exemptions 
 
Since the flowering of cross-border investment that began after the Second 
World War and continues today, countries at all levels of economic 
development have offered corporations explicit exemptions from taxation to 
                                                 
until the initiation of the OECD’s BEPS work after the 2008 financial crisis. I nevertheless use BEPS and 
BEPS-style even in historical discussions, in part to emphasise the remarkably long continuity of the kind of 
tax planning structures that the world continues to try to address. 
30  Other commentaries have observed that the tacit acceptance of governments hosting foreign direct 
investment has been necessary for the perpetuation of BEPS-style tax avoidance. These include Roin 
(2000: 600); Faulhaber (2018: 318) (‘Countries are complicit in tax avoidance schemes …’); Altshuler and 
Grubert (2005) passim. Ault and Arnold (2017: 1, 47 say in this regard: 
Tax incentives for foreign investment can be divided into two major categories: 
(a) Incentives that directly reduce the cost to a non-resident of an investment in the source country (for 
example, a tax holiday or reduced tax rates); and 
(b) Incentives that indirectly reduce the cost to a non-resident of an investment in the source country (for 
example, the lax enforcement of thin capitalisation or transfer pricing rules by the source country). 
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incentivise investment.31 These tax exemptions have taken many different 
forms.32 An especially common form have been tax holidays, which generally 
are established by statute in developing countries. Under a tax holiday, 
investors generally apply to a governmental administrative body for 
exemptions on a project-by-project basis. Holidays are granted for a specified 
period (e.g. 15 years), although extensions of holidays are not unknown. 
Other common forms of explicit tax incentives include exemptions for 
investment in a particular geographic area of a country, and the allowance of 
generous tax write-offs for investment in plant and equipment. The demand 
of inbound investors for explicit tax exemptions has seemed unlimited over 
the past 60 years, and their growth appears to have accelerated in recent 
decades.33  
 
Commentators sometimes criticise explicit tax incentives because they often 
seem wasted on inbound investments that would have been made even if the 
incentives had not been provided. In other words, incentives often seem to 
offer investors the prospect of after-tax returns that are higher than the 
threshold returns that would be necessary to justify a proposed investment. 
This should not be surprising, however, because governments perceiving 
severe pressure of tax competition can be expected to offer tax incentives 
that are more powerful than would be needed in the absence of tax 
competition. In the presence of tax competition it can be rational for a 
government to offer incentives designed to provide after-tax returns 
substantially higher than investors’ threshold levels.  
 
In the early post-War decades, policymakers and researchers seem to have 
directed little criticism towards countries’, including developing countries’, use 
of explicit tax incentives to attract cross-border investment. Instead, it seems 
generally to have been assumed that the offering of incentives represented a 
rational means of promoting social welfare through economic growth. Indeed, 
the dominant question among governments of the world’s wealthier countries 
seems not to have been whether to discourage developing countries from 
offering tax incentives, but whether the wealthier countries should actively 
promote the practice by granting certain tax credits (tax-sparing credits) to 
their home-based multinationals that had availed themselves of explicit tax 
exemptions in developing countries.34 Most of the world’s wealthier countries 
                                                 
31  A discussion of the early use of tax incentives by developing countries is provided in Heller and Kauffman 
(1963). 
32  Recent comprehensive explanations of the various kinds of explicit tax incentives that countries offer are 
provided by Zolt (2017: 523-570) and Tavares-Lehman (2016: 17, 25-27). 
33  See James (2016: 153-176); IMF et al. (2015: 8). 
34  Based on governmental policies developed in the UK in the 1950s, a number of governments of wealthy 
countries began offering tax sparing credits to their home-based multinationals that benefited from tax 
exemptions in developing countries. Under a tax-sparing credit regime, multinationals that avoided paying 
tax on income earned in a developing country through a tax holiday or other incentive could, when sending 
the income back to the home country (i.e. repatriating the income), receive a credit against home-country 
tax for the tax they would have paid in the developing country in the absence of the exemption. The home-
country credit serves to protect the incentive effect of the exemption by the developing country, by 
preventing the imposition of home-country tax on repatriation of the income that had been earned. (The US, 
in contrast, generally has declined to offer tax-sparing credits to its investors in developing countries, on the 
grounds that the subsidisation of foreign tax exemptions was inconsistent with prudent public policy.) For a 
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at the time decided to grant the credits. The United States did not, indicating 
less official enthusiasm for developing countries using explicit tax exemptions 
to attract investment. Even in the US, however, the rationality and normative 
wisdom of offering tax incentives to attract investment do not seem to have 
been questioned seriously in the early post-War period. 
 
The invention of BEPS-style corporate tax avoidance 
 
Explicit exemptions, like tax holidays and tax relief for companies operating in 
special economic zones, have never been the only means by which countries 
use corporate tax exemptions to attract inbound investment. Very soon after 
the Second World War, multinational companies and their tax advisers 
developed techniques for avoiding the imposition of taxes on income earned 
in countries around the world where they operated, without the need for 
those countries to extend formal tax exemptions through explicit legislation. 
These techniques have involved the use of four basic transactional 
structures. All of these have remained in use uninterruptedly, with remarkably 
little serious legal challenge until very recently, since at least the early 
1950s.35 All these transactional patterns feature prominently in the recent 
OECD studies of base erosion and profit shifting, as described in Chapter 
4.36 
 
The four basic kinds of BEPS transactions include the following:37  
 
 Loan-based income-shifting transactions. Example: a multinational 
group establishes a finance company in a zero-tax country, contributing 
a large amount of cash to the finance company. The finance company 
then extends a loan to a group member that performs manufacturing 
operations in a higher-tax country. The manufacturing company deducts 
interest paid on the loan, thereby reducing taxable income in the 
country where it operates, but no tax is imposed on receipt of the 
interest by the zero-tax finance company. Therefore, the group enjoys a 
reduction of its income tax in the country where manufacturing is 
performed, with no corresponding increase in its tax anywhere in the 
world. 
                                                 
useful general discussion of tax sparing, see Toaze (2001); see also Dharmapala and Azémar (2019) 
(discusses continuing significance of tax sparing today). 
35  A 1955 study of the taxation of cross-border investment contains detailed descriptions of all kinds of BEPS-
style avoidance plans that are in common use today (Barlow and Wender 1955: 168-171, 245-246). 
36  As will be seen in Chapter 4, in some circumstances the use of the kinds of transactions described below 
will be limited by recently enacted legislation in some countries. Nevertheless, the descriptions of the four 
basic kinds of BEPS transactions provided below continue to describe transaction patterns that are 
commonly found in tax planning today, including in many circumstances involving developing countries. 
37  The following summary in the text is adapted from Durst (2017a). Extended explanations of the various 
kinds of BEPS transactions in use today are available in Kleinbard (2011a, 2011b); and US Joint Committee 
on Taxation (2010). 
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 Intangibles-based income-shifting transactions. Example: a group 
contributes valuable intellectual property, like the trademark to a 
popular brand of beer, to an intangibles holding company established in 
a zero-tax country. Members of the group who distribute the group’s 
beer in higher tax countries pay royalties to the zero-tax intangibles 
holding company for the use of the trademark. The royalty payments 
are deductible in the countries where the beer is distributed, but no tax 
is imposed when the royalties are received by the intangibles holding 
company.  
 Income-shifting transactions involving related-party transactions in 
services and tangible property. Example: a multinational construction 
group might establish a hub company in a zero-tax country. The hub 
company might purchase valuable construction supplies and equipment 
from a group member based in one country, and resell the supplies and 
equipment, with a profit markup, to a subsidiary based in another 
country. Alternatively, the hub company might contract for the 
performance of technical services by employees of the multinational 
group's parent company and resell the services, at a profit, to the other 
group members. Under both scenarios, the group effectively escapes 
taxation anywhere in the world on that portion of the group’s income 
that is attributed to the zero-tax hub company. (Moreover, the items that 
are purchased and sold by the hub company are typically never actually 
shipped to that company; rather, title is held only momentarily by the 
hub company while the items are in transit from the seller to the ultimate 
purchaser.) 
 Income-shifting transactions involving outbound sales of products. 
These kinds of income-shifting transactions are common in the natural 
resources and agricultural sectors.38 Example: consider a metals 
manufacturing group that operates mines through subsidiaries the 
group has established in several resource-rich countries around the 
world. The group establishes a marketing company in a country that 
imposes corporate income tax at a very low rate. The group arranges 
for its various mining subsidiaries around the world to sell all their 
output of ore to the low-tax marketing company. The marketing 
company then resells most of the ore, at a markup, to manufacturing 
affiliates within its group; the remainder of the ore is sold to unrelated 
manufacturing companies. The purchase and resale of the ore by the 
marketing company are essentially fictional. The ore itself never 
touches the marketing company’s country, but is instead shipped 
directly from the mining subsidiaries to the related or unrelated users of 
the ore. The marketing company merely takes legal title to the ore 
briefly while it is in transit, pursuant to the contracts the group has 
drawn up among its various members. Despite the marketing 
company’s lack of physical involvement in the purchase and resale of 
ore, however, a significant portion of the group’s net income is assigned 
to the company, thereby escaping income taxation anywhere in the 
world. 
                                                 
38  See generally Durst (2016a). 
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These four common tax planning techniques have, over the seven decades 
since World War II, become universal in international business practice. 
Virtually all large multinational companies use these techniques as their 
standard means of structuring their foreign direct investments. The point of all 
these techniques is to shift taxable income from countries where business is 
conducted to affiliates that the groups have established in low- or zero-
income tax countries,39 thus lowering multinational groups’ overall 
international tax burdens. The large number of these transactions means that 
very large amounts of corporate income tax are avoided every year around 
the world. 
 
Given the complexity of international transactions, and the limitations of 
available data, it is not possible to estimate with precision the volume of 
corporate tax revenue that national governments lose to these transactions 
each year. Some indications are provided by the very large financial flows in 
and out of zero- and low-tax countries around the world, and the low global 
effective tax rates reported in annual financial statements of large 
multinational groups.40 Two recent attempts to use econometric techniques 
to estimate the revenue losses, both of which are presented only as very 
approximate, suggest that global losses of tax revenue to these transactions 
are in the range of $500 billion to $600 billion annually, with non-OECD 
countries accounting for about half the total (Crivelli et al. 2015; Cobham and 
Jansky 2017). Developing countries would appear especially likely to incur 
revenue-losses owing to their heightened vulnerability to tax competition.41 
 
The legal fiction at the heart of BEPS-style tax planning 
 
The four kinds of profit-shifting structures share a common feature. They all 
involve the supposed earning of a portion of a multinational group’s income 
by a zero- or low-tax subsidiary that needs to perform little if any observable 
business activity to generate its purported income. Thus, the finance 
company might have few or even no employees in the loan-centred 
avoidance plan. Other group members might simply deposit cash in the 
finance company’s bank account, typically through electronic transfer, and 
the cash can then be sent on immediately, via additional electronic transfer, 
                                                 
39  The list of countries that have facilitated the establishment by multinationals of low- or zero-tax subsidiaries 
is quite wide. The list includes not only small island countries that conform to the typical public image of tax 
havens, but other countries, including some of the world’s major economic powers. A 2010 study of profit 
shifting by the US Congress’s Joint Committee on Taxation (2010: 51-102) presents six extended case 
studies of profit-shifting plans involving US-based multinationals. Countries mentioned as hosting entities 
involved in the profit shifting include the Netherlands, Bermuda, Switzerland and the Cayman Islands. Other 
countries often mentioned as central to profit-shifting planning include Mauritius (see, e.g., ActionAid (2010; 
updated 2012)), Ireland (see, e.g., Drucker (2013a); and Luxembourg (see, e.g., Burow (2014a). The 
countries just mentioned represent only a very partial list of jurisdictions that have been host to corporate 
subsidiaries used in profit-shifting planning. 
40  A useful discussion of the difficulty of estimating revenue losses to BEPS-style tax avoidance is provided by 
Kleinbard (2011a: 737-750). 
41  See generally Crivelli et al. (2015). 
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to the group members to which money is lent. There is no need for personnel 
based anywhere to perform credit analyses on the loans, since all the loans 
are made among members of the same, commonly-owned multinational 
group.  
 
Similarly, in the intangibles-centred tax-avoidance structure, the licensing 
subsidiary that receives legal title to the group’s intangible property, and then 
licenses use of the intangibles to other group members, typically performs no 
observable activities in return for its royalty income. The licensing 
subsidiary’s ownership of the group’s intangible property, and its licences of 
that property to group members, exist only on paper. There is no need for 
employees of the zero- or low-tax subsidiary to do anything in return for the 
income that the subsidiary receives. In the same vein, when hub subsidiaries 
that multinational groups establish in zero- or low-tax countries purchase 
tangible property or services from some members of a group and resell the 
property or services at a markup, the subsidiaries typically have no physical 
contact with the property or services in which they supposedly deal. The 
involvement of the subsidiary arises only on paper, in contracts drafted by the 
multinational group’s lawyers. 
 
Likewise, in the various kinds of planning that involve the ostensible 
purchase and resale of property or services by zero- or low-tax subsidiaries, 
the subsidiaries typically never take physical possession of the property they 
are buying and selling or have any physical involvement in performing the 
services they are supposedly providing. The involvement of the purchasing-
and-reselling subsidiary occurs only on paper, yet tax laws around the world 
treat its transactions as genuine.  
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Chapter 3 The historical evolution of base 
erosion and profit shifting 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the evolution, over almost a century, of the body of 
international tax law that continues to insulate BEPS-style planning 
arrangements from successful legal challenge in countries around the world. 
The chapter focuses on two aspects of current laws: (i) their acceptance of 
contractual arrangements among members of commonly-controlled 
multinational groups that treat low- or zero-tax subsidiaries as conducting 
income-producing activities that they do not in physical reality perform; and 
(ii) the failure of current laws – specifically, transfer pricing laws, controlled 
foreign corporation (CFC) rules, and laws that seek to limit the payment of 
interest on loans from related parties – to place effective limits on the amount 
of profit that multinational companies are permitted to shift to zero- or low-tax 
affiliates under their contractual arrangements. 
 
The inherent formalism of corporate tax law 
 
A starting point in the analysis is to recognise that corporate law, and the 
corporate income tax laws that represent a component of the broader law of 
corporations, are both pre-disposed to legal formalism – respecting the 
written terms of contractual arrangements even when they appear to depart 
from the apparent economic substance of the transactions that the contracts 
govern. A corporation is itself a product of legal formality. The corporation’s 
existence as an entity is based upon the corporate charter, a document that 
grants shareholders assurance (subject to limited exceptions, as will be 
discussed later) that they will not face personal liability for debts arising from 
business that is conducted in the corporation’s name. 
 
The protection against liability that the corporate charter affords often lends 
importance to the question of whether a particular business activity is 
conducted by the corporation in its capacity as a legal entity, or instead by 
the shareholders in their individual capacities. To prevent endless legal 
controversy over this question, the law long ago developed a strong 
presumption that if the contracts governing a business activity consistently 
treat the corporation rather than the shareholders as conducting the activity, 
that characterisation will normally be respected. In light of this presumption, 
much of corporate legal practice consists of ensuring that the activities of a 
corporation are clearly documented by contracts in the name of the 
corporation rather than the shareholders, and that all the i’s are dotted and t’s 
crossed in those contracts. 
 
Corporate law places some limits on the extent to which shareholders can 
shield themselves from liability through contracts specifying that a business is 
being conducted by the corporation as an entity rather than its shareholders. 
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Under the doctrine of ‘piercing the corporate veil’, some kinds of behaviour by 
shareholders – like certain kinds of negligence, or the misleading of lenders 
or customers – can cause shareholders to become directly liable for 
obligations of a corporation.42 The law, however, usually permits piercing the 
corporate veil only in atypical circumstances. Generally, there is a strong 
presumption that if the applicable contracts identify a corporation rather than 
its shareholders as performing a business activity, the corporation should be 
treated as performing the activity for all purposes of the law. 
 
There are countless circumstances in which the law respects a corporation 
as the performer of business activities, notwithstanding that corporate 
employees perform little if any physical activity. In particular, it is generally 
irrelevant whether a corporation performs business activities through its own 
employees or outsources the activity to other persons. For example, an 
investor might have the idea of manufacturing and distributing a particular 
kind of kitchen implement. The investor might form a corporation (let’s call it 
Ladelco) to accomplish these purposes. Ladelco might then contract with a 
separate company (Manuco) to: (i) purchase the raw materials needed to 
manufacture the implements, (ii) perform the manufacturing, (iii) advertise the 
implement through online sellers, and (iv) accept orders from and ship 
products to customers. The contract may provide for Ladelco to compensate 
Manuco for these services by reimbursing that company for its costs plus a 
markup of, say, 5 per cent. Any remaining profit is to be remitted to Ladelco, 
the initiator of the arrangement. (These kinds of cost-plus arrangements are 
quite common in practice.) 
 
The law generally will, for all purposes, respect the various elements of this 
contractual arrangement, particularly (i) the right of Manuco to receive its 
cost-plus compensation, but no more, in return for its services; and (ii) the 
right of Ladelco to receive all residual profits from the sale of the kitchen 
utensils. The law has no choice but generally to respect contractual 
formalities in situations like this and many others, since otherwise the law 
would have no practical means of sorting out the rights and liabilities of the 
various parties involved. Commerce would become chaotic. As a general 
matter, a high degree of formalism in corporate law seems to be unavoidable. 
 
Corporate law’s general policy of respect for the terms of contracts extends 
not only to contracts among unrelated companies like Ladelco and Manuco, 
but also to arrangements among corporations within the same commonly-
owned group. In many instances, a group will desire to conduct several 
different business operations simultaneously – for example, to operate 
several different hotels in different locations. The group will place each 
operation in a separate subsidiary to shield the assets of each from claims 
arising from other operations. The use of multiple entities within a single 
                                                 
42  For a discussion of situations in which courts might choose to pierce the corporate veil and hold 
shareholders liable for corporate obligations, see, e.g., Macey and Mitts (2014). Courts generally are willing 
to pierce the corporate veil only where special circumstances are present, such as active misrepresentation 
by shareholders, or failure to maintain the procedural requirements of corporate existence under applicable 
law. 
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group is especially frequent among businesses operating internationally. For 
many reasons, including the need to comply with different countries’ legal 
and tax requirements, operations in different countries are frequently placed 
in separate subsidiaries established under local law. It is in this manner that 
commonly-owned multinational business groups are typically formed. 
 
The parent and various subsidiaries of multinational groups typically enter 
into numerous contracts among themselves, under which the different 
affiliates supply goods, provide services and lend money to one another. 
Unless special factors are present to justify piercing the corporate veil,43 
courts will generally respect the division of responsibilities and rights to 
receive income that are stated in the contracts into which the different group 
members have entered. 
 
Corporate law’s respect for the terms of contracts made among both 
unrelated and related companies also extends to countries’ corporate income 
tax laws. For the purposes of corporate income taxation, courts generally will 
respect the division of income among corporations that results from 
application of the corporations’ contractual arrangements with one another. 
This is not surprising: other than the contracts into which corporations have 
entered, tax authorities and courts would have no means of determining how 
much income each corporation should be treated as earning. (As discussed 
below, the situation might be different if the countries of the world were to 
adopt an alternative means of dividing corporate income for tax purposes 
among commonly-owned companies, perhaps through use of an 
apportionment formula. This approach, however, while often suggested by 
commentators, has consistently been rejected by national governments.) 
 
Respect for the terms of contractual arrangements among commonly-owned 
companies is not absolute under countries’ corporate tax laws. Tax laws 
generally contain a doctrine of ‘substance over form’, under which tax 
authorities may in some circumstances override the terms of written contracts 
if the terms of the contract diverge too far from what appears to be the 
economic substance of the underlying transactions.44 (In some countries, the 
substance over form doctrine is explicitly included in tax statutes, under the 
label of a general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR).) The doctrine of substance 
over,form in tax law can be seen as somewhat analogous to that of piercing 
the veil in corporate law, in that both doctrines allow a safety valve to permit 
the overriding of formalistic results in especially compelling circumstances.45 
 
Under the substance over form doctrine, courts may re-characterise the 
arrangements described in contracts between companies if the economic 
reality of the arrangements plainly departs from their contractual form. Courts 
typically are willing, however, to apply the substance over form doctrine only 
                                                 
43  See generally Matheson (2009). 
44  For a useful overview of the principle of substance over form, see, e.g., Arnold (2017: 715-766). For a 
historical discussion, see Weisbach (1999). 
45  With respect to the connection between the corporate-veil doctrine and the problem of BEPS-style tax 
planning, see the essay by Wilkie (forthcoming), which includes an exploration of the topic and review of 
prior literature. 
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in especially compelling circumstances, where a taxpayers’ contractual 
arrangements are very plainly contrived for tax-avoidance purposes. To apply 
the substance over form doctrine more readily would risk injecting an 
untenable degree of unpredictability to the operations of corporate tax laws. 
 
Thus, courts generally have not applied the doctrine to override the arguable 
legal fiction on which tax avoidance from BEPS-style planning arrangements 
depends. Despite the presence of the substance over form doctrine, courts 
often accept the desired tax consequences of the contractual arrangements 
made among companies, even where a strong argument can be made that 
the substance of an arrangement differs from its form. The tradition of 
formalism has long been, and remains, strong within corporate income tax 
laws. It was against this background that the practice of BEPS-style tax 
planning was invented, and over the decades became increasingly prevalent 
among the world’s multinational companies. 
 
How the international corporate tax laws developed 
 
Those areas of tax law that are most central to the history of base erosion 
and profit shifting around the world – transfer pricing laws, controlled foreign 
corporation rules, and rules governing the extent to which companies can 
deduct interest paid to other members of their multinational groups – have 
developed in a long historical progression, beginning early in the twentieth 
century and continuing through the present. The following summarises 
important aspects of this history, beginning with the early statement of the 
principles of international corporate tax law under League of Nations 
auspices beginning in the 1920s, through the attempt by the United States to 
adjust its international tax laws to post-World War II economic realities in the 
US Revenue Act of 1962, and culminating in the ‘transfer pricing wars’ of the 
early 1990s, which gave rise to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in 
roughly the form they have today. Chapter 4 will then describe how the 
world’s governments are trying to resolve problems that have accumulated 
during this long history through the OECD’s BEPS process. 
 
The period between the two World Wars: pre-occupation with double 
taxation 
 
After the First World War, three factors combined to direct the attention of 
countries to the task of designing a workable system of international tax 
laws.46 These included: (i) the increasing international trade and investment 
made possible by the ending of the War; (ii) widespread increases in tax 
rates around the world; and (iii) the emergence of international organisations, 
notably the League of Nations and, within the private sector, the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), an organisation of business leaders organised 
in Paris in 1919 (Collier and Andrus 2017: 8).  
                                                 
46  For important historical discussions of the development of international tax law between the First and 
Second World Wars, see Collier and Andrus (2017: 6-49); Carroll (1934); Picciotto (1992, as revised by 
author 2013); Rixen (2010); and two articles by Wells and Lowell (2012, 2013). The historical summary in 
this book is based largely on these resources. 
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The ICC initiated the post-War discussion of international tax laws. In 
particular, the ICC sought the assistance of the League of Nations in 
designing a system of laws that would permit companies to avoid double 
taxation under corporate income tax laws when engaging in business 
spanning national boundaries. The basic concept of double taxation is easy 
to understand. 
 
Consider a company based in Italy that manufacturers automobiles for the 
UK market. The company manufactures the cars in Italy, then sells and ships 
them to a wholly-owned distribution subsidiary established in the UK, which 
then sells them to independent car dealerships around the country. Assume 
that the Italian-based group as a whole, during a particular year, earns total 
net income of $100 million from the manufacture of the cars in Italy and their 
marketing and sale in the United Kingdom. Of this income, how much is 
properly taxable by Italy and how much by the United Kingdom? In the 
absence of rules establishing some means of apportionment, the Italian tax 
authority is likely to argue that the lion’s share of the income is attributable to 
the excellent design and skillful manufacturing of the cars, which both 
occurred in Italy. The UK tax authority is likely to argue that the lion’s share of 
the income is attributable to the skillful advertisement, marketing and 
customer service activities that took place in the UK. Both Italy and the UK, 
therefore, might assert the right to tax a majority of the income from the 
manufacture and sale of cars, leaving the Italy-based company with an 
inflated total tax bill. 
 
The ICC argued after the First World War that, if the threat of double taxation 
was not to pose a serious impediment to international commerce, some 
reliable means needed to be found for apportioning income for tax purposes 
among the different countries in which an international business operates. 
This problem later came to be referred to as the transfer pricing problem. In 
response, the League of Nations initiated a process of studying the problem 
of income apportionment and numerous other important problems of 
international taxation, which extended until the outbreak of the Second World 
War.47 
From the start of their review of the transfer pricing problem, those 
conducting the League’s study had before them two competing policy 
models, which continue to figure prominently in international tax policy 
                                                 
47  In addition to addressing the problem of methods for apportioning income, the League of Nations’ efforts 
considered the important problems of: (i) how an internationally coordinated system of tax rules might be 
implemented through a system of income tax treaties among countries (a topic to be addressed in Chapter 
4 of this book); and (ii) how the right to tax income of an international business group should be divided 
between the group’s country of residence (i.e. its home country) and the various other countries in which 
members of the group earn income from conducting business operations (source countries). 
This book does not seek to address an important problem that figured prominently in the League of Nations 
discussions and continues to pose serious technical difficulties in tax policymaking and tax administration 
today: the fact that multinational groups operate in countries around the world through two different kinds of 
legal entities, separately incorporated subsidiaries and unincorporated branches of parent companies - for a 
recent discussion of this problem, see OECD (2017a). Questions related to the differing tax treatment of 
subsidiaries and branches are of substantial practical importance in international tax practice and 
lawmaking, although trying to discuss this highly technical topic in this book would risk unduly distracting 
non-specialist readers. 
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debates: a model of formulary apportionment (generally referred to at the 
time of the League of Nations studies as fractional apportionment), and 
separate accounting. Under formulary apportionment, governments of 
different countries treat all the members of a multinational group as a single 
taxable entity, and apportion the group’s combined income among countries 
according to a formula.  
 
Consider, for example, a manufacturing group that sells products through 
affiliates in three different countries. As a simple kind of formulary 
apportionment, the governments of the three countries might agree to treat 
the group as a single taxable entity, and divide the group’s total income 
among the countries according to the relative level of sales to customers by 
the different affiliates. Thus, for example, if the affiliate in Country A accounts 
for half the group’s total sales, then half the group’s combined income would 
be taxable in Country A; if 15 per cent of sales were made in Country B, 15 
per cent of the group’s combined income would be taxable there, and so on. 
 
In reviewing the possibility of international formulary apportionment, the 
League examined three then-existing instances in which jurisdictions were 
using formulary apportionment for tax purposes: the states of the United 
States, the cantons of Switzerland, and Austria, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia under a treaty implemented after the First World War.48 
These three systems employed various kinds of apportionment formulas, in 
which not only sales but other indicators of corporate activity were taken into 
account, such as the value of business assets owned or local payroll 
expenses of different members of the group. 
 
Not only was there precedent for the use of formulary apportionment for the 
division of taxable income among affiliates, but the ICC itself had suggested 
a formulary approach in its early communications with the League of 
Nations.49 The League’s experts, however, concluded that a system of 
international formulary apportionment did not offer practical promise for the 
prevention of double taxation. The primary objection to formulary 
apportionment appears to have been (as is often argued today) that different 
countries would adopt and apply differing apportionment formulas, inevitably 
giving rise to overlapping claims of tax jurisdiction and therefore to double 
taxation.50 
 
For these reasons, the League established separate accounting as its basic 
principle for the international division of income for tax purposes.51 Under this 
principle, there is no attempt to consolidate the accounts of different affiliates 
within a multinational group. Instead, the separate books and records of each 
                                                 
48  See Carroll (1934: 481, 488-489, 491-494). 
49  See Wells and Lowell (2013: 14-18). 
50  See Carroll (1934: 473-476). 
51  One expert commissioned by the League of Nations, Mitchell B. Carroll of the United States (the author of 
the article by Carroll cited at various points in this chapter), played an especially influential role in the later 
stages of the League’s deliberations in the late 1920s and 1930s. In the 1980s, a prominent commentary 
strongly criticised Carroll’s analytical work, claiming that it overstated the difficulties of formulary 
apportionment (Langbein 1986: 625, 632-633). 
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affiliate, which of course reflect the results of the contracts under which the 
affiliate conducts business, are accepted as valid for tax purposes, unless the 
taxpayer appears to have been departing from normal business principles in 
dealings with its affiliates, thereby artificially reducing its taxable income. In 
other words, the contracts and other business arrangements of each member 
of a commonly-owned group are to be respected for tax purposes, unless the 
tax authority can show that the member has departed from what has over the 
years become known as the arm’s-length principle in its dealings with other 
members.52 
 
The League of Nations discussions addressed the important question of how 
tax authorities might enforce the arm’s-length principle. The League 
envisioned generally that in those cases where comparable prices can be 
found for a group’s internal dealings – where, say, a manufacturing affiliate 
sells identical products to both related and unrelated parties – the 
comparable price should be used to determine whether intra-group dealings 
have been at arm’s-length. The League provided only limited guidance for tax 
authorities to use in the many situations in which comparable prices are not 
readily available. The League did, however, indicate that two methods that 
were already used by some tax authorities could be useful.53 
 
First, tax authorities could employ a fractional approach, under which the 
income of different affiliates is split between them according to an ad hoc 
formula (e.g. based on relative sales levels and manufacturing costs) devised 
for the taxpayer. This approach (which survives today in the form of the profit 
split transfer pricing method) was, according to the League’s analysis, 
sharply distinguishable from a formulary approach, under which a single 
formula would be applied to all taxpayers on a one-size-fits-all basis. A 
second approach accepted by the League in the absence of useful 
comparables was an empirical approach, under which tax authorities sought 
to identify a reasonable profit margin on sales for companies operating within 
their countries. The empirical approach survives today in the form of the 
transactional net margin method (TNMM) of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, which, as will be seen below, plays an especially important role in 
the taxation of businesses operating in lower-income countries. 
 
The arm’s-length principle can be seen as a kind of substance over form rule, 
under which a commonly-owned group’s contractual arrangements will be 
respected for tax purposes unless the arrangements are inconsistent with 
those that might be found among unrelated entities dealing with each other in 
an arm’s-length manner. It was inevitable from the outset that courts would 
exercise restraint in applying the new arm’s-length standard to re-
characterise taxpayers’ contractual arrangements, for the same reason that 
courts are reluctant to apply the substance over form doctrine as a general 
matter. Excessive eagerness by courts to over-ride companies’ contractual 
arrangements would inject uncertainty into international tax laws, and this 
                                                 
52  Collier and Andrus (2017: 33). Note use of the words ‘arm’s length’ by Mitchell Carroll in the early 1930s. 
53  See Carroll (1934: 484-485). 
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uncertainty could be a significant obstacle to commerce. Therefore, the 
League’s approach created an obvious danger that commonly-owned groups 
of companies might be able to engineer their contractual arrangements to 
steer income artificially to companies that the groups could establish in low-
tax countries, without serious risk of successful legal challenge.54 
 
Although participants in the League debates recognised the possibility that 
the arm’s-length approach might be used to facilitate international tax 
avoidance, those steering the League’s efforts were more concerned with 
what they saw as their immediate goal of avoiding double taxation than they 
were of tax-avoidance practices that might arise in future (Wells and Lowell 
2012: 563; Rixen 2010: 15). As the main danger perceived was that of over-
reaching by tax examiners in different countries, it was quite logical for the 
League to lean, consciously or not, towards a regulatory regime that tax 
authorities would find relatively difficult to enforce. Excessive interference by 
tax authorities with the intended results of taxpayers’ transactions would risk 
subjecting taxpayers to inconsistent treatment by different countries, resulting 
in double taxation. 
 
Another important aspect of the League of Nations study, with implications 
for lower-income countries today, is the role played by a particular model of 
international business operations – the mercantilist paradigm – in shaping the 
League’s perceptions of what constitutes arm’s-length arrangements among 
affiliates.55 In the inter-War years a large amount of international commerce 
consisted of trade in commodities, like mineral and agricultural products, 
between parent companies headquartered in countries holding overseas 
colonies, and corporate subsidiaries that had been established in the 
colonised countries. The League’s analyses reflected the idea that, in 
dividing income between the parent and the colonial subsidiary, the natural 
approach was to apportion to the subsidiary a relatively limited amount of 
income in return for its activities in growing or extracting physical product. 
The rest of the parent’s and subsidiary’s combined income was to be treated 
as attributable to the parent’s role in providing investment capital and overall 
supervision, and therefore taxable to the parent company. The mercantilist 
model may have reflected paternalistic assumptions regarding the economic 
role of colonial dependencies. It may also have reflected a desire by colonial 
powers to encourage foreign direct investment in their colonies by limiting the 
taxable income attributable to colonial enterprises.56 
 
Whatever the League’s motivation for propagating the mercantilist model, it 
has had a lasting effect on the vocabulary and imagery of international tax 
law. International tax rules continue to rely heavily on a conceptual paradigm 
under which developing countries typically are envisioned as source 
countries, where supposedly uncomplicated (routine in the parlance often 
                                                 
54  See Wells and Lowell (2012: 561 ff.); Rixen (2010). 
55  See Wells and Lowell (2013: 10-13), on which the discussion below is largely based. See also Carroll 
(1934: 474-476). 
56  See Gann and Duignan (1975: 8): ‘From the very beginning, colonial governments sought to make colonies 
pay. They encouraged investors, bankers, traders, plantation owners and business groups. Tax systems 
were drawn up to attract investment’. 
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used by tax practitioners) activities like farming, mining, the performance of 
services in places like call centres, and basic manufacturing operations take 
place. Wealthier countries are seen as residence countries that provide the 
capital, as well as the valuable intellectual property, that are used in the 
operations conducted in the source countries.57 As will be seen later in this 
chapter, the persistence of this imagery has helped lend legitimacy to tax 
planning structures under which subsidiaries of multinational groups 
operating in lower-income countries tend to be apportioned low levels of 
income in return for the routine activities they are treated as performing. 
 
Emergence of BEPS-style tax planning in the aftermath of World War II 
 
Foreign direct investment resumed with unprecedented intensity at the end of 
the Second World War – especially from the United States, whose industrial 
infrastructure was undamaged. In the early post-War years, former 
combatant countries needed foreign capital to rebuild their physical 
infrastructure. The colonial system also began to dissolve, leading to a desire 
for cross-border economic development in the former dependencies. 
Wartime innovations in communications and transportation technologies 
eased the task of managing multinational businesses on a centralised basis, 
and increased the speed and reliability with which products and services 
could be delivered internationally. Further, wartime technological 
developments – for example, in antibiotics and other pharmaceuticals – gave 
rise to global demand for high-value, easily transportable products. 
 
Companies needed to devise corporate legal structures through which to 
conduct their rapidly expanding international operations. Consider, for 
example, a US-based pharmaceutical company that wished to expand sales 
of products in numerous countries on five continents. An initial question 
facing the group would have been whether to operate in different countries 
around the world through separately incorporated local subsidiaries, or 
through unincorporated branches of the US parent company. Even leaving 
aside tax considerations, several factors would have encouraged the 
establishment of separately incorporated subsidiaries. These would have 
included a desire to limit cross-liability for claims against the different national 
operations of the group. In addition, separately incorporated subsidiaries 
might have been needed to comply with countries’ requirements that, say, 
local citizens serve on companies’ boards of directors. 
 
Moreover, a number of business and tax considerations encouraged 
multinationals to adopt a particular corporate structure that soon became 
central to BEPS-style tax planning – the use of holding companies in low- or 
zero-tax countries to own the stock of companies established in the various 
countries in which the group conducted business. For example, if a US-
based multinational group established subsidiaries in, say, France, the 
United Kingdom and Spain, it would naturally have arranged for the US 
                                                 
57  Thought-provoking analyses of the development of the concepts of source and residence are provided by 
Graetz and O’Hear (1997) and Wells and Lowell (2013). 
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parent company not to own the stock of the French, British and Spanish 
entities directly, but instead through a holding company established in a low- 
or zero-tax country like, say, Panama.58 The group could then accumulate 
earnings from all three foreign operating entities in the holding company 
without incurring significant local Panamanian tax, and reinvest the earnings 
abroad wherever the group desired. There was no need to distribute the 
foreign earnings all the way up to the group’s parent company, where they 
would have become subject to US tax under tax laws in effect at the time.59 
The use of the holding company structure also could simplify the task of 
accumulating and reinvesting profits under the restrictive national currency 
exchange regulations that were common around the world during the post-
War era (Barlow and Wender 1955: 168). Thus, the basic three-tier corporate 
structure, with a zero- or low-tax holding company in the middle, quickly 
became standard for multinational companies expanding their international 
operations after World War II. 
 
Once the model of a zero- or low-tax holding company structure was in place, 
the technique of shifting income from the operating subsidiaries to the 
holding company through, for example, intangibles-licensing and lending 
arrangements, would have been apparent to tax planners. In theory, the 
amounts shifted from the operating subsidiaries to the low- or zero-tax 
holding company should have been limited by the arm’s-length standard. 
That is, the holding companies should have been permitted to charge only 
arm’s-length royalty amounts under their licensing arrangements with the 
operating companies, and the holding companies should have extended to 
the operating companies only economically reasonable amounts of interest-
bearing debt. In practice, however, the arm’s-length principle appears to have 
exerted little restraint on the growth of BEPS-style tax planning around the 
world, and BEPS-style planning grew over the years to become standard 
practice among multinational groups. 
 
Post-War legislative developments in the United States 
 
The United States, which served as the source for much of the world’s cross-
border investment in the years following World War II, appears to have been 
the first country to perceive profit shifting by its home-based multinationals as 
posing a significant public policy issue. At first, in the immediate post-War 
years, US officials generally took a benign view of the avoidance of tax by US 
firms on income from their foreign operations.60 US policymakers apparently 
saw foreign direct investment by US firms as a useful adjunct to the Marshall 
                                                 
58  See generally Barlow and Wender (1955: 168-170). Barlow and Wender mention Panama, Canada, Puerto 
Rico, Uruguay and Liechtenstein as countries that hosted international holding companies. 
59  In the post-World War II era, the tax laws of countries around the world generally subjected the parent 
companies of multinational groups to taxation on income from their foreign subsidiaries only when that 
income was repatriated to the parent in the form of dividends. Therefore, the use of separate entities 
delayed the premature home-country taxation of foreign earnings. In recent decades, most countries in 
which multinationals tend to be based (including, as of 2018, the US) have adopted territorial systems under 
which dividends from foreign subsidiaries are exempt from home-country taxation, even when repatriated. 
60  For contemporaneous discussion of this topic, see Barlow and Wender (1955: 77-94). See generally Ram 
(2018) - Ram’s excellent article provides substantial historical background on the events of the 1950s and 
early 1960s described in this chapter. 
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Plan in stimulating economic recovery among war-damaged countries, as 
well as an aid in competing with the Soviet Union for influence in post-
colonial areas. 
 
By the early 1960s, however, important political actors in the US began to 
perceive that outbound investment by US-based multinationals had 
blossomed into too much of a good thing. The ex-combatant countries had 
largely completed their post-War reconstruction, and some were becoming 
potent economic competitors of the United States. Also, outbound investment 
was contributing to currency strains.61 
 
In 1961, President John F. Kennedy released a message to Congress urging 
action to end the deferral of US taxation on income earned by foreign 
companies within US-owned multinational groups (Kennedy 1961). This 
would have made it pointless for US-based multinationals to accumulate 
foreign income in holding companies, and also generally would have 
removed the benefit to US-based groups from any explicit exemptions, like 
tax holidays, offered by a country to investors, since income untaxed by the 
host country would have become immediately taxable in the US. The 
Kennedy proposal contained a carve-out for explicit exemptions provided by 
specified underdeveloped countries, on the condition that the exempted 
income was reinvested in the underdeveloped country. Income exempted 
from taxation only implicitly, however, through what the Kennedy proposal 
referred to as tax haven planning devices, would be subject to immediate US 
taxation under all circumstances.62 If enacted, therefore, the Kennedy 
proposal to eliminate deferral would have ended BEPS-style tax planning by 
US multinational groups. 
 
Business interests, however, expressed the view that the elimination of 
deferral would place US-based multinationals at a competitive disadvantage 
with respect to their non-US competitors, who could still avail themselves of 
tax exemptions offered by countries around the world. Ultimately, the 
Congress passed and the President signed, in what became the Revenue 
Act of 1962, legislation that stopped short of the full elimination of deferral, 
but which attempted to curtail the use of tax planning by US-based 
multinationals centred on holding companies established in zero- or low-tax 
countries. 
 
Congress made two important decisions in the 1962 Act, which ended up 
having a long-term effect on the shape of international tax rules around the 
                                                 
61  Ram (2018) ascribes a central role to US balance of payments concerns in stimulating tax reform in the 
early 1960s. 
62  The language used by President Kennedy in describing these avoidance devices makes clear that by 1961 
BEPS-style tax avoidance planning had taken on essentially the same form as it displays today. Kennedy 
said: ‘The undesirability of continuing deferral is underscored where deferral has served as a shelter for tax 
escape through the unjustifiable use of tax havens such as Switzerland. Recently more and more 
enterprises organized abroad by American firms have arranged their corporate structures – aided by 
artificial arrangements between parent and subsidiary regarding intercompany pricing, the transfer of patent 
licensing rights, the shifting of management fees, and similar practices which maximize the accumulation of 
profits in the tax haven – so as to exploit the multiplicity of foreign tax systems and international agreements 
in order to reduce sharply or eliminate completely their tax liabilities both at home and abroad’. 
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world. First, Congress adopted the world’s first body of controlled foreign 
corporation rules, by which the US and many other countries have sought, 
generally with only limited success, to curtail their multinational groups’ 
involvement in BEPS-style tax planning. Second, Congress considered, but 
rejected, a proposal to adopt a system of formulary apportionment for the 
international division of income earned by related-party groups, instead 
reaffirming a commitment to the arm’s-length approach to transfer pricing that 
had been developed under the auspices of the League of Nations.The 
following discussion offers an introduction to both CFC rules and post-War 
arm’s-length transfer pricing rules as they have developed globally in the 
more than 50 years that have elapsed since the 1962 US legislation. 
 
Controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules 
 
The Revenue Act of 1962 generally defined as a controlled foreign 
corporation any foreign corporation that was more than 50 per cent owned by 
US corporate or individual shareholders.63 Therefore, the foreign subsidiaries 
of US-owned multinational groups generally fell within the definition of CFCs. 
If a CFC was located in a country with a low or zero tax rate, any income 
received by the CFC, falling within specified categories, would be subject to 
immediate US taxation as if the income had been repatriated to the United 
States. The categories of ‘tainted’ income included interest, royalties, and 
profits from purchases or sales of goods and services to or from related 
parties – precisely the kinds of income transferred to zero- or low-tax 
subsidiaries under BEPS-style tax avoidance planning. The 1962 US CFC 
rules, therefore, if they had worked as intended, would have removed from 
US-based multinationals the financial incentive to pull income from foreign 
subsidiaries into offshore collection points, and presumably would have 
dramatically reduced US companies’ involvement in BEPS-style tax 
avoidance structures. 
 
From the time of their enactment in 1962, however, the effectiveness of the 
US CFC rules in discouraging BEPS-style tax planning has been limited. In 
part, problems have arisen from weaknesses in the wording of the statute. 
For example, the 1962 legislation defined a CFC as a company that is more 
than 50 per cent owned, by vote or value, by a US parent company or certain 
other US shareholders. But the ‘more than 50 per cent by vote or value’ test 
proved susceptible to manipulation. For example, there are an infinite 
number of ways in which voting rights can be spread among different classes 
of a corporation’s stock (with e.g. some shares given voting rights for some 
purposes rather than others), and it can be very difficult to assign values to 
particular classes of stock with unique voting or other rights. It soon proved 
possible to avoid classification as a CFC of some companies that appeared 
as a practical matter to be controlled by US shareholders. 
 
                                                 
63  The following discussion in the text seeks to provide only non-technical and simplified descriptions of the 
CFC rules of the US and other countries. More detailed background on CFC rules around the world can be 
found in the OECD’s BEPS report (2015a), Office of Tax Policy (2000) and Avi-Yonah and Halabi (2012). 
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Similarly, the language defining the kind of payments that are subject to 
home-country taxation under CFC rules raises difficulties. For example, 
interest received by a CFC in a low- or zero-tax country generally is subject 
to home-country taxation under the US CFC rules, but if the CFC also 
performs some banking services for unrelated customers – something that 
can easily be arranged among friendly multinationals – its interest income 
may under complex rules qualify as ‘active financing’ income, and therefore 
as exempt from home-country taxation. 
 
As another example, although the US CFC rules generally tax income of a 
zero- or low-tax CFC from purchasing and reselling property in related-party 
transactions, the rules do not apply this treatment if the low- or zero-tax 
company substantially transforms the property through manufacturing 
processes (i.e. the CFC rules provide a manufacturing exception). Early in 
the history of the US CFC rules, US multinationals adopted contract 
manufacturing arrangements, under which CFCs claimed the right to the 
manufacturing exception by virtue not of their own manufacturing activities, 
but of manufacturing performed by others under contract. Over time, contract 
manufacturing arrangements, which US tax authorities generally proved 
unable legally to curtail, have been used to escape much taxation under the 
CFC rules.64 
 
Finally, in 1997, an unexpected regulatory incident in the United States 
delivered the coup de grace to the US CFC rules as a meaningful constraint 
on BEPS-style planning by US multinationals.65 The Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) issued a regulation that was apparently intended to simplify, 
under US tax rules, the process of qualifying business entities as 
partnerships or other forms of pass-through entities (like limited liability 
companies) for tax purposes, thereby providing the entities with tax 
advantages in certain circumstances. There is no indication that this 
simplification was intended fundamentally to alter the operation of the CFC 
rules. The new regulation, however, contained language to the effect that, in 
some circumstances, entities qualifying for pass-through classification would 
be treated ‘for all purposes of US taxation’ as transparent entities – that is, 
treated as if they did not exist. 
 
Immediately, US multinationals recognised that they could structure their 
operating entities in various countries around the world as subsidiaries of 
low- and zero-tax companies within the group, and then cause the operating 
subsidiaries to ‘check the box’ so that they would be treated not as separate 
companies for US tax purposes, but instead as unincorporated branches of 
the low- or zero-tax companies. This means, as a formal legal matter, that 
payments of interest, royalties, and other kinds of passive income made by 
the operating companies to their low- or zero-tax parents were not payments 
at all – they were, as a formal matter, non-events – so that the low- or zero-
tax company should not be treated as receiving CFC income. 
                                                 
64  For a historical discussion, see Bates and Kirkwood (2008). 
65  The history of the check-the-box rules is described in, e.g., Sicular (2007). 
Chapter 3 | The historical evolution of base erosion and profit shifting 
 
 44 
 
The US IRS and Treasury quickly announced their intention to modify the 
recently-issued regulations to clarify that they could not be applied to defeat 
operation of the CFC rules. But once the horse of the check-the-box 
regulations had bolted, it was politically impossible for the Treasury to 
retrieve it. Businesses argued that to restore the US CFC rules to health 
would place US-owned multinationals at a competitive disadvantage with 
respect to their foreign counterparts. Supporting the business position, 
Congress made clear that it would legislatively block action to limit the 
operation of the check-the-box rules in a way that would resuscitate the CFC 
rules; indeed, in 2006 Congress enacted legislation that effectively confirmed 
this position. The result is that the US CFC rules have been of little effect in 
limiting the participation of US-based multinationals in BEPS-style tax 
planning since 1997. 
 
Since 1972, dozens of countries have adopted CFC rules that are at least 
broadly similar to those of the United States.66 Inevitably, however, these 
CFC rules have been vulnerable to the same kind of definitional ambiguities 
that impaired the operation of the US CFC rules, even before the final blow of 
the tick-the-box regulations. It is not clear how successful different countries’ 
CFC rules have been in curtailing BEPS-style tax planning among 
multinationals based outside the US. My experience as a practitioner 
suggests that the degree of effectiveness has varied substantially among 
countries. The large volume of avoidance visible around the world today, 
however, suggest that overall CFC rules have operated at a low level of 
efficacy. 
 
The basic problem with CFC rules, which very likely has prevented them 
historically from interfering decisively with the growth of BEPS, relates to 
competition among capital-exporting countries – the countries where 
multinational groups tend to be based. A country’s CFC rules prevent that 
country’s own home-based multinationals from benefiting from BEPS-style 
tax planning in countries where they conduct business. The multinationals of 
other countries that have not enacted CFC rules, however, remain free to 
engage in tax planning. Countries therefore tend to be reluctant to enact 
effective CFC rules, which can be seen as placing their home-based 
multinational companies at a competitive disadvantage.67 
 
Chapter 4 gives further attention to the topic of CFC rules in the course of a 
discussion of the OECD’s BEPS recommendations. As will be seen, in its 
2015 BEPS reports the OECD, while noting the possible value of CFC rules 
in curtailing BEPS-style tax planning, does not offer concrete 
recommendations for strengthening them. Conceivably, the adoption of 
effective CFC rules would be made more feasible if all, or at least most, 
capital-exporting countries were willing to adopt the rules in concert. The 
BEPS process, though, did not offer concrete suggestions for international 
                                                 
66  The OECD’s 2015 final report on BEPS Action 3 (OECD 2015a: 9), notes that 30 of the countries 
participating in the BEPS deliberations had CFC rules. 
67  See generally Durst (2016b: 316). 
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coordination of CFC rules, and overall did not display optimism that the 
institution of CFC rules would be reinvigorated around the world soon. 
 
As I discuss further in Chapter 4, however, the United States enacted a new 
tax on the global intangible low-tax income (GILTI) of US-owned corporate 
groups in its December 2017 tax reform legislation.68 The GILTI rules are 
complex – their overall intention is to impose a US tax on much of a US 
group’s foreign income, at a rate of about 10.5 per cent, to the extent the 
group’s foreign income was not subject to foreign taxes of at least that rate. 
The GILTI tax therefore imposes a minimum tax on a US group’s low-tax 
foreign income. The GILTI tax serves much the same purpose as a CFC rule. 
In addition, as discussed in Chapter 4, the European Union has been 
engaged in an effort to enact effective CFC rules among member countries. 
Chapter 4 considers whether, despite the reserved tone taken towards CFC 
rules in the BEPS report, US adoption of the GILTI tax, and efforts in other 
countries to enact strengthened CFC rules, might signal a revival of the 
concept of CFC rules as a means of controlling BEPS-style tax planning. 
 
Post-1962 transfer pricing laws 
 
In addition to CFC rules, the US Congress in 1962 focused on the possibility 
of strengthening the arm’s-length approach to transfer pricing. Legislative 
consideration of transfer pricing rules, in what became the Tax Reform Act of 
1962, began in a perhaps surprising manner.69 The House of 
Representatives (the lower house of the US Congress, where revenue-
raising legislation must originate) approved a provision under which, if a 
comparable price could not be identified in sales of tangible property between 
related parties, income from the production, purchase and resale of the 
property generally was to be divided among entities according to a formula 
based on companies’ assets, payroll expenses and advertising expenses. 
The formulary method was to apply only to related-party transfers of tangible 
property, so it is not clear how the method would have applied in connection 
with avoidance planning involving transfers of rights to intangibles or of 
services. The formulary method also would not have applied if relevant 
comparable prices could be found, or if the taxpayer could agree upon a 
more accurate transfer pricing methodology with the US tax authorities. 
 
Businesses objected strongly to the House proposal, claiming both that the 
legislation was unacceptably vague, and that applying a single formula to 
many different factual circumstances would inevitably lead to unfair results. 
When the House-passed bill was transmitted to the US Senate for its 
consideration, the Senate eliminated the formulary-apportionment provision 
from subsequent versions of the legislation. Ultimately, in the 1962 Act 
Congress decided against making any change to existing transfer pricing law, 
thus in effect retaining the arm’s-length approach as it had been developed 
by the League of Nations. Congress, however, directed the US Treasury 
                                                 
68  The new GILTI tax is contained in Section 951A of the US Internal Revenue Code. 
69  The following discussion of the US 1962 Revenue Act, and ensuing transfer pricing regulations of 1968, is 
based on Durst and Culbertson (2003: 48-58) and the authorities cited therein. 
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Department to re-examine the question of whether additional regulations 
might be needed to govern transfer pricing. Congress directed the Treasury 
specifically to consider whether regulations should include ‘guidelines and 
formulas for the allocation of income and deductions’. 
 
In 1968, after a substantial delay, the US Treasury issued transfer pricing 
regulations in response to Congress’s request. The new regulations generally 
rejected Congress’s 1962 invitation to consider the use of formulas. Instead, 
the 1968 regulations introduced the idea of transfer pricing guidelines, which 
the new regulations called methods. It was clear that these methods were to 
be governed by the arm’s-length principle, with its heavy dependence on 
information derived from comparables. 
 
The 1968 regulations established three basic transfer pricing methods: (1) a 
comparable uncontrolled price method, which was to be used if apparently 
reliable comparables information for the related-party transaction in question 
could be located; (2) a cost-plus method, to be applied to sales of 
manufactured products between related parties, under which the arm’s-
length nature of pricing was to be evaluated according to whether the 
manufacturer’s gross markup on costs was similar to the markups obtained in 
comparable sales involving unrelated parties; and (3) a resale price method 
(sometimes called a resale minus method), to be applied to purchasers-
resellers of products within a commonly controlled group, under which pricing 
was to be evaluated according to whether the reseller’s gross profit (i.e. its 
gross margin) was similar to that observed in comparable sales between 
unrelated parties. If none of these three methods could be applied, the 1968 
regulations permitted the use of other methods, which in practice was taken 
to mean individually crafted profit-split methods like the fractional methods of 
apportionment to which the League of Nations had referred. 
 
In addition to creating the concept of transfer pricing methods, the 1968 US 
regulations also established the precedent of remarkably wordy and complex 
governmental transfer pricing guidance, built around the expectation that tax 
authorities would conduct highly detailed factual analyses of the operations 
and history of each taxpayer before proposing tax adjustments. It has been 
my experience that the kind of extraordinarily detailed factual inquiries for 
which the US regulations call (and, as will be seen, the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines later modelled after the US regulations) are sometimes 
beyond the practical capacity of even the most skilled government tax 
examiners or private-sector tax advisers to perform comprehensively in the 
context of real-life tax examinations.70 
 
                                                 
70  One prominent commentator in 1968 made the following observation: ‘The first question that arises after a 
close reading of the proposed … regulations is how much simplicity and reduction of uncertainty will be 
effected thereby. Their constant references to all facts and circumstances and the numerous valuation 
complexities created by the various formulas contained therein, bode ill for ease of administration hopes. 
Moreover, the incredible mass of detail contained in the proposed regulations, coupled with their almost 
equally consistent retreats to vaguely worded general principles, tend to weaken the cohesive nature of 
these provisions. The net effect of the regulations seems more likely, on balance, to increase rather than 
decrease disputes … It may well be that the new proposals, despite their general readability, just cannot be 
effectively applied to concrete situations in practice’ (Eustice 1968). 
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The efficacy of the 1968 regulations was soon tested in a series of high-
profile court controversies in the United States. Most of these cases involved 
a particular fact pattern associated with BEPS-style avoidance planning, 
‘outbound migrations of intangibles’, which bedevilled US tax authorities in 
the 1960s, and with which the US IRS continues to struggle today, largely 
unsuccessfully.71 These cases have usually involved the question of whether 
a US-based multinational has received adequate compensation, typically in 
the form of royalties, when transferring patent or other intellectual property 
rights to a low- or zero-tax affiliate under a BEPS-style tax plan.72 The 
taxpayers have prevailed against the IRS in almost all these cases,73 
typically by submitting to courts extensive analyses by consulting 
economists, arguing that the royalties received by the US parent company 
are similar to royalties received by companies in comparable arm’s-length 
arrangements. Although outbound transfers of intangibles of the kind 
involved in these cases are unlikely to arise frequently in lower-income 
countries, the US cases afford general caution regarding the practical 
limitations of comparables analysis as the basis for reasonably administrable 
transfer pricing rules. 
 
Continuing official frustration with the comparables-based rules resulted in a 
comprehensive congressional review of US transfer pricing law in connection 
with what became the Tax Reform Act of 1986.74 Early in the consideration of 
the 1986 Act, the House Ways and Means committee speculated that the 
arm’s-length approach to transfer pricing laws might be untenable as a 
conceptual matter.75 Ultimately, however, Congress in 1986 chose to make 
only minor adjustments to the existing transfer pricing rules of the Internal 
Revenue Code, leaving the law’s foundation in the arm’s-length principle 
generally unchanged.76 In addition, following the approach it had taken in 
                                                 
71  For summaries of these historical cases, see Avi-Yonah (2007: section 4). Recent examples include Veritas 
Software Corp. v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 297 (2009) and Amazon.com, Inc. v. Commissioner, 148 T.C. 
number 18 (2017) (case remains subject to review by US Court of Appeals). Legislation included in the 
December 2017 US tax reform act, however, revised some of the rules for valuing outbound transfers of 
intangibles from the United States. It is possible, therefore, that the ‘intangibles migration’ cases will be of 
largely historical significance in the future. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 466, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017) at 
661-662. 
72  e.g. a US-based multinational in the pharmaceuticals business might have developed, through research and 
development in the United States, a valuable patent to a new drug, enjoying large US tax deductions in the 
process. Then, pursuing the format of an intangibles-centred avoidance plan described in Chapter 2, the US 
might have licensed the patent to a low- or zero-tax affiliate in return for a royalty of 5 per cent of sales; the 
affiliate might then have on-licensed the rights to companies operating around the world for a royalty of 10 
per cent of sales. This arrangement would permit the rapid accumulation of high levels of profit within the 
low- or zero-tax company. The US tax authorities have typically argued in this kind of situation that the 
royalty initially paid by the low- or zero-tax company (5 per cent in this example) is below arm’s-length 
levels, thereby depriving the US of adequate taxable income from the arrangement. 
73  For a recent US judicial decision, however, siding with the IRS in a case involving an outbound intangibles 
migration, see United States v. Medtronic, case number 17-1866, US Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit 
(2018). See generally Finley (2018). 
74  The following discussion of the US 1986 Reform Act and the ensuing Treasury Department white paper on 
transfer pricing is based on Durst and Culbertson (2003: 64-77). 
75  The Committee said: ‘A fundamental problem is the fact that the relationship between related parties is 
different from that of unrelated parties. Observers have noted that multinational companies operate as an 
economic unit, and not “as if” they were unrelated to their foreign subsidiaries’ (H.R. Rep. No. 99-426, 
reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. (vol. 2) 424 (footnote omitted)). 
76  In particular, Congress added the ‘commensurate with income rule’ to Section 482 of the US Internal 
Revenue Code. This was intended to permit the IRS, in a tax controversy involving the arm’s-length level of 
a royalty that should be received in return for the outbound transfer of an intangible, to treat as evidence the 
level of income actually earned by a low- or zero-tax company from the intangible, even though that 
knowledge would not have been available to the multinational group at the time the transfer was made. 
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1962, Congress in the 1986 Act instructed the Treasury Department to 
perform a comprehensive study of the problem of transfer pricing, to examine 
whether the regulations should be changed ‘in any respect’. 
 
The Treasury issued its report on transfer pricing, usually referred to as the 
Treasury White Paper, in 1988.77 The report did not recommend wholesale 
replacement of the arm’s-length standard with a formulary approach. The 
White Paper, however, introduced a novel approach to transfer pricing 
enforcement that fundamentally changed how tax authorities around the 
world try to enforce the arm’s-length principle. 
 
The White Paper recommended the creation of a new transfer pricing 
method, which Treasury labelled the basic arm’s-length return method 
(BALRM). The method appears to have originally been largely conceived as 
a means of addressing the pricing of outbound transfers of intangibles by US 
parent companies, although, as will be seen, its use in other contexts has 
become substantially more important. Under BALRM, the IRS would have 
examined the level of profitability being earned by the low- or zero-tax affiliate 
within an intangibles-centred avoidance arrangement. If the level of profit 
earned by the affiliate seemed higher than reasonable in view of the actual 
functions performed by the affiliate – which under the typical BEPS-style 
avoidance plan would be minimal – the excess profit would be assumed 
attributable to the intangible that had been transferred by the US parent and 
included in the parent’s US taxable income. The net effect would be to 
increase the royalty paid by the low- or zero-tax subsidiary back to the United 
States. 
 
Even when seen primarily as a means of addressing the longstanding US 
problem of outbound migration of intangibles, the proposed BALRM 
approach, of attributing to specified corporations market levels of routine 
income, would have been criticised by many as an excessive departure from 
the arm’s-length paradigm. By the late 1980s, however, the BALRM proposal 
also had become embroiled in a transfer pricing dispute of a different kind, 
between the United States and some of its major trading partners, including, 
notably, Japan. 
 
The root of the controversy was a substantial decline in the value of the US 
dollar during the second half of the 1980s against a number of world 
currencies, especially the Japanese yen. This was a period in which 
Japanese manufacturers of automobiles, and other durable goods like 
industrial machinery, were making dramatic inroads into the US marketplace. 
The rapid appreciation of the yen versus the dollar made it very difficult for 
manufacturers to build cars and other expensive products in Japan, paying 
for labour and supplies in yen, and to sell the products profitably for 
depreciated dollars in the United States. 
 
                                                 
77  The White Paper, and the international controversy over transfer pricing laws that followed, are discussed in 
detail in Durst and Culbertson (2003: 64-88). 
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Japanese manufacturing groups therefore were experiencing losses, or 
substandard levels of profitability, from their US operations. The Japanese 
companies, supported by Japan’s National Tax Administration, argued that, 
for tax purposes, the losses or other substandard results should be shared 
between the Japanese parent company and its distribution subsidiary in the 
United States. The US IRS, however, argued that the distribution subsidiary 
was performing a service for its parent company for which it should be 
compensated, even if for the time being the corporate group’s US operations, 
as a whole, were experiencing losses or unusually low profitability.78 
 
Japan and other trading partners of the US feared that the IRS would use the 
BALRM approach, contrary to international tradition, as a de facto minimum 
tax on the operations of US distribution subsidiaries of foreign-owned 
manufacturing groups. Moreover, it appeared the US envisioned applying the 
new approach on a somewhat mechanical basis, under which economists 
employed by the IRS would be permitted to estimate reasonable minimum 
levels of income for foreign-owned US subsidiaries, without the need to 
conduct factually intensive, case-by-case analyses of potentially relevant 
comparables. 
 
Alarmed trading partners convened what turned into a multi-year session of 
the OECD’s tax arm to try to forge a compromise between the US and non-
US positions with respect to net-income benchmarking of subsidiaries. The 
negotiations in the OECD were at times unusually heated for that forum, and 
the debates are still sometimes referred to laconically as the ‘great transfer 
pricing wars’ of the early 1990s. The result was the release in 1994 of new 
US transfer pricing regulations, and the near-simultaneous release of a set of 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in 1995.79 
 
In response to concerns that the proposed BALRM method would be applied 
overly mechanically, the new US regulations introduced a new transfer 
pricing method called the comparable profits method (CPM), and the 1995 
OECD guidelines introduced an essentially identical method called the 
transactional net margin method (TNMM).80 Under TNMM, tax authorities are 
permitted to require that a local subsidiary of a multinational group earn at 
least a minimum level of income, commensurate with the functions the 
subsidiary performs and the business risks that it faces. However, the tax 
authority is required to base its determination of a minimum permissible level 
of income only on the basis of a case-by-case factual analysis of the 
subsidiary, including a search for financial information on companies that are 
comparable to the subsidiary under examination. 
 
Here is how a tax authority is in theory supposed to apply TNMM in ensuring, 
for example, that a local distributor of brand-name farming equipment, 
                                                 
78  See generally Guttentag and Miyatake (1994); Daily Tax Report (1994); and Akamatsu (1997). 
79  The 1994 US regulations and 1995 OECD Guidelines are described in Durst and Culbertson (2003: 90-98). 
80  Despite the differing names of the US and OECD methods, in practice the two methods are applied 
identically – see Culbertson (1995). This book will use the OECD terminology and call the method TNMM, 
as that is the term generally used in countries other than the US. 
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established in a lower-income country by a multinational group, earns 
adequate income from its operations.81 First, the local tax authority is to 
perform a detailed functional analysis of the taxpayer (called the tested party 
in the language of TNMM), to obtain an understanding of how its business 
operates. For example, does the distributor perform only routine functions 
like the receipt and delivery of products, or does the distributor also perform 
extensive advertising functions for which additional income might be 
expected? Then, after having completed the functional analysis, the tax 
authority is to review commercially available electronic databases of financial 
information gathered from publicly-traded companies to locate companies 
that perform functions comparable to those of the tested party but are 
independent, in the sense of not being parts of commonly controlled business 
groups. If any reasonably comparable independent distributors of brand-
name farming equipment are identified through the database search, their 
operating profit margins are subjected to statistical analysis. If the actual 
operating profit margin of the tested party is not below the median of the 
comparables’ margins by a statistically significant extent, the tested party’s 
results are accepted as reflecting arm’s-length pricing in its transactions with 
the other members of its multinational group. If, however, the tested party’s 
results fall below the median of the comparables’ results to a statistically 
significant extent, then the tax authority is permitted to adjust the tested 
party’s income for tax purposes up to the median. 
 
The insistence of the OECD Guidelines that tax authorities apply TNMM only 
based on detailed functional analyses of the tested party, and that tax 
authorities apply the method by reference to data from uncontrolled 
comparables, reflected the continuing concerns of trading partners of the 
United States within the OECD. The thinking at the time was, in my 
observation, that by placing formidable procedural hurdles in the way of 
successful application of the TNMM, countries’ tax authorities would be able 
to apply the new method successfully only in the case of relatively egregious 
income-stripping by locally operating subsidiaries. 
 
The negotiators at the OECD do not appear to have had BEPS-style 
avoidance structures prominently in mind when hammering out the details of 
the new TNMM in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, it soon became clear that 
TNMM was the natural – and as a practical matter the only – OECD-
approved transfer pricing method potentially available for tax authorities, 
including those in low-income countries, to use in seeking to enforce 
reasonable minimum levels of incomes for the ‘stripped risk’ distributors, 
manufacturers and service providers that figure prominently in BEPS-style 
tax planning arrangements. Indeed, TNMM appears to have become the 
world’s most commonly applied transfer pricing method.82 
 
                                                 
81  Rules governing the TNMM are contained in Paragraphs 2.64 to 2.113 of the OECD’s Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, as revised in 2017 following the OECD’s 
BEPS studies. 
82  See Collier and Andrus (2017: 111). 
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Despite the very wide application of TNMM around the world, however, tax 
administrations, even in the world’s wealthiest countries, have never been 
able to administer the TNMM effectively. The root of the problem lies in the 
OECD’s insistence that tax authorities apply the method only by reference to 
searches for financial data for uncontrolled comparables. Typically, tax 
authorities are simply unable to locate reasonably satisfactory uncontrolled 
comparables for the kinds of stripped-risk distributors, manufacturers and 
service providers that multinational groups establish as part of their tax 
planning structures. 
 
Part of the problem is that uncontrolled independent businesses generally do 
not enjoy the high degree of insulation from business risks that intragroup 
contracts afford to the limited-risk entities that multinational groups establish 
under BEPS-style plans. Therefore, the uncontrolled companies that tax 
authorities might identify through searches of financial databases are 
systematically noncomparable in economic terms to the tested parties that 
the tax authorities are trying to examine. In addition, those independent 
distributors, manufacturers and service providers that might happen to exist, 
and to perform functions roughly similar to those of the tested parties in 
TNMM examinations, are unlikely to sell stock or other securities on public 
exchanges, so that their financial information is not typically included in 
available financial databases. 
 
The practical result is that tax authorities are not usually able to identify 
enough high-quality comparables to apply TNMM persuasively in determining 
acceptable arm’s-length margins for local distributors, manufacturers and 
service providers within multinational groups. Any comparables that might be 
identified are likely to differ in obvious ways from the stripped-risk entity that 
is being examined. For example, efforts to locate purported comparables for, 
say, a local distributor of high-margin branded food or beverages might result 
in the identification of a few local wholesale food distributors that handle 
lower-margin unbranded products, at volumes significantly lower than those 
of the large brand-name distributors. 
 
Even with highly imperfect matches of this kind accepted, moreover, 
searches typically result in very small sample sizes of purported comparables 
– in my experience, sample sizes of only five or six purported comparables 
are often used in practice. Tax authorities then attempt, following the OECD 
Guidelines, to use statistical techniques to determine an arm’s-length range 
of profitability for the taxpayer that is under examination. If the taxpayer’s 
actual profitability is within that range, the taxpayer will be considered to have 
satisfied the arm’s-length pricing standard under the Guidelines.83 As the 
OECD Guidelines recognise, however, basic statistical theory makes clear 
                                                 
83  e.g. in examining a particular stripped-risk distributor, a tax authority might locate, using commercially 
available databases, financial information for six at least arguably uncontrolled comparables. Those six 
comparables might have a medium operating margin of 2.7 per cent of sales; and applying some form of 
statistical technique to the available data the tax authority might determine an arm’s length range of 
operating margins extending from 1.0 to 4.5 per cent. So long as the tested party has earned an operating 
margin of at least 1.0 per cent, therefore, the tested party will be considered to have complied with the 
arm’s-length standard in its operations. 
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that it is impossible to conduct reliable statistical analyses using very small 
sample sizes, especially when the data being used is of low quality to begin 
with.84 The result is that the statistical ranges estimated in practice tend to be 
far too wide to be of real use in tax administration – basically, the range is so 
wide that even implausibly low margins are found to be within the arm’s-
length range. In sum, TNMM as used around the world today provides tax 
administrations with only a very flawed means of attempting to prevent 
excessive profit shifting by the kinds of limited-risk distributors, 
manufacturers, and service providers that are used under BEPS-style tax 
planning structures. 
 
This book will return to the topic of transfer pricing rules, and in particular the 
TNMM, in Chapter 4, which analyses the OECD’s recent BEPS reports. The 
OECD and other international organisations have recognised the importance 
of rectifying the problem of insufficient comparables if TNMM is to function 
effectively in tax administration, especially in developing countries.85 Chapter 
4 considers the potential feasibility of improving the operation of the TNMM 
as a component of policies to enable lower-income country tax 
administrations to achieve better control over profit shifting from their 
jurisdictions. 
 
 
Profit shifting through interest deductions 
 
As described in Chapter 2, a very common kind of BEPS-style tax avoidance 
structure is based on lending money between members of multinational 
groups. Members of multinational groups routinely establish financing 
subsidiaries in low- or zero-tax countries and fund the financing subsidiaries 
with large amounts of cash. The financing subsidiaries then extend loans to 
the group’s various operating subsidiaries around the world (which often are 
risk-limited companies established pursuant to BEPS planning). The 
operating subsidiaries pay interest on the loans, which they deduct for tax 
purposes, thereby reducing their tax bills in the countries where they are 
located. There is no corresponding tax cost when the interest is received by 
the low- or zero-tax financing company, so the overall result is to reduce the 
multinational group’s global tax bill. 
 
Corporate income tax laws around the world typically allow corporations to 
deduct interest on loans, and claiming a deduction for interest is not in itself 
evidence of tax avoidance. The problem, however, is that under BEPS-style 
avoidance plans risk-limited subsidiaries can incur interest-bearing debt from 
                                                 
84  OECD Guidelines paragraph 3.57: ‘It may also be the case that, while every effort has been made to 
exclude points that have a lesser degree of comparability, what is arrived at is a range of figures for which it 
is considered, given the process used for selecting comparables and limitations in information available on 
comparables, that some comparability defects remain that cannot be identified and/or quantified, and are 
therefore not adjusted. In such cases, if the range includes a sizeable number of observations, statistical 
tools that take account of central tendency to narrow the range (e.g. the interquartile range or other 
percentiles) might help to enhance the reliability of the analysis’ [emphasis added]. 
85  See especially Platform for Collaboration on Tax (a group comprised of OECD, World Bank, IMF and UN) 
(PCT 2017). 
Chapter 3 | The historical evolution of base erosion and profit shifting 
 
 53 
related lenders far in excess of the level of debt that is necessary for a 
company to incur for business reasons. 
 
For illustration, consider the situation of a global multinational group as a 
whole. The group might find it desirable for business reasons to borrow 
money from banks and other outside lenders to a certain extent – say, to the 
point at which the group’s debt-to-equity ratio (its ratio of debt outstanding to 
the total value of its outstanding stock) is 1.5 to 1 (a typical debt-to-equity 
ratio for companies in some industries). The group will refrain from borrowing 
more because then its debt will become too risky, forcing the group to pay 
overly high interest rates. Also, incurring high levels of debt might subject the 
group to an excessive risk of bankruptcy if economic conditions change for 
the worse. Thus, at arm’s length, there are natural limits to a multinational 
group’s desire to incur additional debt to outside lenders. 
 
Within a commonly-owned multinational group, however, there are no 
substantial business constraints on the volume of loans made from one 
group member to another. As a matter of economic reality, since the same 
parent company owns the lender and the borrower, the loans place no one at 
genuine economic risk. The tax benefits that can be derived from the loans, 
nevertheless, can be very large. Not surprisingly, therefore, financing 
companies under BEPS-style planning structures often lend large sums to 
group members operating in countries around the world, causing those 
members to be much more heavily indebted than the group as a whole. For 
example, whereas a group as a whole may have a debt-to-equity ratio of 1.5 
to 1, some companies within the group might have ratios that are 
substantially higher. This kind of leverage permits massive amounts of tax 
avoidance through deduction of interest paid to group financing companies in 
low- or zero-tax countries. 
 
Although in theory the arm’s-length principle should limit the amount of debt 
between related parties to levels justified by bona fide business 
considerations, in practice the OECD’s transfer pricing methods, including 
TNMM, do not impose effective limits on tax avoidance through related-party 
lending arrangements. This is largely because the OECD’s transfer pricing 
methods, including TNMM, seek to place a floor on the amount of ‘operating 
income’ that a subsidiary is treated as earning for tax purposes – and 
operating income in accounting terminology generally means income before 
the deduction of interest paid by an entity. Therefore, even if a company 
earns, say, the minimum operating profit margin required by TNMM, the 
company can reduce its taxable income further by deducting interest paid, 
even to related parties.86 The inability of transfer pricing methods, especially 
the commonly-used TNMM, to meaningfully limit taxpayers’ interest 
                                                 
86  e.g. consider a member of a multinational group that distributes products in a particular country, and has 
sales revenue during the year of $10 million. Despite the difficulties of applying TNMM, the tax authorities of 
the country establish successfully that the distributor should earn an operating margin of at least 3 per cent, 
so the distributor should earn an operating income of at least $300,000. The distributor nevertheless 
remains free under the transfer pricing rules to reduce its taxable income below $300,000, perhaps even to 
zero, by claiming deductions for interest on loans from related parties. 
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expenses has historically represented a serious loophole in the OECD’s 
approach to controlling BEPS-style tax planning. 
 
For many decades countries around the world have maintained rules, 
separate from their transfer pricing rules, that attempt to limit deductions for 
interest paid by a company to related lenders based on whether the company 
is thinly capitalised – that is, whether the corporation has more debt relative 
to equity than seems reasonable given business needs. For example, a 
country’s statutes might disallow deductions for interest on a company’s 
loans to the extent the company’s debt-to-equity ratio exceeds, say, 3 to 1. 
This thin capitalisation approach to the control of interest deductions has 
been flawed, however, in part because, as the OECD describes in its report 
on BEPS Action 4,87 companies have been able to avoid application of the 
statutes by contributing cash to the taxpayer company, thus increasing the 
value of its equity and artificially reducing the company’s debt-to-equity ratio. 
 
As discussed further in Chapter 4, the OECD has recommended that 
countries adopt tighter limitations on corporate interest deductions, generally 
limiting interest deductions to 30 per cent of a company’s net income before 
payment of interest. Because these rules do not depend on a company’s 
debt-to-equity ratio, they cannot be avoided by injections of additional cash to 
the company. As discussed in Chapter 4, the OECD has modelled its 
recommendation on income-based interest limitations that some, mainly 
relatively wealthy, countries have adopted over the past ten years. 
 
As will be seen in Chapter 4, by the OECD’s own analysis the recommended 
30 per cent limitation would allow companies to continue to deduct interest 
on substantially larger loans than companies in most industries need to meet 
their genuine business needs. Therefore, even if lower-income countries 
adopt the OECD recommendation, companies in the countries will still be 
able to accomplish significant tax avoidance through the payment of interest 
on loans from low- or zero-tax finance companies. Moreover, because of 
perceived pressure of tax competition, it is not clear that many lower-income 
countries will choose to adopt even the limited controls on interest deductions 
that the OECD has recommended. As will be seen in Chapter 5, however, it 
is my view that the OECD recommendation, in part because of its relatively 
moderate effects, promises significant net benefits even for countries that 
feel heavily constrained in their policymaking by considerations of tax 
competition. Lower-income countries should give careful consideration to 
adopting the OECD’s recommended approach.  
                                                 
87  See the discussion of the OECD Action 4 report in Chapter 4 of this book. 
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Chapter 4 The OECD’s BEPS project and 
lower-income countries 
 
 
Why the OECD? Institutional setting of the BEPS studies 
 
In reviewing the OECD’s BEPS process as it relates to lower-income 
countries, it may be useful to begin with a question about global tax 
institutions. Why, as controversy arose over base erosion and profit shifting 
after the 2008 financial crisis, did the OECD assume leadership of the 
ensuing intergovernmental study of the topic, instead of a more inclusive 
international organisation like the United Nations? The OECD’s membership 
consists of 35 industrialised and relatively wealthy countries,88 whereas the 
United Nations consists of 193 member states at all levels of wealth and 
economic development. Especially given that, as discussed in Chapter 2, the 
fiscal consequences of BEPS-style tax planning seem disproportionately 
severe for lower-income countries, why did the BEPS process originate 
under the auspices of an organisation comprised of relatively wealthy 
countries? 
 
Much of the reason is historical, and has to do with events in the years 
immediately following World War II.89 As discussed in Chapter 3, after the 
First World War the League of Nations took leadership of a global effort to 
draft a model income tax treaty. This task, as a practical matter, involved 
articulating a standard pattern for countries to use in enacting their 
international tax laws. However, the League of Nations dissolved after the 
Second World War, and its successor, the newly-formed United Nations, was 
slow to assume the League’s former work on model tax treaties. Instead, the 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), a group of 16 
Western European countries that was established to help administer post-
War US aid under the Marshall Plan, assumed the work of studying and 
reviewing the League’s model treaties. The OEEC was succeeded by the 
OECD in 1960, with a membership extending beyond Europe, and the new 
organisation continued the OEEC’s tax treaty work. The OECD issued a new 
model income tax treaty in 1963, replacing the prior versions of the League. 
Since then the OECD, despite its relatively limited membership, has 
maintained the position of primary global standards-setter in the design of 
international tax legislation.
                                                 
88  OECD members at the time of writing are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
89  See generally McIntyre (2005), on which the following historical discussion largely relies. 
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In 1967 a group of developing countries, arguing that the international tax 
policy interests of capital-importing countries sometimes differ from those of 
capital-exporting countries, initiated an effort at the United Nations to 
articulate a model income tax treaty parallel to the OECD’s. The work on a 
model tax treaty at the UN, unlike that at the OECD, was not designated as a 
formal collaborative process among sovereign governments. Instead, the UN 
process was to be conducted by a committee of government officials and 
other tax experts from 20 countries, who were to act in their individual 
capacities. Decisions of the UN committee therefore could be seen only as 
informal recommendations of experts, not resolutions agreed to among UN 
member governments. 
 
In 1980, the UN Tax Committee issued its own model income tax treaty for 
use between developed and developing countries. The new UN model treaty 
paralleled the OECD model in overall format, but departed from it in ways 
intended to give developing country governments greater leverage in their tax 
dealings with investing multinationals. For example, in its rules regarding 
permanent establishments – that is, rules governing when an investing 
multinational has a sufficiently extensive presence in a country to become 
liable to local taxation – the UN model treaty accorded countries greater 
power to tax investors than the OECD model.90 With respect to central 
concepts, however, including notably the arm’s-length principle that governs 
the division of a multinational group’s income among countries, the UN model 
treaty was virtually identical to that of the OECD. Since 1980, both the OECD 
and the UN have been engaged in ongoing processes of reviewing and 
incrementally updating their model treaties. The two model treaties continue 
to differ in details relating to the ability of source countries to tax inbound 
investors, while remaining consistent with each other on broad principles like 
the applicability of arm’s-length transfer pricing rules.91 
 
The establishment of the UN Tax Committee, and the issuance by the 
Committee of its own model treaty, did not dent the OECD’s leading role in 
establishing global standards for international tax rules. The OECD has 
consistently maintained a much larger tax staff than the UN; it has extensive 
physical facilities based in Paris for which the UN Tax Committee has no 
counterpart; and the OECD’s formal status as an intergovernmental 
organisation gives its pronouncements and publications greater apparent 
weight of legal authority than documents generated by the UN Tax 
Committee. 
 
                                                 
90  For a useful summary of differences between the OECD and UN model treaties, see Lennard (2009). 
91  The texts of the most recent versions of the OECD and UN model tax conventions - extensive documents 
with lengthy official commentaries - are maintained on the websites of the two organisations. In addition to 
the UN model treaty, an important UN Tax Committee document is the United Nations Practical Manual on 
Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries (UN 2017 2nd ed). The UN Manual contains detailed discussions 
of special administrative issues faced by developing countries in administering and enforcing transfer pricing 
rules, but does not challenge the primacy of the arm’s-length principle, as interpreted in the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines. 
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In addition, for many years the OECD has worked closely with international 
business representatives through its Business and Industry Advisory 
Committee (BIAC).92 Although BIAC has no formal decision-making role 
within the OECD, the OECD generally appears to try to reach a working 
accord with business interests when formulating its tax guidance. Therefore, 
the OECD’s guidelines in different areas of taxation are perceived by many in 
the global tax community as reflecting the results of quasi-formal bargaining 
between global business interests and OECD member governments, a 
perception that gives the determinations of the OECD in tax matters 
additional international prestige. 
 
As the controversy over corporate tax avoidance grew around the world 
following the 2008 crisis, some non-governmental organisations criticised the 
notion of giving the OECD leadership over a tax reform study that would 
affect the interests of many countries that were not OECD members.93 
Developing countries along with the NGOs engaged in a global lobbying 
effort to upgrade the UN Tax Committee to an intergovernmental 
organisation on a par with the OECD. This effort proved unsuccessful, but 
the argument that developing countries should be represented in the BEPS 
process was persuasive. Accordingly, from the outset of the BEPS effort, in 
late 2012 the OECD’s leadership made efforts to invite developing country 
governments to participate in its deliberations in various ways. 
 
During the initial stages of the BEPS analyses, in 2013 and 2014, the 
involvement of countries other than OECD members generally entailed 
informal consultations among government officials from OECD member and 
non-member countries, both at OECD headquarters in Paris and in regional 
conferences held around the world.94 Later, as the BEPS process was 
concluding and the focus was turning to the implementation stage, the OECD 
invited all countries to participate formally in the BEPS process on an equal 
footing with OECD members, in what the OECD called an Inclusive 
Framework for implementing BEPS. About 100 countries have participated in 
meetings of the Framework.95 
 
Developing country governments have generally appeared eager to 
associate themselves with the OECD’s tax reform efforts through the 
Inclusive Framework and other institutional means of cooperation with the 
                                                 
92  For a critical look at the OECD’s historical relationship with business interests, see Drucker (2013b). 
93  For an account of NGOs’ arguments to this effect, see, e.g., Burow (2014) and Johnston (2015). 
94  The OECD describes its efforts to engage developing country governments in the BEPS process in its 
online discussion of Frequently Asked Questions on the BEPS process. It should be recognised as well that 
the initial political impetus for the BEPS process came both from the OECD and the G-20 Group of 
countries, a group that includes Brazil, China and India - see G-20 (2013: paras. 50-52). From the initial 
stages of the BEPS process, Brazil, China and India (as well as Mexico, which is an OECD member 
country) were included in negotiations as full participants, affording some degree of representation to 
countries that are often seen as developing (although their interests are likely to diverge from those of other 
developing countries with substantially lower per capita income). 
95  See Johnston (2016). 
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OECD. In my view, this reflects at least in part that developing country 
governments generally do not view themselves as engaged in zero-sum 
competition with either multinational companies or the governments of 
capital-exporting countries. It seems likely to me, instead, that most 
developing country governments perceive themselves as engaged in a 
continuous negotiation with the world’s multinationals, and with those 
companies’ home country governments, to achieve politically and 
economically viable levels of corporate taxation on cross-border investment. 
The OECD has, by longstanding practice, established itself as an 
experienced forum for conducting this kind of negotiation. As a practical 
matter, whatever doubts might be expressed as to the appropriateness of the 
OECD as the main articulator of global standards in corporate taxation, it 
seems likely that the OECD will continue to serve as the world’s primary 
locus of negotiation of those standards for the foreseeable future. 
 
As discussed further in Chapter 6, however, this does not mean that the role 
of the UN Tax Committee, and especially its analytical resources, should not 
be enhanced. There are ways in which the interests of OECD and UN 
member countries are likely to differ systematically, and forums should be 
provided to ensure that differing views are openly and thoroughly debated. 
No single institution should hold a monopoly over authoritative policy analysis 
on international taxation. But, especially if the Inclusive Framework proves to 
function effectively, the notion that the primary locus of negotiation in 
international tax matters should be shifted from the OECD to the UN seems, 
at least at the current time, politically unrealistic and potentially distracting 
from important substantive matters. 
 
Content of the OECD’s BEPS studies: overview 
 
The OECD’s BEPS studies address 15 Action items, each of which involves 
a difficult technical topic in international tax law.96 All 15 Actions are 
important, in that they relate to areas of law that play some role in facilitating 
BEPS-style corporate tax avoidance around the world. Some of the items 
addressed in the BEPS studies, however, are of more fundamental 
importance than others to the tax systems of lower-income countries. 
 
This chapter seeks to address in a non-technical manner four topics covered 
by the BEPS report that are of special practical significance for lower-income 
                                                 
96  The OECD organised its BEPS study around 15 Actions: Action 1: Address the tax challenges of the digital 
economy; Action 2: Neutralise the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements; Action 3: Strengthen CFC 
rules; Action 4: Limit base erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments; Action 5: Counter 
harmful tax practices more effectively, taking into account transparency and substance; Action 6: Prevent 
treaty abuse; Action 7: Prevent the artificial avoidance of PE status; Actions 8, 9, and 10: Assure that 
transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation; Action 11: Establish methodologies to collect and 
analyse data on BEPS and the actions to address it; Action 12: Require taxpayers to disclose their 
aggressive tax planning arrangements; Action 13: Re-examine transfer pricing documentation; Action 14: 
Make dispute resolution mechanisms more effective; and Action 15: Develop a multilateral instrument. 
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countries. These include the OECD’s treatment of: (i) transfer pricing rules; 
(ii) controlled foreign company (CFC) rules; (iii) companies’ deductions of 
interest on loans from related parties; and (iv) income tax treaty shopping. 
The chapter then discusses some measures that relatively wealthy countries 
have recently taken outside the boundaries of the BEPS recommendations to 
protect their tax bases from erosion. 
 
Transfer pricing rules under the BEPS studies 
 
The new control-of-risk test 
 
As described in Chapters 2 and 3, BEPS-style tax avoidance typically 
involves claims that members of multinational groups located in zero- or low-
tax jurisdictions are bearing business risks on behalf of the group, and 
therefore should be treated as earning a large portion of the group’s income, 
even though personnel of the zero- or low-tax affiliate may perform little or 
even no observable business activity. For example, zero- or low-tax affiliates 
that do nothing but contribute cash towards the development of a 
multinational group’s intellectual property have historically been treated as 
entitled to a large portion of the group’s global income, typically by the receipt 
of royalties from other group members. Similarly, zero- or low-tax affiliates 
that simply receive cash from parent companies and re-lend that cash to 
other group members are treated as bearing genuine risk in making the 
loans. 
 
Even before the inception of the BEPS process, an OECD discussion draft 
on transfer pricing aspects of intangible property argued strongly that 
members of multinational groups should not be rewarded for supposedly 
bearing business risks associated with the ownership of intangibles if they 
performed no significant business functions other than contributing cash to 
the intangibles’ development (OECD 2012). The discussion draft reported 
that the members of Working Party No. 6, the group of national tax and 
finance officials who are responsible for transfer pricing analysis at the 
OECD, were: ‘uniformly of the view that transfer pricing outcomes in cases 
involving intangibles should reflect the functions performed, assets used, and 
risks assumed by the parties. This suggests that neither legal ownership, nor 
the bearing of costs related to intangible development, taken separately or 
together, entitles an entity within an MNE group to retain the benefits or 
returns with respect to intangibles without more’ (OECD 2012: 12). 
 
A few months later, an early public release of the OECD during the BEPS 
process extended the principle that transfer pricing rules should enforce a 
geographic correlation between an entity’s income and its value-creating 
functions, describing the BEPS process’s goal as ‘better aligning [countries’] 
rights to tax with real economic activity’ (OECD 2013a: 8). Soon afterwards, 
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in the BEPS Action Plan the OECD similarly endorsed the goal of ensuring 
‘that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation’ (OECD 2013b: 
20). 
 
Some practitioners perceived the OECD’s intention as a substantial 
departure from existing transfer pricing rules, which generally rejected the 
notion of apportioning income among affiliates in proportion to their levels of 
observable business activities as an unacceptably formulaic departure from 
the arm’s-length principle. The language of the BEPS Action Plan indeed 
indicated possible willingness to depart from the arm’s-length principle as 
historically understood, saying that although the OECD would try in its BEPS 
recommendations to remain consistent with the arm’s-length principle, 
‘special measures, either within or beyond the arm’s length principle, may be 
required’.97 A few months later, the OECD Secretariat’s top tax official, 
Pascal Saint-Amans, alarmed practitioners further when he described himself 
as agnostic with respect to the longstanding debate between the arm’s-length 
principle and formulary approaches to the division of income among related 
companies (PwC 2014).98 
 
The BEPS final recommendations on transfer pricing, however, released late 
in 2015, do not contain special measures, and disclaim any intention to 
depart from the arm’s-length principle. Instead, the recommendations seek to 
solve the problem of excessive apportionment of income to zero- or low-tax 
affiliates by addressing how the transfer pricing rules determine which 
members of a multinational group should be treated as bearing the groups’ 
business risks. In particular, the BEPS final report has revised the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines to provide that, regardless of the language of 
intragroup contracts seeking to assign risks to particular members, an affiliate 
can be treated for tax purpose as bearing particular business risks only if it in 
fact controls the bearing of those risks (OECD 2017b: paras 1.61 ff). 
 
The question whether a member of a group controls specified risks is based 
on a subjective, facts-and-circumstances test: 
 
Control over risk involves … (i) the capability to make decisions to take 
on, lay off, or decline a risk-bearing opportunity, together with the actual 
performance of that decision-making function and (ii) the capability to 
make decisions on whether and how to respond to the risks associated 
with the opportunity, together with the actual performance of that 
                                                 
97  OECD Action Plan (2013b: 20): ‘Alternative income allocation systems, including formula based systems, 
are sometimes suggested. However, the importance of concerted action and the practical difficulties 
associated with agreeing to and implementing the details of a new system consistently across all countries 
mean that, rather than seeking to replace the current transfer pricing system, the best course is to directly 
address the flaws in the current system, in particular with respect to returns related to intangible assets, risk 
and over-capitalisation. Nevertheless, special measures, either within or beyond the arm’s length principle, 
may be required with respect to intangible assets, risk and over-capitalisation’. 
98  See also Johnston (2014). 
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decision-making function. It is not necessary for a party to perform the 
day-to-day mitigation … in order to have control of the risks. Such day-
to-day mitigation may be outsourced … However, where these day-to-
day mitigation activities are outsourced, control of the risk would require 
capability to determine the objectives of the outsourced activities, to 
decide to hire the provider of the risk mitigation functions, to assess 
whether the objectives are being adequately met, and, where 
necessary, to decide to adapt or terminate the contract with that 
provider, together with the performance of such assessment and 
decision-making. In accordance with this definition of control, a party 
requires both capability and functional performance as described above 
in order to exercise control over a risk (OECD 2017b: para 1.65). 
 
This language is then followed in the newly revised Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines by five paragraphs detailing the various facts that a tax examiner 
is supposed to consider in determining whether personnel of a zero- or low-
tax affiliate are exercising sufficient hands-on supervisory responsibility over 
a business activity to be seen as controlling the activity. The paragraphs 
avoid any language that could be seen as establishing a bright-line 
quantitative test for the level of supervisory activity that will suffice to 
constitute control. 
 
The new control-of-risk test therefore makes controversy between tax 
planners and tax authorities inevitable: how many people, at what levels of 
seniority, must a zero- or low-tax subsidiary employ to establish control over 
the subsidiary’s claimed business risks? This kind of controversy will not be 
new. Tax practitioners have for years been reluctant to endorse tax plans in 
which a zero- or low-tax company has no employees or observable business 
activity, being concerned with the substance-over-form doctrine or general 
anti-avoidance rules that most countries have had for a long time, as 
described in Chapter 3. The standard of practice instead generally has been 
to require at least some observable quantum of personnel and activities. 
Given the difficulty faced by tax authorities in seeking adjustments based on 
subjective substance tests, minimal physical activity in zero- and low-tax 
jurisdictions often suffices, as a matter of practice, to sustain BEPS-style 
planning structures. A key question is whether the new control-of-risk test 
has sufficient verbal teeth to limit companies’ tax-planning practices 
employing low- and zero-tax subsidiaries of arguably limited economic 
substance. 
 
In practical tax enforcement, the new test is more likely to be of immediate 
use to tax authorities in residence countries where multinationals are based, 
than in source countries where operating subsidiaries are often based. To 
some extent, tax administrations in source countries might attempt to counter 
taxpayers’ claims to treatment of local subsidiaries as risk-stripped on the 
grounds that substantial risks are in fact controlled by personnel of the 
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subsidiaries.99 Making an argument of this kind might afford the source 
country additional leverage in seeking to increase the profit margin of local 
subsidiaries under the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM). Given the 
subjectivity inherent in determining whether risks are controlled locally, 
however, it may be hard for the source country tax authority to make the 
argument persuasively. In particular, it may be difficult for the tax authority to 
prevail upon a particular transfer pricing adjustment as appropriate to a local 
subsidiary’s arguable control of risks. 
 
In residence countries, however, the control-of-risk might be of use to tax 
authorities in seeking to challenge the results of offshoring, of intangibles 
ownership or of economic functions like intragroup lending. For example, the 
tax administration of a country in which a multinational group is based might 
argue that a low- or zero-tax intangibles holding company with few apparent 
activities does not genuinely control the risks related to the intangibles it 
purports to earn, but that those risks are in reality borne by the parent 
company. The tax administration might therefore insist that royalty income 
paid to the holding company should instead be treated as paid to the parent 
company. The same argument might be made with respect to a zero- or low-
tax financing company – the tax administration might argue that the parent 
rather than the financing company in reality controls the risks related to 
intragroup loans, so that interest income received by the financing company 
should be taxable instead to the parent company. 
 
Even if the control-of-risk test does prove to be of more immediate practical 
use in residence than source countries, the test might nevertheless offer 
revenue benefits to source countries. To the extent residence countries 
choose to enforce the new test rigorously, they will reduce the attractiveness 
of BEPS-style tax planning to their home-based multinationals, thereby 
perhaps reducing the level of tax deductions taken in lower-income countries. 
It is unclear, however, (i) whether as a political matter capital-exporting 
countries will in fact desire to enforce the new control-of-risk test rigorously, 
or (ii) given the subjective nature of the new test, whether courts in capital-
exporting countries will support tax adjustments that might be made under it. 
In sum, therefore, while the new control-of-risk test might reduce overall 
global demand for profit shifting from lower-income countries, the extent to 
which that effect will materialise remains to be seen. 
 
The BEPS project and the TNMM 
The BEPS reports do not directly address problems of the TNMM which, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, is the transfer pricing method that lower-income 
countries typically apply in attempting to ensure that local subsidiaries of 
multinational groups report reasonable levels of taxable income. In the 
aftermath of the BEPS project, however, the OECD, along with the IMF, UN 
                                                 
99  This approach is suggested in the context of Indian tax administration in UN (2017) at paras D.3.4.3 and 
D.3.4.4. 
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and World Bank, have established a Platform for Collaboration on Tax (PCT) 
to provide technical assistance in transfer pricing administration to 
developing countries. The PCT has produced a detailed study (Toolkit) of the 
administrative challenges posed by different OECD transfer pricing methods, 
including the TNMM (PCT 2017). The Toolkit can be seen as the functional 
equivalent of a BEPS report on TNMM as it is applied in developing 
countries, and it offers some important observations. 
 
The Toolkit reports that tax administrations in developing countries have 
often been unable to identify sufficient numbers of uncontrolled comparables 
from commercially available financial databases or other sources to apply the 
TNMM effectively.100 In the absence of sufficient data on comparables, it can 
be impossible to argue with reasonable persuasiveness (the kind of 
persuasiveness that might support a finding in court) that the income of a 
taxpayer is lower than the taxpayer would have earned at arm’s length. The 
Toolkit offers various means by which tax administrations might try to expand 
the pool of available comparables, for example by accepting comparables 
from other areas of the world, or perhaps by using comparables information 
derived from tax returns in the tax administration’s files, as well as from 
commercially available financial databases. 
 
The Toolkit acknowledges, however, that in many circumstances these 
measures will not suffice to generate a persuasive case that a local 
subsidiary should be earning income of at least a specified level: ‘This reality 
means that all parties need to be realistic about the use of comparability 
data, and avoid the misperception that comparability analyses always result 
in a well-defined and definitive answer. It is often necessary to recognise that 
a comparability analysis provides only an approximate answer, and that 
some flexibility is needed to determine a principled answer in many cases’ 
(PCT 2017: 66). 
 
The Toolkit suggests that, even if available comparables are insufficient to 
permit a definitive answer in a transfer pricing examination, the available data 
might provide a tax authority with a basis for negotiating a resolution with the 
taxpayer.101 A transfer pricing method that provides only a starting point for 
                                                 
100  The Toolkit says: ‘A common concern of developing economies in the implementation of transfer pricing 
regimes relates to difficulties in accessing information on ‘comparables’: data on transactions between 
independent parties used in the application of the arm’s length principle ... Available statistics and academic 
research on the availability of information on comparables corroborate the difficulties reported by many 
developing countries. Often, the information relevant to a jurisdiction can only be accessed through the 
purchase of a licence from database providers. However, even putting aside the financial cost of acquiring 
access to such databases, challenges for developing country tax administrations often remain, particularly 
in cases where little relevant information relating to a specific jurisdiction or even region exists. Where the 
information does exist, it may exhibit differences compared to the transactions under review. Typically, in 
such cases, transfer pricing practitioners need to consider using imperfect data, including the use of data 
from foreign markets. However, the effectiveness of such approaches has not been studied sufficiently to 
enable definitive conclusions to be drawn about when they are reliable or how any adjustments to account 
for such differences should be applied’ (PCT 2017: 12). 
101  PCT (2017: 67): ‘Some countries, particularly those that are more experienced in transfer pricing seek to 
mitigate this issue by negotiating with taxpayers to arrive at a sensible, arm’s length result, however others, 
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negotiation with taxpayers, however, is not appropriate for principled and 
transparent tax administration. The TNMM, therefore, remains an unsolved 
problem for tax administrations. Although TNMM is in many cases the only 
OECD-endorsed transfer pricing method that is practically available to lower-
income country tax administrations to try to control base erosion and profit 
shifting, the method remains too flawed to serve this purpose effectively.102 
 
The Toolkit mentions several possible routes towards improving the 
performance of TNMM. First, it describes (but does not endorse) the 
approach to transfer pricing that is used by Brazil (PCT 2017: 76). Brazil 
employs a transfer pricing method that is similar to TNMM, but does not rely 
on searches for comparables. Instead, the tax authority publishes required 
minimum margins for companies performing different kinds of activities in the 
country.103 The Brazilian fixed margin approach, however, is inconsistent with 
the political settlement within the OECD that gave rise to the TNMM in 1995 
– particularly the insistence on case-by-case, factually-intensive 
examinations of each taxpayer, with individualised searches for 
comparables.104 Even today, in light of growing recognition of the difficulties 
of applying TNMM, it is unlikely that many OECD members would consider 
favourably an approach like Brazil’s, which dispenses with case-by-case 
identification of comparables.105 Therefore, at least in the short term, it seems 
unlikely that widespread adoption of a Brazilian-style fixed margin approach 
will solve the difficulties faced by low-income country tax administrations in 
attempting to apply TNMM. 
 
The Toolkit also considers an approach to simplifying administration of 
TNMM that is in some ways similar to, but not as prescriptive as, the 
Brazilian fixed margin approach, namely the statement by a tax 
administration of safe harbour net margins for specified categories of local 
subsidiaries of multinational groups (PCT 2017: 75, 82-84). For example, 
                                                 
particularly many developing countries, prefer to avoid settlement of cases in this manner. Further, many 
developing countries report that they do not have the capacity to negotiate in this way. However, where tax 
administrations do negotiate with taxpayers, the available data will inform the negotiations’. (Footnote 
omitted.) 
102  The Toolkit observes that TNMM is not the only transfer pricing method potentially available to tax 
authorities, and that in some cases, especially where the activities of a local subsidiary seem to generate 
locally valuable intangibles, a profit split method might be most appropriate - see, e.g., PCT (2017: 28-29). 
The profit split method, however, requires tax administrators to analyse not only a multinational group’s local 
operations, but also the operations of other group affiliates located around the world. In practice, convincing 
profit split analyses can surpass the technical capacity of even the best-resourced revenue administrations, 
and transfer pricing enforcement in lower-income countries generally is likely to remain limited, as a 
practical matter, largely to attempts to apply the TNMM. 
103  The Brazilian transfer pricing rules are described in detail in Chapter D.1 of the UN Practical Transfer 
Pricing Manual for Developing Countries (UN 2017 2nd edition). The Brazilian approach is described in PCT 
(2017: 75-76). (As a technical point, it should be noted that the margins specified under the Brazilian 
approach are gross margins, rather than the net margins prescribed for use under TNMM. It should be 
possible, however, also to apply the Brazilian approach in the context of a transfer pricing method based on 
net instead of gross margins.) 
104  See the discussion of the origins of TNMM in Chapter 3. 
105  In connection with Brazil’s proposed membership in the OECD, the Brazilian government and the OECD 
are, at the time of writing, exploring means of harmonising the current Brazilian approach to transfer pricing 
with the OECD Guidelines. See Johnston and Finley (2018). 
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minimum safe-harbour profit margins might be prescribed for subsidiaries 
engaged in distribution, manufacturing and the provision of various kinds of 
services. Taxpayers would be assured that if their operating margins were at 
least as high as the safe-harbour levels, the tax authority would not subject 
them to further transfer pricing examination. The safe-harbour margin levels 
would not be binding on taxpayers – that is, if a taxpayer believes that the 
applicable safe-harbour margin is too high, the taxpayer would remain free to 
state a lower margin on their tax return. The overall success of the safe 
harbour therefore depends on the hope that many taxpayers would choose to 
comply with it to avoid the costs and uncertainties of undergoing intensive 
transfer pricing examination.106 
 
The 1995 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, reflecting their overall aversion 
to any departure from the use of comparables in transfer pricing 
enforcement, expressed disapproval of transfer pricing safe harbours.107 
However, in 2013 the OECD revised the Guidelines and endorsed the use by 
countries of safe harbours as an aid to transfer pricing administration (OECD 
2013c). Therefore, at least in theory, transfer pricing safe harbours fall within 
the OECD’s international consensus of acceptable tax administration 
mechanisms. 
 
Nevertheless, in practice, countries have made relatively little use of transfer 
pricing safe harbours as a means of simplifying the application of TNMM. 
India appears to be the only country to have attempted the use of transfer 
pricing safe harbours on a large scale.108 Practitioners, however, appear to 
have perceived the Indian safe harbour margins as unrealistically high, and 
reportedly few taxpayers have followed them. The difficulties seen in the 
Indian safe-harbour regime reflect a problem inherent in safe harbours under 
TNMM. If the tax authority sets the required safe harbour margins too low, 
they will be seen as permitting taxpayers to report income below the proper 
arm’s-length level. If they set the safe harbour margins too high, taxpayers 
will report income below the safe-harbour levels and risk examination. 
 
Another problem in designing safe harbours is determining the extent, if any, 
to which taxpayers who report income below safe-harbour levels should be 
subjected to heightened scrutiny by tax authorities. Arguably the most 
common-sense approach would be to subject these taxpayers to both an 
enhanced likelihood of selection for audit and a strong burden of persuasion 
in supporting margins below safe-harbour levels. However, a safe harbour 
with this kind of relatively strong presumptive effect, arguably would be 
difficult to distinguish in practice from the politically problematic Brazilian 
                                                 
106  The discussion in the following paragraphs is based in large part on the analysis of transfer pricing safe 
harbours in Durst (2017a). 
107  See OECD (1995: chapter 4(E) (text subsequently replaced as described below)). 
108  See generally Lewis (2017). See also Collier and Andrus (2017: 269-270) (noting the historical lack of use 
of transfer pricing safe harbours and encouraging countries to give safe harbours closer consideration). 
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approach. Moreover, even if a country attempts to subject taxpayers with 
margins below safe-harbour levels to strong adverse presumptions in tax 
audits, the only transfer pricing method by which the tax administration can 
attempt to enforce the presumption is likely to be the TNMM, which remains 
largely ineffective in application because of the difficulty of identifying 
comparables. 
 
In sum, transfer pricing safe harbours at least in theory offer potential 
administrative advantages for lower-income countries by inducing some 
taxpayers to avail themselves of safe-harbour margins and thereby reduce 
pressure on the transfer pricing audit process. Some key problems in the 
design of safe harbours remain unresolved. Perhaps the most important of 
these unresolved problems are: (i) the level at which safe harbour margins 
should be set, and (ii) the degree of presumptiveness that should be afforded 
to the published safe-harbour margins. Progress in resolving these problems 
is only likely to occur incrementally as additional countries seek to implement 
safe harbours. 
 
As an additional approach to improving transfer pricing enforcement in 
developing countries, the PCT Toolkit envisions technical assistance to help 
tax administrators broaden the criteria for identifying acceptable comparables 
under TNMM. For example, the Toolkit envisions providing assistance in 
adjusting the results of comparables found in databases covering different 
geographic regions, and in supplementing data from commercial databases 
with data culled from taxpayers’ returns (with safeguards to prevent 
disclosure of information that might be associated with particular taxpayers). 
If successful, this kind of assistance could help tax administrators to 
assemble larger numbers of comparables for use in a transfer pricing 
examination, and thereby to make a more persuasive case for adjustment 
when taxpayers have reported apparently low levels of income. 
 
The Toolkit envisions continuation of current efforts under the auspices of the 
OECD and other international organisations to provide training to transfer 
pricing examiners in developing countries. The still-unresolved problem of 
comparables under TNMM raises the question of whether this training is 
likely to be cost-effective in generating significant revenue recovery. The 
discussion in Chapter 5 shows even the best-trained of tax examiners is 
unlikely to be able to generate sufficiently large numbers of comparables to 
support a strongly defensible TNMM analysis during the course of a tax audit.  
 
Against this, however, as the Toolkit points out, in practice transfer pricing 
examinations are sometimes resolved based not upon scientifically 
conclusive analysis of comparables, but instead upon de facto negotiation 
between taxpayers and examiners (PCT 2017: 67). In this connection, 
enhanced training of examiners in TNMM could be helpful for two reasons: (i) 
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the training could increase examiners’ skills in pointing out vulnerabilities to 
taxpayers with respect to their reported return positions, thereby enhancing 
the kind of resolution that auditors are able to negotiate; and (ii) the training 
could increase the pool of available transfer pricing auditors, thereby 
increasing the number of instances in which revenue is recovered through 
negotiation. Revenue recovery through increased transfer pricing audit 
coverage is especially likely if audit coverage in a jurisdiction has been 
limited historically. Therefore, despite the defects of current transfer pricing 
methods, revenue recovery after training efforts could be substantial – 
especially in the initial years following the training. 
 
Tax Inspectors Without Borders (TIWB), a collaboration of the OECD and 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), has provided on-the-job 
training to transfer pricing examiners for several years, and revenue recovery 
has reportedly been significant – greatly exceeding the costs of the 
programme.109 It seems sensible to continue and even expand current efforts 
in technical assistance in transfer pricing administration efforts, so long as 
the revenue benefits appear to significantly outweigh the costs. 
 
It is nevertheless important that training and other forms of technical 
assistance do not mask the need for transfer pricing methods that can be 
applied more persuasively and predictably than is possible today. In 
particular, the persistence of a regime in which results can only be 
negotiated, rather than determined with reasonable certainty, is unacceptable 
in the long or even medium term, given the obvious dangers with respect to 
the integrity and effectiveness of revenue administration. 
 
Transfer pricing documentation under BEPS 
 
BEPS Action 13 addressed the topic of transfer pricing documentation and 
country-by-country (CbC) reporting.110 The requirement that taxpayers 
maintain transfer pricing documentation originated in the US during the early 
1990s, and has now spread to dozens of countries around the world at all 
levels of economic development.111 The idea has been that by maintaining, 
and making available to tax authorities on request, a comprehensive 
explanation of the policies under which they determine transfer prices, 
taxpayers will enable tax inspectors to perform more effective transfer pricing 
audits. 
                                                 
109  Tax Inspectors without Borders (2018: 19-20). The TIWB reports revenue gains in excess of the equivalent 
of $100 for each dollar spent on the programme. 
110  The OECD’s recommendations under Article 13 are contained in two documents, Guidance on Transfer 
Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting (OECD 2014) and a brief Final Report on Action 
13 (OECD 2015d). 
111  For historical background, see Durst and Culbertson (2003: 96-98). 
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In practice, it has been my impression that in many instances transfer pricing 
documentation is of surprisingly limited value to tax examiners. During the 
1990s, as first the US and then dozens of other countries began requiring 
documentation, its drafting quickly became a routinised function of 
accounting firms and other consultants around the world. In part through the 
movement of personnel among accounting and other firms, transfer pricing 
documentation quickly took on a standardised format. Much of the factual 
description of the taxpayer’s business in the documentation has tended to be 
copied from annual reports or similar documents prepared under securities 
laws. This material is publicly available and would be readily available to tax 
inspectors even in the absence of the documentation. The documentation 
also contains the results of taxpayers’ computerised comparable searches. 
However, in most instances the analyses are performed under TNMM, and 
because of the difficulties of statistical analysis under that method, the arm’s-
length ranges reported in the documentation are generally, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, too wide to be very useful in tax enforcement. 
 
After a few years of operating with transfer pricing documentation in the US, 
it became clear that in practice many examiners were not reviewing the 
documentation.112 Examiners in the US are now required to memorialise in 
their files that they have read the taxpayer’s transfer pricing documentation, 
but it is not clear whether this requirement has led to enhanced revenue 
recovery. 
 
Under BEPS Action 13 the OECD has prescribed a standard format to be 
used internationally for transfer pricing documentation. Information on the 
multinational group’s global activities (the master file) is to be combined with 
information on local activities in each country (the local file). The OECD 
recommendations also contain standard templates for the presentation of 
information, designed to make the documentation more useful to tax 
examiners. Tax administrations around the world are adopting the OECD’s 
recommendations, and they are likely to be used widely by tax 
administrations. 
 
The Action 13 report also recommends that countries require large 
multinational groups (those with consolidated global sales greater than €750 
million) to prepare, and make available to the tax authorities, a country-by-
country (CbC) report that compares the distribution of the group’s taxable 
income among the countries where it operates, to the distribution of the 
group’s active business activities among those countries. The group’s 
business activities are measured by the group’s sales, the value of its 
tangible assets and its number of employees in each country. The CbC 
                                                 
112  See Memorandum from IRS chief corporate enforcement official Larry Langdon to IRS Executives, 
Managers, and Agents (22 January 2003) (reminding of the need for examiners to request transfer pricing 
documentation). 
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report therefore shows tax authorities how the apportionment of a group’s 
income among countries differs from the apportionment that might have 
resulted from a three-factor formulary system. Governments generally have 
reacted favourably to the OECD’s recommendation with respect to CbC 
reports, and many member as well as non-member countries are 
implementing the new requirement.113 
 
The OECD promotes CbC reporting as a potentially valuable risk assessment 
tool for tax administrations in conducting transfer pricing examinations. 
Presumably, the CbC breakdown will assist examiners in identifying 
situations where income is being shifted from their jurisdictions to zero- or 
low-tax affiliates. 
 
It should be noted, however, that in their final form the OECD’s CbC rules 
differ from the version originally proposed in an important respect. The CbC 
proposal originated not with the OECD or national tax administrations, but 
instead with NGOs, which had a broader function in mind for it.114 The NGOs 
advocated that multinational groups’ CbC reports be made available not only 
to tax authorities, but also to the public. The apparent hope was that public 
dissemination of the CbC reports would generate continuing political 
pressure for change to international tax rules, particularly in the direction of 
formulary apportionment. The proposal for public disclosure, however, 
departed from a longstanding global consensus in favour of treating 
companies’ tax filings as confidential, and the OECD did not adopt it. To the 
contrary, the OECD’s report on Action 13 recommends strongly that tax 
authorities protect CbC reports from public disclosure. In addition, the OECD 
emphasises that, although it expects the CbC reports to be useful to tax 
authorities for risk assessment, the requirement does not reflect an intention 
to establish formulary apportionment as a substantive rule – and in particular 
countries are not to use CbC reports as the basis for tax adjustments made 
on formulary principles. 
 
I believe it is important to be cautious in expectations that the new 
documentation rules, including the CbC rules, will fundamentally enhance the 
capacity of tax examiners in practice. In my experience, a barrier to effective 
transfer pricing examinations is often not that tax inspectors lack necessary 
information, but instead that they are expected in theory, under the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines and similar bodies of national regulation, to 
consult a broader range of information about a taxpayer than can be 
organised and digested in a real-life tax audit.115 Presenting the same or a 
higher volume of information, but in an internationally standardised format, 
                                                 
113  See OECD (2017c). 
114  See generally Murphy (2012). 
115  A sample functional analysis questionnaire, to be used by examiners in transfer pricing examinations, is 
attached to the PCT Toolkit (PCT 2017: Appendix 1). It should be apparent from a reading of this document 
that detailed functional analysis conforming with OECD standards occurs more frequently in theory than in 
practice. 
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may have only a limited effect on the quality of transfer pricing examinations 
that can be performed under applicable rules. Tax examiners, moreover, 
have long had access to information concerning the kinds of outbound flows 
of royalties, service fees, interest payments and other items that produce 
base erosion and profit shifting. Obtaining confirmation in CbC reports that a 
multinational group as a whole is accumulating profits in low- or zero-tax 
countries may not tell examiners much that they were not previously aware 
of.116 
 
This is not to say that CbC reports will have no effect on compliance: they 
might, for example, assist tax administrators in building support within their 
agencies for additional compliance efforts involving multinationals that make 
especially heavy use of profit shifting. In addition, companies may temper 
their tax planning out of concern that CbC reports might in practice become 
publicly available.117 Moreover, CbC reports should make available statistical 
data that will shed light on the effectiveness of BEPS measures generally, 
thereby building a knowledge base that could prove valuable in improving tax 
administration around the world.118 Country-by-country reporting, though, is 
unlikely to have substantial immediate effects on the effectiveness of tax 
examinations. Its primary effects are likely to result gradually from effects on 
the culture of multinational tax planning over time.  
 
The BEPS project and CFC rules 
 
The OECD’s Action 3 report 
 
Action 3 of the OECD’s BEPS effort addressed the task of designing effective 
controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules. CFC rules, it will be recalled from 
Chapter 3, are laws, following a pattern originating in the US in 1962, by 
which many countries have sought to limit benefits to their home-based 
multinationals from shifting income from countries where they operate to 
affiliates in zero- or low-tax countries. Essentially, under a CFC rule, any 
                                                 
116  It is even possible that CbC reports might impede the transfer pricing audit process to some extent, by 
requiring examiners to assimilate voluminous information of potentially little operational relevance. In this 
connection, the Canada Revenue Agency has prepared for the OECD a risk assessment manual for use 
with CbC reports. Although the manual suggests numerous ways in which tax examiners might employ CbC 
reports to identify taxpayers for transfer pricing examination, the manual also contains the following warning: 
‘One of the most basic challenges faced by tax authorities will be the sheer volume of information provided. 
CbC Reports are prepared by the largest MNE groups, many of which include hundreds or even thousands 
of entities, across a large number of jurisdictions. In addition, jurisdictions will vary in terms of the number of 
CbC Reports they will receive, but some large jurisdictions are expecting to receive several thousand 
reports (including those received from foreign tax authorities). This quantity of information will pose a 
particular problem for tax authorities that rely on manual processes, but even those which currently use 
automated systems may find it challenging to determine information relevant to their jurisdiction, to apply 
risk assessment tools and to identify risk flags among such a large volume of data’ (OECD 2017d: 46). 
117  In this connection, it is not out of the question that one or more countries might mandate public disclosure of 
CbC reports at some time in the future. 
118  See Johnston (2018a). 
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amounts accumulated in zero- or low-tax affiliates are treated as CFC 
income, and become taxable by the home country. 
 
If all countries subjected their home-based multinationals to strict CFC rules, 
the incidence of BEPS around the world, including in lower-income countries, 
would be substantially reduced if not eliminated. As described in Chapter 3, 
however, capital-exporting countries generally have allowed their CFC rules 
to become relatively toothless over time. The problem has basically been 
political – when a country imposes CFC rules, it precludes its own 
multinationals from benefiting from profit-shifting opportunities that might 
remain available to other countries’ multinationals. 
 
The OECD’s Action 3 report acknowledges the political difficulties that have 
led to the maintenance of weak CFC rules, referring somewhat delicately to 
the need to ‘strik[e] a balance between taxing foreign income and maintaining 
competitiveness’ (OECD 2015a: 15). The report also notes the possibility that 
capital-exporting countries might, at least in theory, mitigate concerns 
regarding competitiveness through multilateral coordination of their CFC 
rules.119 The report, however, perhaps bowing to political reality, makes no 
move towards advocacy of a global network of strict CFC rules as a primary 
goal of the BEPS project. 
 
Instead, the bulk of the Action 3 report consists of an exhaustive and, in tone, 
academic discussion of the various technical choices that legislatures and tax 
authorities must make in drafting CFC statutes and regulations.120 
Apparently, lack of consensus among governments during the BEPS process 
prevented the OECD from taking a more prescriptive approach to the topic of 
CFC rules, notwithstanding the rules’ potential for substantially curtailing 
BEPS around the world through collective action by capital-exporting 
countries. 
 
The Action 3 report notes that some countries’ CFC rules attempt to only tax 
income that is shifted from the multinational’s home country (i.e. from the 
country that has enacted the CFC rules), rather than from other countries.121 
The approach of protecting only the tax base of the home country removes 
the protection that CFC rules might otherwise afford to the tax bases of other 
                                                 
119  OECD (2015a: 16): ‘[A] way to maintain competitiveness would be to ensure that more countries implement 
similar CFC rules. This is therefore a space where countries working collectively and adopting similar rules 
could reduce the competitiveness concerns that individual countries may have when considering whether to 
implement CFC rules’. 
120  One practitioner’s critique of an intermediate draft of the Action 3 report was entitled, ‘How Not to Engage 
with CFC Rules’ (Blanchard 2015). 
121  This topic is discussed in OECD 2015a: 15-16. An example is provided by the CFC rules currently 
maintained by the UK; see the UK government explanation of the rules at UK Government (2013). 
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countries, including lower-income countries.122 Arguably, rules incorporating 
this approach should not be considered CFC rules at all, but should be seen 
as a different species of base protection measure that countries might 
implement.123 
 
CFC rules and the EU anti-tax avoidance directive 
 
In July 2016, as a follow-up to the OECD’s final BEPS reports, the Council of 
the European Union issued an Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive prescribing 
minimum standards for anti-tax avoidance legislation that EU member states 
were to enact by the end of 2018.124 It is not clear at the time of writing 
whether the Directive will permit member states to adopt CFC rules that 
apply only to income shifted from the enacting country itself, or whether 
countries will be required to maintain CFC rules that also protect the tax 
bases of other countries. 
 
Even if the Directive is interpreted as requiring members to adopt rules that 
protect the tax bases of other countries, however, the effect on the global 
extent of base erosion and profit shifting may not prove very large. The 
Directive permits member countries to exempt from coverage by CFC rules 
income transferred to a zero- or low-tax company that ‘carries on a 
substantive economic activity supported by staff, equipment, assets and 
premises, as evidenced by relevant facts and circumstances’. This is a vague 
test, similar in form to the minimum substance tests contained in many 
general anti-avoidance rules around the world. Depending on how member 
countries choose to interpret the test, CFC practice in the EU might devolve 
into gamesmanship, with companies seeking to satisfy the test through 
assigning only a token number of employees and minimal level of physical 
business activity to zero- or low-tax affiliates. If EU governments accept this 
interpretation, the effect of European CFC rules on demand for BEPS 
planning could be quite limited. 
 
In fairness, it should not be assumed that EU countries will interpret the 
requirement for CFC rules in so permissive a manner. EU governments may 
instead require that subsidiaries in zero- or low-tax jurisdictions demonstrate 
a high level of observable, profit-motivated business activities to be 
                                                 
122  The OECD’s Action 3 report criticises this characteristic of CFC rules that protects the tax base only of the 
parent country: ‘CFC rules that focus only on parent jurisdiction stripping may not be as effective against 
BEPS arrangements for two reasons. First, it may not be possible to determine which country’s base has 
been stripped (for example, in the case of stateless income). Second, even if it were possible to determine 
which country’s base was stripped, the BEPS Action Plan aims to prevent erosion of all tax bases, including 
those of third countries. This issue may be of particular relevance for developing countries because there 
may be more of an incentive to structure through low-tax jurisdictions in the absence of CFC rules that focus 
on foreign-to-foreign stripping’ (OECD 2015a: 16 [footnote omitted]). 
123  cf. the related discussion of the UK and Australian Diverted Profits Tax rules, and the US Base Erosion and 
Anti-Abuse Tax (BEAT), below at notes 62-63 and accompanying text. 
124  Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that 
directly affect the functioning of the internal market. 
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exempted from CFC rules. This kind of interpretation might make it difficult 
for EU-based multinationals to continue to engage in BEPS-style tax 
planning, thus affording significant protection to lower-income countries 
around the world. Moreover, EU countries maintaining effective CFC rules 
could establish a normative standard for capital-exporting countries outside 
the EU, resulting in further reductions in profit shifting globally. 
 
Finally, another EU-related development that should be mentioned has been 
the willingness in recent years of the European Commission to challenge 
member countries’ extensions of tax benefits to multinational companies 
under the doctrine of state aid.125 Although the long-term significance of the 
Commission’s state aid campaign is yet to be determined, it seems possible 
that, like more effective CFC rules, application of the state aid doctrine could 
reduce the availability of low- and zero-tax jurisdictions for multinationals to 
use in connection with BEPS-style tax planning. This effect might be 
sufficiently widespread to measurably reduce global demand for BEPS-style 
tax planning as it affects countries at all levels of economic development. 
 
The GILTI tax: revival of CFC concept in 2017 US tax reform 
 
In its tax reform legislation of December 2017, the United States enacted a 
special tax on the Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (GILTI) of US-owned 
multinational groups. The GILTI tax is complex in its structure.126 Somewhat 
simplified, it generally imposes a US tax, at a rate of 10.5 per cent (half the 
regular US corporate rate of 21 per cent), on that portion of a US-owned 
group’s foreign income that exceeds a 10 per cent return on the value of the 
group’s foreign tangible assets, except to the extent that the income has 
already been subject to foreign tax. Thus, roughly speaking (as the actual 
computations are complex and depend upon the availability to the US 
taxpayer of foreign tax credits), the GILTI tax subjects the non-US income of 
US-based multinational groups, above a routine level (defined as a return of 
10 per cent on the group’s foreign tangible assets), to a minimum tax of 10.5 
per cent. 
 
The GILTI tax would appear to remove some of the financial benefit to US-
owned multinationals from engaging in BEPS planning around the world, and 
therefore may reduce some of the competitive pressure on lower-income 
countries to tolerate the erosion of their tax bases. In practice, however, 
because of the way that the GILTI minimum tax is structured, the degree of 
protection afforded to lower-income countries may be limited. 
 
                                                 
125  e.g. see European Commission (2017). 
126  The GILTI tax is contained in Section 951A of the US Internal Revenue Code. It is described in detail at pp. 
622-627 of H.R. Conf. Report No. 466, Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017). 
Chapter 4 | The OECD’s BEPS project and lower-income countries 
 
 74 
During the Obama Administration, the president had proposed a minimum 
tax roughly similar in structure to the GILTI tax, except that application of the 
minimum tax would be determined on a per-country basis.127 That is, the 
minimum tax would have applied to the extent the US-owned group’s 
effective tax rate in any single country fell below the stated threshold amount, 
even if the group was subject to higher effective tax rates in other countries. 
Under the overall approach of the GILTI tax, however, a US-owned group 
becomes subject to the minimum tax only if the average effective non-US tax 
rate on all the group’s non-US income falls below a threshold level, generally 
13.125 per cent. Thus, under the GILTI tax a taxpayer facing a high tax rate 
in some countries can continue to benefit from shifting profits from other 
countries, even down to an effective tax rate of zero in that country, so long 
as the taxpayer’s average foreign tax rate does not fall below the threshold. 
An overall minimum tax like the GILTI tax therefore discourages BEPS-style 
tax planning less strongly than a similar tax imposed on a per-country 
basis.128 
 
Given the large role played by the US in the global economy, it is possible 
that, even given its overall rather than per-country structure, the GILTI tax will 
reduce overall demand for BEPS-style profit shifting to an extent that will 
meaningfully lessen the pressure of tax competition on lower-income 
countries. If that is the case, the GILTI tax might serve as a promising model 
for CFC-like reforms in other countries. If, however, the effects of the GILTI 
tax on demand for BEPS-style planning prove very limited, then the per-
country approach of the Obama Administration might be necessary for a 
GILTI-style minimum tax structure to afford adequate protection to the tax 
bases of lower-income countries. Careful monitoring of the performance of 
the GILTI tax over time, particularly the extent to which the tax planning 
behaviour of US multinational groups in lower-income countries appears to 
be affected, may provide valuable information for policymaking in the future. 
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that, at the time of writing, France and 
Germany reportedly are considering the adoption of minimum tax rules that 
are in some respects similar to the US GILTI rules.129 Should these and other 
countries adopt such rules, the resulting global reduction in demand for profit-
shifting tax planning might be significantly reduced, especially if the new rules 
are applied on a per-country basis. 
                                                 
127  For discussion of the Obama Administration proposal, see Herzfeld (2016: 807). For formal statement of the 
proposal, see US Treasury Department (2016: 9-12). 
128  As a simplified example, consider a GILTI-style minimum tax that subjects to home country taxation all 
foreign income that a group earns that is not subject to a local tax of at least 12 per cent. Assume that a 
multinational group conducts operations in two foreign countries, Countries A and B, earning $100 million in 
each country. Assume that Country A imposes corporate tax at a rate of 30 per cent, and Country B 
imposes corporate tax at a rate of 5 per cent. Under an overall GILTI-style minimum tax, the taxpayer is 
considered to pay tax at an average rate of 17.5 per cent on all its foreign income, which is above the 12 per 
cent threshold, so no minimum tax is imposed. Under a per-country approach, however, whereas the 
taxpayer owes no minimum tax based on its operations in Country A, its effective rate in Country B is below 
the 12 per cent threshold so that minimum tax is imposed on income earned in that country. 
129  See, e.g., VanderWolk (2018). 
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BEPS and limitations on interest deductions 
 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the payment of interest on intragroup 
loans extended from zero- and low-tax financing companies has for many 
years comprised a large component of BEPS-style tax planning around the 
world. The BEPS Action 4 report focuses on this topic, and offers policy 
recommendations that seem well-suited to the situation of lower-income 
countries.130 
 
The Action 4 report proceeds from the principle that a member of a 
multinational group should be permitted to deduct, for local corporate income 
tax purposes, only its fair share of the group’s total indebtedness to unrelated 
lenders. Under this principle, the Action 4 report argues that if a multinational 
group as a whole holds indebtedness to unrelated lenders totaling, say, €100 
million, each member of the group should be entitled to deduct interest on a 
part of that amount in proportion to the member’s share of the group’s total 
income. Thus, as a conceptual ideal the Action 4 report advocates a 
formulary approach to the apportionment of interest expense, which the 
report refers to as a group ratio rule. A group ratio rule would substantially 
curtail income shifting through related-party loans, because group finance 
companies could not create debt to affiliates in excess of the group’s actual 
total indebtedness to outside parties.131 
 
Despite the theoretical appeal of the group ratio approach, however, the 
Action 4 report concludes that the approach could pose administrative 
problems and might be considered overly restrictive by some countries. As 
an alternative, the OECD has recommended that countries adopt fixed-ratio 
limitations on interest deductions, which generally would limit each group 
member’s net interest deductions (i.e. the excess of interest deductions over 
interest income) to a fixed percentage set at a point in the range of 10 to 30 
per cent of their earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
                                                 
130  In October 2015 the OECD released its final report on Action 4: Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest 
Deductions and Other Financial Payments (OECD 2015b), along with its final reports on other BEPS 
actions. In 2016 the OECD released a follow-up study of two technical topics: (i) the details of the design of 
a group-ratio rule, as explained in the text immediately below; and (ii) the application of interest deduction 
limitations to banks and insurance companies (OECD 2016a). 
131  Consider e.g. a multinational group comprised of a parent company in Country A, which owns operating 
subsidiaries in Countries B and C, and a group finance company in zero- or low-tax Country F. Assume the 
group as a whole is subject to indebtedness from unrelated parties (e.g. bondholders and banks) of $100 
million, and that the group as a whole pays $8 million annually in interest on this debt. The group finance 
company extends indebtedness to each of the group affiliates in Countries A, B, and C of $250 million each, 
with stated interest of $20 million per year. During the taxable year, the parent in Country A earns $300 
million, and the affiliates in Countries B and C each earn $150 million, of EBITDA prior to payment of taxes 
and interest. Under a group ratio approach, since the parent in Country A earns 50 per cent of the group’s 
income before interest and taxes, the parent would be permitted to deduct half the group’s interest expense 
paid to unrelated lenders, or $4 million; and the affiliates in Countries B and C, which each account for 25 
per cent of the group’s income before interest and taxes, would be permitted to deduct $2 million each. No 
deduction would be allowed to any group member for the interest paid to the Country H finance company. 
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amortisation (EBITDA). The report also recommends that countries consider 
allowing companies to use a group ratio approach as an elective alternative. 
 
The Action 4 report envisions that countries will use the recommended 
EBITDA-based limitations to replace or supplement existing thin 
capitalisation rules, which, as described in Chapter 3, countries historically 
have used to attempt to limit revenue losses from companies’ excessive 
deductions of interest payments. As discussed in Chapter 3, thin 
capitalisation rules deny interest deductions if a taxpayer’s ratio of debt to 
equity exceeds a specified level (e.g. 3 to 1). The OECD points out in its 
Action 4 report that multinationals can relatively easily avoid application of 
thin capitalisation rules by injecting additional equity into its subsidiaries.132 
 
The OECD based its EBITDA recommendation on the actions of a number of 
countries around the world, including Germany and Italy, which already had 
adopted 30 per cent of EBITDA limitations, as well as Spain, Finland and 
Norway, which have 25 per cent limitations.133 Since the BEPS reports the 
UK has implemented a 30 per cent of EBITDA rule effective 1 April 2017,134 
and the US has done so effective 1 January 2018.135 Under France’s interest 
deduction limitations, which set forth several alternative limitations on 
deductions, interest deductions can in some circumstances be limited to 
approximately 25 per cent of a taxpayer’s EBITDA.136 In addition, the EU now 
prescribes limitations based on BEPS Action 4 as best practice for tax 
administrations among member countries, essentially requiring member 
countries to amend their limitations as necessary to conform to the new 
OECD standard.137 South Africa enacted limitations in 2013, which became 
effective in 2015, based generally on 40 per cent of EBITDA, although the 
limitation can be higher or lower based on fluctuations of market interest 
rates.138 In addition, as of early 2018, the OECD has reported that Argentina, 
India, South Korea and Vietnam had enacted 30 per cent of EBITDA rules, 
and Norway, Japan, Malaysia and Turkey were taking legislative steps to 
align their rules with the OECD Action 4 recommendations (OECD 2018: 
117). 
 
                                                 
132  OECD (2015b: 21): ‘[A]n equity test allows entities with higher levels of equity capital to deduct more 
interest expense, which makes it relatively easy for a group to manipulate the outcome of a test by 
increasing the level of equity in a particular entity’. 
133  See Sheppard (2014). 
134  PwC (2017). Although the OECD’s Action 4 report recommends that countries limit interest deductions to 
anywhere from 10 to 30% of EBITDA, because a number of countries have in practice enacted 30% 
limitations, the OECD recommendation is often perceived as a 30% limitation. 
135  See pp. 385-392 of H.R. Conf. Report No. 466 (2017). 
136  See PwC (2018). 
137  European Union, Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 (establishing rules against tax avoidance) (12 July 
2016). 
138  Republic of South Africa, Income Tax Act (revised) section 23M. See generally Readhead (2017). 
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The OECD’s report on BEPS Action 4 cites data indicating that the interest 
expenses of most multinational groups on unrelated party debt are 
substantially below 30 per cent of the group’s EBITDA, suggesting that a 30 
per cent limitation will continue to allow substantial scope for loan-centred, 
BEPS-style tax planning (OECD 2015b: 49). Nevertheless, it seems likely 
based on the OECD data that a 30 per cent limitation has the potential to 
reduce loan-based tax avoidance to substantially below current levels in 
many countries.139 Moreover, although some elements of EBITDA-based 
deduction limitations raise administrative complexity,140 the rules are 
relatively simple compared to other kinds of corporate tax anti-avoidance 
measures, and should be administrable even by revenue agencies of 
constrained resources. In sum, EBITDA-style limitations on interest 
deductions would appear suitable for use by many lower-income countries. 
 
In view of the continuing pressure of tax competition, however, it remains an 
open question whether many lower-income country governments will choose 
to adopt EBITDA-based limitations on interest deductions. To date, the only 
countries in the developing world to have adopted EBITDA-based limitation 
conforming to the new model have been countries that offer relatively strong 
attraction to investors. It is also not clear whether, and if so to what extent, 
the effect of the new interest limitations will be offset by tax holidays or other 
tax exemptions. Nevertheless, the growing global acceptance of EBITDA-
based limitations, their relative simplicity of administration, and their limited 
but still significant effects on the volume of base erosion, all suggest that at 
least some lower-income countries might find the limitations both politically 
feasible and capable of raising worthwhile amounts of additional revenue. 
Chapter 5 of this book considers how lower-income countries might 
incorporate EBITDA-based interest deduction limitations into a 
comprehensive approach to the control of base erosion and profit shifting. 
 
Income tax treaties and withholding taxes 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 offered an overview of the development of the now-global 
institution of bilateral income tax treaties, first under the auspices of the 
League of Nations after World War I, and then of both the OECD and the UN 
since World War II. Income tax treaties address a very wide range of tax 
issues that arise when individuals or companies conduct cross-border 
                                                 
139  A 2017 study concludes that the introduction of a limitation in Finland, based in part on approximately 25 per 
cent of EBITDA, has been effective in raising revenue (Harju et al. 2017). 
140  For discussion of this topic, see Barnes (2017: 179 ff). 
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activities. Virtually all the BEPS Action items have some connection with the 
topic of income tax treaties.141 
 
Procedural aspects of tax treaties 
 
For example, income tax treaties typically provide for exchange of taxpayer 
information between countries’ tax administrations for enforcement purposes. 
Treaties also establish procedures by which the tax authorities of different 
countries can consult with one another to protect companies from double 
taxation arising from inconsistent claims by revenue agencies, for example in 
transfer pricing examinations. The BEPS reports contain numerous 
suggestions for improving these and other procedural rules in bilateral tax 
treaties.142 
 
Permanent establishment provisions 
 
Other important provisions found in tax treaties set forth the circumstances 
under which a country that is party to a treaty is permitted to assert taxing 
jurisdiction over an individual or corporate resident of the other party. For 
example, a multinational based in Country A might maintain an office in 
Country B to coordinate the local sales of the multinational’s products. If 
Countries A and B have entered into an income tax treaty, the treaty will 
typically contain provisions determining whether the local office is substantial 
enough (e.g. in terms of whether local personnel have authority to bind the 
parent company contractually) to permit Country B to tax income attributable 
to the office’s activities. 
 
A local presence of a foreign taxpayer that is substantial enough to subject 
the taxpayer to local income taxation is called a permanent establishment in 
tax treaties. It has become widely acknowledged in recent years that, in part 
because it has become easier to conduct business operations remotely by 
selling products and services online, the permanent establishment provisions 
in many bilateral income tax treaties can deprive a host country of tax 
jurisdiction even over a foreign multinational that transacts substantial local 
business. The BEPS Action 7 report recommends that countries revise their 
tax treaties to expand somewhat the circumstances under which the local 
operations of a foreign company will constitute a permanent establishment – 
for example, by expanding the circumstances in which the solicitation of 
sales orders within a country can give rise to a permanent establishment 
(OECD 2015g and 2017a). In addition, a more extensive expansion of the 
                                                 
141  For a comprehensive discussion of the many connections between the BEPS Action Items and questions 
related to international tax treaties, see Brauner (2016). 
142  Discussion of the procedural aspects of income tax treaties is found especially in the Final Reports on 
BEPS Action 15 (OECD 2015f) and BEPS Action 14 (OECD 2015e). 
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permanent establishment concept, under which online sales into a country 
could create a permanent establishment even without a local physical 
presence, is currently under discussion within both the OECD and the EU, 
and has already been adopted by a few countries.143 Numerous technical 
and political barriers remain before global rules with respect to permanent 
establishments are likely to be fundamentally restructured. Over time, 
however, rules expanding the definition of permanent establishment, if 
adopted by lower-income countries, might generate meaningful revenue 
increases. 
 
Treaty shopping and withholding taxes 
 
One element of the BEPS project’s analysis of income tax treaties, dealing 
with the interrelated topics of treaty shopping and withholding taxes, has 
special importance for lower-income countries. Countries around the world 
have for many decades imposed taxes on the gross amounts of interest, 
royalties, dividends and sometimes management or other service fees, paid 
by local taxpayers to recipients in other countries. These withholding taxes 
reflect a longstanding and widespread view that international tax laws tend to 
assign insufficient taxing rights to capital-importing (source) countries, and 
excessive taxing rights to capital-exporting (residence) countries in which 
investing multinational groups are based. For example, under the mercantilist 
paradigm that was described in Chapter 3 and still pervades international tax 
laws, the local distribution, manufacturing and service-provider subsidiaries 
of multinational groups, especially in developing countries, often end up with 
low taxable incomes after the subsidiaries have deducted payments to other 
group members for management fees, interest and royalties. Withholding 
taxes are intended to move the balance of taxing rights to some extent back 
in the direction of source countries. 
 
Withholding taxes are simple in their operation, and their potential for 
mitigating profit shifting from source countries is easy to see. Assume, for 
example, that a country’s tax statutes impose corporate income tax at a rate 
of 25 per cent, and also impose a withholding tax of 20 per cent on outbound 
payments of royalties.144 If a local member of a multinational group makes a 
payment of $1,000 to a licensor of intellectual property (which might be a 
related party located in a zero- or low-tax jurisdiction), deducting the royalty 
for income tax purposes will result in a tax reduction of $250. The withholding 
tax will, however, impose a corresponding tax cost of $200. The overall loss 
of government revenue from the licensing arrangement, therefore, will be 
substantially reduced. 
 
                                                 
143  This topic is discussed in OECD (2018) and European Commission (2018). 
144  A summary of the withholding taxes levied by countries around the world can be found at Deloitte (2018). 
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If source countries applied withholding taxes at substantial rates, they would 
significantly reduce the amount of their revenue losses from base erosion 
and profit shifting. Bilateral income tax treaties, however, typically provide for 
the reduction of withholding taxes on different kinds of payments to levels 
much lower than those prescribed by countries’ tax statutes. For example, 
whereas two countries might under their domestic tax statutes both impose 
withholding taxes on interest, royalties and dividends at, say, a 25 per cent 
statutory rate, they might agree in their income tax treaty to reduce that rate 
to 10 or 5 per cent, or even zero. 
 
The treaty-based reduction or elimination of withholding taxes by a country 
may be appropriate if the treaty is not being used by companies to facilitate 
BEPS-style avoidance. In that case, the amounts of interest, royalties and 
service fees that taxpayers are paying generally will be limited to 
economically sensible levels, and there should be no need for a withholding 
tax to compensate for the taking of excessive deductions. Where BEPS is 
present, however, the deductions taken by taxpayers tend to be at higher 
than economically justifiable levels. For example, interest deductions might 
simply be manufactured through related-party debt, and related-party service 
fees might be inflated. In those circumstances, the imposition of withholding 
taxes at relatively high levels seems necessary if substantial losses of tax 
revenue are to be prevented. 
 
Often, however, the perceived pressure of tax competition induces countries, 
particularly in the developing world, to agree to tax treaties that reduce or 
eliminate withholding taxes, even when the countries are plainly affected by 
high levels of base erosion and profit shifting.145 Thus, over the years 
developing countries have entered into many tax treaties that reduce or 
eliminate withholding taxes, even when the financial cost of doing so, in 
terms of revenue lost to BEPS-style tax planning, has probably been high. In 
light of this history, lower-income countries should exercise considerable 
caution in deciding whether to enter into tax treaties, especially those that 
would involve substantial reduction or elimination of withholding taxes.146 
 
The damage from treaties that reduce or eliminate withholding taxes has 
been magnified over the years by the phenomenon of treaty shopping. 
Consider, for example, Investco, a multinational group headquartered in 
Country A, that wishes to open a manufacturing operation in Country B, a 
lower-income country. Because Investco desires to engage in BEPS-style tax 
avoidance in Country B, the company does not make its desired investment 
directly in Country B. Instead, Investco establishes a subsidiary in a zero-tax 
                                                 
145  A quantitative study of treaty negotiation outcomes involving lower-income countries is provided by Hearson 
(2016). See also Beer and Loeprick (2018). 
146  A 2014 IMF staff policy paper advised that ‘countries should not enter treaties lightly - all too often this has 
been done largely as a political gesture - but with close and well-advised attention to the risks that may be 
created’ (IMF 2014: 28). 
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country, Country H, which happens to have a tax treaty with Country B 
eliminating withholding taxes. The Country H subsidiary serves as the parent 
for the new manufacturing subsidiary in Country B. 
 
Under the envisioned planning structure, substantial payments of interest and 
royalties are to be made from Investco’s new subsidiary in Country B to the 
holding company in Country H. Country B, under its generally applicable tax 
statute, imposes a 25 per cent withholding tax on outbound payments of 
interest and royalties, which could substantially offset Country B’s revenue 
losses from Investco’s BEPS-style tax planning. The income tax treaty that is 
in effect between Countries B and H, however, exempts the payments made 
from Country B to Country H from withholding taxes. A situation like this is 
said to involve treaty shopping because the real beneficiary of the 
withholding tax exemption, Investco, is a resident of Country A, which is not a 
party to the treaty between Countries B and H. Treaty shopping in order to 
reduce or eliminate withholding taxes is common in tax planning around the 
world. 
 
The OECD’s BEPS reports identify treaty shopping as a substantial 
contributor to base erosion and profit shifting, and the OECD has initiated an 
ambitious plan to introduce a new Multilateral Instrument (MLI) that would in 
effect substitute for the thousands of bilateral tax treaties now in effect 
around the world. The centrepiece of the MLI consists of an anti-treaty-
shopping rule, which would permit countries to deny treaty benefits, including 
exemptions from withholding tax, to taxpayers that are engaged in triangular 
treaty-shopping efforts with a principal purpose of avoiding taxes.147 
 
More than 100 countries, at all levels of economic development, have signed 
the MLI, expressing at least symbolic support for its provisions. Before the 
MLI comes into effect, however, pairs of countries must formally indicate their 
desire to be bound by its terms. Participating countries must also ratify the 
instrument through legislative action. Despite the large number of countries 
that have indicated initial approval of the MLI by signing it, it remains 
uncertain whether the procedural steps needed to bind a large number of 
country pairs to the MLI will be taken.148 
 
Moreover, the principal purpose test, which in most cases is likely to control 
treaty shopping under the MLI, is factually vague, and tax administrations 
may encounter substantial practical difficulties in attempting to apply it. 
                                                 
147  The text of the MLI, and various discussion documents pertaining to it, are available online. The MLI offers 
countries the option of adopting language more stringent than the mere principal purpose test to control 
treaty shopping, including a detailed limitation-of-benefits test modelled after language that the US has used 
in a number of its treaties. See generally Brauner (2016: 1004-1006). Relatively few countries, however, are 
likely to adopt the US-style language. 
148  See Sheppard (2017): ‘Signing the MLI is like a dating service - a lot of work, a lot of dashed expectations, 
and no joy’. 
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Overall, it is unclear whether the BEPS recommendations will in practice lead 
to substantial reductions in the frequency of treaty shopping. 
 
Base protection measures that countries have taken outside the scope 
of the BEPS reports 
 
Diverted profits taxes 
 
Some relatively wealthy countries have in recent years enacted new 
legislature to protect their own corporate tax bases from erosion, when these 
fall outside the recommendations of the BEPS reports. For example, both the 
UK and Australia have enacted diverted profits taxes (DPTs) which 
essentially disallow deductions taken from the enacting countries in 
connection with BEPS-style planning strategies.149 The UK and Australian 
DPTs have attracted a good deal of attention among tax practitioners. 
However, in determining whether profits have been inappropriately diverted, 
both the UK and Australian DPTs rely heavily on the application of a 
subjective substance-over-form test; therefore, the DPTs incorporate at least 
some of the weakness of traditional general anti-avoidance rules, which tax 
administrations typically have had difficulty applying. It remains to be seen 
whether the UK and Australian DPTs will prove substantially effective in 
controlling BEPS, and whether the DPTs offer a legislative model that may 
be useful for lower-income countries. 
 
The US Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax (BEAT) 
 
In late 2017, as part of comprehensive tax reform legislation, the US enacted 
a new Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax (BEAT) in an effort to curtail profit 
shifting from the US through the making of deductible payments to foreign 
related parties.150 The BEAT requires a US taxpayer to add back into its 
taxable income many kinds of payments, including interest expenses, some 
royalties and some service-fee payments made to related foreign persons. A 
10 per cent tax is then computed on the expanded taxable income, and if that 
amount exceeds the taxpayer’s regular tax liability the 10 per cent tax is 
imposed instead of the regular tax.151 The BEAT therefore operates as a form 
of minimum tax on companies engaged in cross-border business in the 
United States. 
 
                                                 
149  See generally Wasimi et al. (2017). 
150  The Base Erosion Minimum Tax is contained in a new Section 59A of the Internal Revenue Code, and is 
described in H.R. Conf. Report No. 466 (2017: 653-660). 
151  The tax is phased in, with a 5% rate applying in 2018. The rate is scheduled to rise to 12.5% in 2025. 
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The apparent intent of the BEAT is to limit the extent to which multinational 
groups can benefit from the use of stripped-risk entities in the US. The BEAT 
can therefore be seen as a protective overlay placed atop the transfer pricing 
rules and interest limitations. Even if the deduction of certain amounts is 
permitted under transfer pricing rules and interest limitations, the BEAT can 
nevertheless deny some of the tax benefit from taking the deductions. 
Enactment of the BEAT can be seen as an acknowledgement by the US 
Congress that transfer pricing rules and limitations on interest deductions are 
not in themselves sufficient to limit base erosion from the US to acceptable 
levels, but that an additional back-up is needed to strengthen those rules. 
 
As an economic matter, the US was able to enact the BEAT because of the 
strong market power that the country enjoys as a destination for investment. 
Lower-income countries, which are likely to be more beholden than the US to 
pressures of tax competition, may be hesitant to follow the US example for 
fear of suppressing inbound investment. Moreover, the US BEAT is 
administratively demanding, counselling against its application in lower-
income countries without substantial modification. Nevertheless, the new tax 
is intriguing. Chapter 5 will discuss how a minimum tax overlay that is 
administratively simpler than the US BEAT might be applied effectively in the 
lower-income country setting. 
 
The overall legacy of the BEPS studies for lower-income countries 
 
Incrementalism vs. systemic transformation 
 
The BEPS process arose from substantial public anger towards corporate tax 
avoidance in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. In response to this 
political pressure, statements from the OECD and G-20 early in the BEPS 
process promised a thorough revisiting of the existing structure of 
international tax rules, aimed at sharply curtailing profit shifting by 
multinationals to corporate affiliates in low- and zero-tax jurisdictions.152 In 
particular, in emphasising the goal of aligning the division of income among a 
group’s members with their relative contributions to value creation, the early 
OECD and G-20 statements hinted at willingness to re-examine the basic 
                                                 
152  The OECD’s 2013 Action Plan (OECD 2013b: 14) declared: ‘Fundamental changes [to international tax 
rules] are needed to effectively prevent double non-taxation, as well as cases of no or low taxation 
associated with practices that artificially segregate taxable income from the activities that generate it’. In a 
similar vein, the 2013 St. Petersburg Declaration of the G-20, (G-20 2013: para 50), said: ‘In a context of 
severe fiscal consolidation and social hardship, in many countries ensuring that all taxpayers pay their fair 
share of taxes is more than ever a priority. Tax avoidance, harmful practices and aggressive tax planning 
have to be tackled. The growth of the digital economy also poses challenges for international taxation. We 
fully endorse the ambitious and comprehensive Action Plan - originated in the OECD - aimed at addressing 
base erosion and profit shifting with mechanism to enrich the Plan as appropriate. We welcome the 
establishment of the G20/OECD BEPS project and we encourage all interested countries to participate. 
Profits should be taxed where economic activities deriving the profits are performed and where value is 
created. In order to minimise BEPS, we call on member countries to examine how our own domestic laws 
contribute to BEPS and to ensure that international and our own tax rules do not allow or encourage 
multinational enterprises to reduce overall taxes paid by artificially shifting profits to low-tax jurisdictions’. 
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tenets of arm’s-length transfer pricing rules, under which groups are able to 
steer income towards affiliates in zero- and low-tax countries through 
intragroup contracts, even when the affiliates perform little if any physical 
business activity (see earlier section of this chapter on the new control of risk 
test). If the BEPS process had in fact resulted in fundamentally revised 
transfer pricing rules, which firmly established the principle of proportionality 
between a company’s business activities and the income that can be 
attributed to it, BEPS-style tax planning would have been dealt a serious and 
perhaps even fatal blow. 
 
Fundamental systemic change, however, was never realistically on the table 
during the BEPS process.153 Popular political pressure required the G-20 and 
OECD to use ambitious language in the BEPS process’s early stages, but 
BEPS-style tax planning was and remains deeply embedded in the 
structuring of virtually all multinational business activity around the world. 
Base erosion and profit shifting has long stood at the centre of a global 
political equilibrium under which companies’ effective tax rates are 
constrained in practice at levels significantly below the rates stated in 
countries’ tax statutes. 
 
Even in view of the political pressure that arose from the 2008 crisis, 
upsetting this equilibrium in favour of markedly higher effective rates would 
have been politically unacceptable to governments of both capital-exporting 
and capital-importing countries. Highly effective constraints on BEPS would 
in effect have forced capital-exporting countries to tax their home-based 
multinationals at levels that many would have seen as unduly discouraging 
outbound investment, and similarly would have compelled capital-importing 
countries to tax inbound investment at levels that many in those countries 
would consider as excessive. 
 
Rather than recommendations for fundamental systemic change, therefore, 
the BEPS process has suggested incremental measures that governments 
might adopt to protect their tax bases from erosion, generally to a modest 
extent. The decision of whether to adopt these measures, and how 
vigorously to enforce them, is left to each country. To date, it appears that the 
world’s wealthier countries, which perceive themselves as relatively insulated 
from pressures of tax competition, and where local political sentiment 
opposing corporate profit shifting remains substantial, are more likely to 
adopt the BEPS recommendations or other base-protection measures than 
the world’s lower-income countries. 
 
Some of the measures taken by relatively wealthy countries in the aftermath 
of the BEPS reports – including, as discussed above, possibly strengthened 
                                                 
153  cf. generally Rixen (2010). 
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CFC rules under the EU’s Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive and the US GILTI tax 
(especially if its overall approach is adopted by additional capital-exporting 
countries) – might have the spillover effect of mitigating the pressure of base 
erosion on lower-income countries. Similarly, revised transfer pricing rules 
around the world, modelled on the OECD’s new control-of-risk test, might 
reduce global demand for BEPS-style tax planning, thereby reducing base 
erosion pressure on lower-income countries. Efforts by the EU to discourage 
the use of EU countries as zero- or low-tax jurisdictions could also reduce 
demand for BEPS-style planning. 
 
The quantitative extent of any spillover effects of these kinds, however, is 
unknown, and is likely to remain so for some time. Overall, it seems likely 
that whatever mitigating effects they might have, measures like enhanced 
CFC rules, the US GILTI tax, and revised transfer pricing rules incorporating 
the control-of-risk test will fall far short of eliminating the attractiveness of 
BEPS-style planning among the world’s multinationals. Therefore, it is likely 
that if lower-income countries are to raise corporate tax revenue to or near 
desirable levels, they will need to do more than rely on spillover effects from 
actions taken by other countries. They will instead need to adopt base 
protection measures of their own, suitable to their political and economic 
circumstances.  
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Chapter 5 A corporate tax policy agenda for 
lower-income countries 
 
Introduction 
 
In the preceding four chapters of this book, I have sought to explore: (i) the 
economic and political roots of base erosion and profit shifting in lower-
income countries and (ii) the recent (and continuing) efforts of the OECD and 
other international organisations to redress the problem, especially in 
connection with the BEPS studies. Based on this analysis, I offer in this 
chapter suggestions for policy initiatives that seem especially promising for 
lower-income countries. These include some measures recommended by the 
BEPS studies and others that are outside their scope. 
 
In particular, this chapter explores the following options: 
 
1) incremental improvements to transfer pricing administration, including 
modifications to current practices for selecting comparables, the possible use 
of transfer pricing safe harbours, and capacity building to increase audit 
coverage of multinational companies; 
2) limitations on interest deductions; 
3) modifications to countries’ tax treaty policies to prevent treaty-shopping; 
4) a policy instrument that the BEPS reports do not address, but which is already 
used by some developing countries around the world – alternative corporate 
minimum taxes based on taxpayers’ gross revenue (turnover); and 
5) for hard-to-tax industries, greater use of tax instruments based on gross 
revenue rather than net income, such as carefully structured royalties in the 
area of natural resource taxation, and excise taxes in industries like 
telecommunications and electronic commerce. 
 
Improvements to transfer pricing methods and practices 
 
Simplifications relating to searches for comparables 
 
After the publication of the BEPS reports, in 2016 the Platform for 
Collaboration on Tax (PCT), a joint undertaking of the OECD, World Bank, 
IMF and UN,154 published a Toolkit for Addressing Difficulties in Accessing 
Comparables Data for Transfer Pricing Analyses (PCT 2017). The Toolkit 
responds to complaints by tax administrators that the standards for selecting 
comparables under the OECD’s transfer pricing methods are unrealistically 
restrictive, preventing tax inspectors from persuasively supporting arguments 
that locally operating companies are not earning sufficient levels of income 
under the arm’s-length standard.155 The Toolkit discusses various ways in 
                                                 
154  See generally OECD (2016b). 
155  The PCT summarises the tax administrations’ concerns in the following language: 
Available statistics and academic research on the availability of information on comparables corroborate 
the difficulties reported by many developing countries. Often, the information relevant to a jurisdiction can 
only be accessed through the purchase of a license from database providers. However, even putting 
aside the financial cost of acquiring access to such databases, challenges for developing country tax 
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which tax administrations might modify their practices with respect to the 
selection and analysis of comparables to improve their revenue recovery 
from transfer pricing examinations. 
 
Based on my experience as a practitioner, I am confident the Toolkit is 
correct in identifying difficulties in locating usable comparables as a central 
and pervasive problem in transfer pricing enforcement. In practice, as 
described in Chapter 3, the problem often arises under a particular transfer 
pricing method that the OECD incorporated in its Guidelines in 1995, the 
transactional net margin method (TNMM). This is the transfer pricing method 
that tax administrations in lower-income countries often use in trying to test 
whether members of multinational groups operating in their jurisdiction are 
earning reasonable, arm’s-length levels of income, as opposed to shifting 
income excessively in BEPS-style planning structures. 
 
As described in Chapter 3, the drafters of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines in the 1990s were concerned that tax inspectors might apply the 
TNMM against inbound investors in an automatic fashion, essentially 
requiring minimum levels of taxable income with insufficient regard to the 
facts and circumstances of the taxpayer under examination. In an effort to 
prevent this, the drafters included language requiring that tax administrations 
apply the TNMM only after an exhaustive factual study of the taxpayer under 
examination (often called a functional analysis), and the identification of 
comparable companies that are closely similar to the taxpayer.156 
                                                 
administrations often remain, particularly in cases where little relevant information relating to a specific 
jurisdiction or even region exists. Where the information does exist, it may exhibit differences compared to 
the transactions under review. Typically, in such cases, transfer pricing practitioners need to consider 
using imperfect data, including the use of data from foreign markets. However, the effectiveness of such 
approaches has not been studied sufficiently to enable definitive conclusions to be drawn about when 
they are reliable or how any adjustments to account for such differences should be applied. 
A common concern of developing economies in the implementation of transfer pricing regimes relates to 
difficulties in accessing information on ‘comparables’: data on transactions between independent parties 
used in the application of the arm’s length principle. In response to this challenge and under a mandate 
from the Development Working Group of the G20, the Platform for Collaboration on Tax (PCT) - a joint 
initiative of the IMF, OECD, UN, and World Bank Group - has developed a toolkit to assist tax 
administrations of developing countries (PCT 2017: 12). 
156  A flavour of the level of detailed inquiry that the OECD Guidelines expect of tax administrations is provided 
in the current (2017) version (OECD 2017b paras 1.34 and 1.35): 
1.34 The typical process of identifying the commercial or financial relations between the associated 
enterprises and the conditions and economically relevant circumstances attaching to those relations 
requires a broad-based understanding of the industry sector in which the MNE group operates (e.g. 
mining, pharmaceutical, luxury goods) and of the factors affecting the performance of any business 
operating in that sector. The understanding is derived from an overview of the particular MNE group which 
outlines how the MNE group responds to the factors affecting performance in the sector, including its 
business strategies, markets, products, its supply chain, and the key functions performed, material assets 
used, and important risks assumed. This information is likely to be included as part of the master file as 
described in Chapter V in support of a taxpayer’ analysis of its transfer pricing, and provides useful 
context in which the commercial or financial relations between members of the MNE group can be 
considered. 
 1.35 The process then narrows to identify how each MNE within that MNE group operates, and provides 
an analysis of what each MNE does (e.g. a production company, a sales company) and identifies its 
commercial or financial relations with associated enterprises as expressed in transactions between them. 
The accurate delineation of the actual transaction or transactions between the associated enterprises 
requires analysis of the economically relevant characteristics of the transaction. These economically 
relevant characteristics consist of the conditions of the transaction and the economically relevant 
circumstances in which the transaction takes place. The application of the arm’s length principle depends 
on determining the conditions that independent parties would have agreed in comparable transactions in 
comparable circumstances. Before making comparisons with uncontrolled transactions, it is therefore vital 
to identify the economically relevant characteristics of the commercial or financial relations as expressed 
in the controlled transaction. 
Chapter 5 | A corporate tax policy agenda for lower-income countries 
 
 
 88 
These requirements have raised two serious problems for tax auditors. First, 
the level of detailed factual analysis that the OECD Guidelines require is 
beyond the budgetary and personnel capacity of even well-resourced 
revenue agencies, and in practice tax examiners must typically conduct 
analyses that are far more perfunctory than the Guidelines purport to require. 
Second, the standard of similarity that the OECD Guidelines require for the 
selection of comparables is unrealistically demanding. Even after extensive 
combing through available financial databases examiners typically can 
identify a very few companies (in my experience, often less than 10) that are 
plausibly comparable to the taxpayer under examination. The resulting 
sample of, say, five to ten approximate comparables is much fewer than 
necessary under standards of reasonable statistical practice to offer a 
persuasive indication of the ‘true’ arm’s-length level of income of the taxpayer 
under examination.157 
 
At best, the kinds of comparables examinations performed in practice can pin 
the taxpayer’s arm’s-length profit level within a very wide range – for 
example, between a net operating margin of 2 and 8 per cent. This would 
mean that, for a taxpayer with $100 million of sales, the arm’s length range of 
income might be found anywhere between $2 million and $8 million. Arm’s 
length ranges this broad are of limited use to tax administrations in seeking to 
enforce reasonable levels of taxable income for locally operating subsidiaries 
of multinational groups. Accordingly, TNMM has not served as an effective 
enforcement tool even in relatively wealthy countries, and the problems 
appear to be especially serious in developing countries. 
 
The Toolkit recommends several ways tax administrations might improve the 
performance of TNMM by expanding the pool of acceptable comparables. 
For example, tax administrations might accept comparables located in 
countries other than their own, making adjustments for differences in 
prevailing economic conditions (PCT 2017: 57-60); or they might accept 
comparables with less functional similarity to the taxpayer under examination 
than has been considered necessary in the past (PCT 2017: 47-48). The 
Toolkit even mentions the adoption of transfer pricing regimes similar to 
Brazil’s as a possibility to be evaluated, under which margins to be used for 
transfer pricing enforcement are not generated through case-by-case 
searches for comparables, but are instead prescribed by fiat by the tax 
administration (PCT 2017: 75-76). 
 
These suggestions of the Toolkit are intriguing. I have little doubt that adding 
flexibility to the identification of comparables could improve the performance 
of TNMM as a tax enforcement tool. Broadening the definition of 
                                                 
 Detailed instructions for implementing these principles occupy many additional paragraphs of the 
Guidelines. 
157  As mentioned in Chapter 4, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (OECD 2017b para 3.57) point out that in 
cases of relatively inexact comparables, ‘if the range includes a sizeable number of observations, statistical 
tools that take account of central tendency to narrow the range (e.g. the interquartile range or other 
percentiles) might help to enhance the reliability of the analysis’ (emphasis added). The PCT Toolkit also 
cautions that large sample sizes are necessary for proper application of statistical techniques in determining 
arm’s-length ranges (PCT 2017: 61, 140). 
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comparability, however, would challenge the implicit political settlement from 
1995 that tax inspectors should have the capability to make tax adjustments 
under TNMM only in cases of exceptional non-compliance. Even if one or 
more lower-income country governments were willing politically to adopt a 
standard of comparability that is more permissive than that applied generally 
around the world today, taxpayers might resist the new approach vigorously 
in tax audits, arguing with some justification that the new permissiveness 
departs from the arm’s-length principle as envisioned by the drafters of the 
1995 Guidelines. Tax inspectors’ determinations might be overturned in 
administrative or judicial appeals, or government officials might feel 
compelled to intervene in favour of taxpayers, especially those that play large 
and visible roles in the local economy. 
 
This is not to say that research aimed at widening the pool of comparables 
under TNMM is not desirable. The potential revenue benefits from 
successfully easing the barriers to large-scale and effective application of 
TNMM could be considerable. Nevertheless, the effort should be pursued 
with recognition of the political resistance, both explicit and tacit, that it is 
likely to encounter. 
 
Transfer pricing safe harbours 
 
The PCT recommends that developing country governments consider 
adopting transfer pricing safe harbours as part of their efforts to improve the 
performance of TNMM.158 Under a programme of safe harbours, the tax 
authority prescribes minimum operating margins for different kinds of 
businesses (e.g. distributors, manufacturers and providers of various kinds of 
services, like the operation of call centres or the performance of research and 
development). Taxpayers that report incomes of at least the safe harbour 
level are protected from transfer pricing examination (except to the extent 
needed to verify the taxpayer’s compliance with the safe harbour).159 The 
hope is that taxpayers will find it worthwhile to comply with the safe harbours, 
rather than taking more taxpayer-favourable positions on their returns and 
facing the cost and inconvenience of a detailed audit, as well as the risk of a 
tax adjustment and possible penalties. 
 
A safe harbour regime requires compromise on the part of both the taxpayer 
and the tax administration. The taxpayer voluntarily reports a relatively high 
level of income (perhaps higher than the taxpayer believes is necessary 
under the arm’s-length standard). The government specifies required safe 
harbour levels somewhat lower than it might seek to insist upon in the course 
of a tax audit. Through this compromise, both the taxpayer and the 
government are relieved of the costs and uncertainty of transfer pricing 
audits. 
                                                 
158  Transfer pricing safe harbours are described generally in Chapter 4 of this book. The PCT Toolkit also 
discusses safe harbours (PCT 2017: 69-73). 
159  e.g. a country’s tax administration might provide that so long as a local distributor of consumer goods, on 
behalf of a multinational group, earns a net operating margin of at least x per cent, the distributor will be 
immune from transfer pricing examination other than as might be necessary to verify compliance with the 
safe harbour. 
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I believe safe harbours can provide benefits in countries of all levels of 
economic development, especially in developing countries where tax 
administration resources tend to be very constrained.160 For this reason, I 
welcomed the OECD’s decision in 2012 to end its prior opposition to the use 
of safe harbours. To date, however, transfer pricing safe harbours have not 
fulfilled the promise that I and others perceive in them. I am only aware of 
one country that has implemented a comprehensive system of safe harbour 
margins under TNMM – India, in 2013.161 Few taxpayers, however, took 
advantage of the Indian safe harbour, apparently because taxpayers 
perceived the safe harbour margins as unrealistically high. In June 2017, 
India issued revised safe harbour rules with lower margins, but it is too soon 
to know whether taxpayer use of the system will increase. 
 
As the Indian experience demonstrates, a barrier to the success of safe 
harbours is the tendency of taxpayers who challenge government positions in 
transfer pricing audits to achieve favourable resolutions. Statistics on transfer 
pricing audits in the US illustrate this phenomenon. In 1995, a US 
congressional report determined that on average less than 20 per cent of 
amounts that examiners proposed as adjustments in transfer pricing audits 
were upheld following administrative appeals (and litigation if needed) (US 
General Accounting Office 1995). During the subsequent two decades, 
although the US tax administration devoted substantial resources to 
improving transfer pricing administration, the situation did not change. A 2016 
report by the US Treasury’s Inspector General reported that the 20 per cent 
sustention ratio had remained virtually constant (US Treasury Inspector 
General for Tax Administration 2016). There is little reason to believe that the 
situation with respect to transfer pricing examinations is materially different 
outside the US. All countries that subscribe to the OECD Guidelines are 
beholden to the same indeterminate transfer pricing methods, which lead tax 
examiners to propose adjustments that cannot be sustained. 
 
This situation poses a substantial challenge to the successful design and 
implementation of safe harbours. The root of the problem is that there tends 
to be a wide gap between the levels of income that tax auditors and 
taxpayers believe to be arm’s length. Safe harbour income levels prescribed 
by tax administrations may therefore be too high to attract much taxpayer 
participation. For transfer pricing safe harbours to be effective, tax 
administrations need to be willing to prescribe safe harbour income levels 
closer to the levels that taxpayers can realistically expect to prevail in an 
audit. 
 
This does not mean that the safe harbour income levels need to be as low as 
those on which taxpayers tend to prevail in audits. Taxpayers will probably 
agree to abide by safe harbour levels that are somewhat higher than the 
                                                 
160  e.g. see Durst and Culbertson (2003: 124-127, 132-133); Durst (2012). 
161  See generally news analysis of KPMG India (2017). See generally the discussions of experience to date 
with safe harbours in Collier and Andrus (2017: 269-270) and Lewis (2017). It should be mentioned in 
addition that Mexico has in place a safe harbour regime for transfer pricing with respect to maquiladoras, 
which are regulated manufacturing subsidiaries of multinational groups. See UN (2017: section D.4.9). 
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results they believe likely to be sustainable on audit, as a reasonable trade-
off for avoiding the cost and uncertainty of the examination process. 
Successful safe harbours, however, will need to incorporate prescribed 
income levels that are reasonably close to taxpayer expectations of what 
constitutes a fair arm’s-length result. To date, no country appears to have 
succeeded in designing a safe harbour regime with margins high enough to 
satisfy the expectations of the tax administration, but low enough to invite 
widespread taxpayer participation. For safe harbour regimes to succeed, this 
gap will need to be narrowed. 
 
At least in theory, it should be possible to identify safe harbour margins that 
viably balance the expectations of taxpayers and tax administrations. Safe 
harbour margins set at this kind of optimal level should generate additional 
tax revenue, while at the same time conserving tax administration resources 
and according enhanced certainty of result to all participants in the system. 
Experience to date suggests, however, that progress towards these kinds of 
balanced safe harbours may be both difficult and slow. Given the potential 
benefits of safe harbour regimes, especially in developing countries, efforts to 
develop workable safe harbours should continue. Policymakers should 
recognise, however, that safe harbours are unlikely to provide a 
comprehensive solution to the difficulties of transfer pricing administration, at 
least for the foreseeable future. 
 
Capacity building in transfer pricing administration 
 
For years, international organisations have offered instruction and other 
technical assistance to developing country tax administrations to increase the 
skill levels of tax inspectors in applying OECD transfer pricing methods.162 I 
believe it is important, as an initial matter in considering this topic, to 
recognise the limitations of capacity building, in and of itself, as a means of 
improving the performance of transfer pricing administration. Even tax 
administrations with a high level of training and experience encounter serious 
difficulties in applying the available transfer pricing methods. Problems 
relating to the identification of comparables, and the need to perform 
extensive factual examinations, affect even the most highly trained transfer 
pricing examiners. There is even a danger that an excessive focus on 
capacity building may divert attention and resources from needed substantive 
improvements to current transfer pricing rules. 
 
Despite these concerns, however, I believe that capacity building, even under 
current transfer pricing rules, can be cost-effective in many cases. This is 
especially likely to be true to the extent the capacity building leads to more 
extensive audit coverage of large taxpayers. Owing to the vagaries of 
existing transfer pricing methods, the amounts recovered in examinations 
may be substantially lower than the original assessments sought by the 
examiners. Nevertheless, the amounts recovered can be significant, and on 
                                                 
162  For an overview of technical assistance efforts by international organisations, including capacity building in 
transfer pricing administration, see PCT (2016). 
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average the revenue raised from expanded audit coverage could be 
substantial. 
 
Tax Inspectors Without Borders (TIWB), a joint initiative of the OECD and 
United Nations, has reported significant revenue recovery from some of their 
capacity-building efforts to date (Tax Inspectors Without Borders 2018). 
These reports are somewhat anecdotal. It would be useful for TIWB to 
provide more details of the particular kind of audits and audit techniques that 
have generated the increased revenue. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to 
expect that if capacity-building efforts generate higher audit coverage, 
especially of relatively large taxpayers, additional revenue is likely to result. 
Accordingly, high-quality capacity-building efforts – efforts that lead directly to 
higher audit coverage – are likely to be cost-effective for the foreseeable 
future, even if the transfer pricing methods available to tax administration 
personnel remain flawed. 
 
An important possible impediment to successful capacity building consists of 
fear, on the part of host country governments, of alienating inbound 
investors. The PCT observes, ‘An indispensable prerequisite to improving tax 
capacity is enthusiastic country commitment’ (PCT 2016: 3). Even overt 
conflict between those providing technical assistance and the governments 
they are supposed to be assisting is not unknown.163 It is inevitable that 
political aversion to expanded tax enforcement will in some and perhaps 
many circumstances pose a challenge to successful capacity building. The 
potential benefits of capacity building, however, especially when those efforts 
lead to enhanced audit coverage, suggest that in many cases efforts should 
be cost-effective, in terms of revenue raised, despite the possibility of political 
ambivalence on the part of host-country governments. 
 
Limitations on interest deductions 
 
Chapter 4 described the OECD’s BEPS recommendation that countries 
adopt limitations on companies’ deductions for their net interest expenses, 
generally limiting deductions to no more than 30 per cent of a company’s 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortisation (EBITDA). 
This recommendation is based on rules that first Germany (in 2007), and 
later some additional countries, had implemented to protect their tax bases 
even before the OECD’s BEPS process had begun. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, it is essential that a country’s base-protection 
measures include limitations on interest expenses in addition to transfer 
pricing rules. Transfer pricing rules under the OECD Guidelines generally 
seek to place a floor, at an arm’s-length level, on a taxpayer’s operating 
                                                 
163  The PCT acknowledges the presence of this conflict in some instances, and reports mixed results in 
addressing it: ‘In one country, the Ministry of Finance and the Revenue Agency could not agree on the 
implementation plan for a WBG project, leading to its failure. In another, the Tax Department refused even 
to meet with the IMF/WBG team that was diagnosing the situation. Ultimately, in a show of real commitment, 
the Prime Minister established an entirely new revenue agency - with a much smaller staff and fewer 
decentralized offices - which had been identified as a locus of much corruption. The ministry and new 
agency worked enthusiastically together to implement the CD project, contributing fundamentally to its 
success’ (PCT 2016: 18). 
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income.164 Operating income is defined as all of a company’s revenue, minus 
the cost of goods sold and all other expenses (like salaries and 
administrative expenses) except, generally, interest expense. That is, by 
accounting convention, a company’s interest expenses are generally not 
considered operating expenses. OECD transfer pricing methods, therefore, 
generally do not prevent companies from reducing their income to a low level 
by paying interest on loans from related parties.  
 
An EBITDA-based limitation along the lines recommended by the OECD, as 
described in Chapter 4, appears to represent a balanced approach to the 
problem of interest deductions. The data analysed by the OECD suggests 
that for most companies, a 30 per cent-of-EBITDA limitation should be in 
excess of the interest deductions needed for bona fide business purposes.165 
Nevertheless, the data indicates that many companies have been deducting 
interest substantially in excess of the 30 per cent level, so a limitation at that 
level should result in revenue gains.166 Administratively, an EBITDA-based 
limit on interest deductions is relatively simple. While some complicated 
questions are raised (e.g. whether certain payments that are not labelled as 
interest nevertheless are ‘the economic equivalent of interest’167), precedents 
for handling these questions already exist in a number of countries. Thus, 
implementation of the rules recommended by the OECD generally should be 
feasible for developing countries, especially with technical assistance from 
countries experienced in the implementation of similar provisions. 
 
To date, however, lower-income countries appear to have been reluctant to 
adopt EBITDA-based interest limitations as recommended by the OECD. To 
some extent this undoubtedly reflects lower-income countries’ generally 
heightened sense of vulnerability to tax competition. In this connection, a few 
large multinationals can account for relatively large proportions of the total 
corporate tax base in many lower-income countries. If one or more of these 
companies is currently deducting large amounts of interest in connection with 
BEPS-style tax planning, a legislative proposal to tighten limitations on 
interest expense becomes in effect a negotiation with these taxpayers, who 
may possess substantial political leverage. 
 
Despite the apparent political constraints, EBITDA-based limits on interest 
deductions offer significant revenue potential for lower-income countries, and 
adopting these kinds of limits should be seen as an important policy goal – 
even if progress towards that goal may be gradual and uneven across 
countries. Technical assistance in estimating the potential revenue gains, 
using data from filed corporate tax returns, might be especially helpful to 
lower-income countries. Technical assistance of this kind could provide 
benefits even outside the field of interest limitations. It could provide an 
                                                 
164  e.g. see, OECD (2017b: para. 2.68). 
165  See OECD (2015b: 87-89). 
166  Preliminary results from adoption of a 30 per cent limitation by Finland support the expectation of revenue 
gains. See Harju et al. (2017). 
167  See OECD (2015b: 29-31). 
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opportunity to diagnose the need for better collection and maintenance of tax 
return data – which is necessary not only to evaluate potential policy 
initiatives, but also to monitor revenue-agency performance. 
 
Efforts to reduce treaty shopping 
 
As described in Chapter 4, countries at all levels of economic development 
have entered into a network of thousands of bilateral income tax treaties. 
Among the many provisions typically contained in tax treaties are 
agreements by the parties to reduce, sometimes to zero, the withholding 
taxes that countries impose on outbound payments of dividends, interest, 
royalties and sometimes service fees. As discussed in Chapter 4, (i) the 
reduction or elimination of withholding taxes under treaties is inappropriate 
with respect to cross-border payments made in connection with BEPS-style 
tax avoidance plans, and (ii) the problem of inappropriate reductions or 
exemptions of withholding taxes is greatly exacerbated by the problem of 
treaty shopping. 
 
The OECD has advised in its BEPS recommendations that countries include 
in their treaties provisions designed to deny benefits of the treaties, like 
exemptions from withholding taxes, when corporate groups use the treaties 
under conduit arrangements. As discussed in Chapter 4, however, the 
OECD’s recommended standards for identifying improper conduit 
arrangements are subjective, and will probably be difficult for tax 
administrations to enforce. Therefore, even if a large number of lower-income 
countries adopt the OECD anti-treaty-shopping recommendations (and they 
may feel constrained from doing so by the pressure of tax competition), the 
resulting reduction in profit shifting may be relatively small. 
 
In theory, lower-income countries could gain protection from treaty shopping 
simply by refraining from entering into tax treaties with countries that serve as 
conduits, and even terminating existing treaties to which they are already 
party. Indeed, countries have withdrawn from treaties that appeared to be 
used to facilitate excessive tax reduction in a few recent instances.168 It is 
tempting to envision a coordinated refusal of lower-income countries to 
maintain tax treaties with countries that allow the treaties to be used in 
BEPS-style planning arrangements. 
 
There are, however, two substantial barriers – one political and the other 
technical – to a ‘just-say-no’ policy for lower-income countries against 
maintaining tax treaties with zero- or low-tax jurisdictions. Politically, the 
treaties to which lower-income countries are already party may have been 
negotiated at the behest of particular investors. In general, the pressure of 
tax competition that induced low-income countries to agree to these treaties 
is unlikely to have disappeared. In many situations countries may not be able 
to garner the political will to terminate the treaties. 
                                                 
168  For a discussion of circumstances in which developing countries have sought renegotiation of, or revoked, 
existing income tax treaties, see Hearson (2015: 26-28). 
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From a technical standpoint, refraining from entering into tax treaties would 
leave lower-income countries with an acute dilemma in the design of 
withholding tax rules, which it would be difficult to solve effectively. The basic 
problem is that withholding taxes are sensible for lower-income countries 
from a policy standpoint in some circumstances, but not in others. When 
deductible payments are made from a country in connection with BEPS-style 
tax avoidance plans, the withholding taxes compensate for tax revenue that 
the country is losing through artificially contrived deductions. When taxpayers 
are not engaged in BEPS-style planning, however, the deductions they take 
for outbound payments of interest, royalties and service fees may well 
represent legitimate costs of doing business, and to deny the benefits of 
these deductions could result in excessive levels of taxation. 
 
In theory, a lower-income country might solve this problem by enacting 
legislation that imposes withholding taxes only on payments being made to 
recipients in zero- or low-tax countries. Legislation of this kind, however, 
would probably encounter the same kind of political resistance from investors 
as countries’ attempts to terminate existing treaties. In addition, drafting the 
legislation would involve politically difficult definitional issues, including 
notably the definition of the zero- or low-tax countries to which the rule is to 
apply. 
 
Further, even if legislation imposing withholding taxes only on payments to 
designated zero- and low-tax countries could be enacted, enforcement of the 
law would confront difficult practical challenges. Among the most serious 
would be the possibility of back-to-back conduit arrangements by members of 
corporate groups. By a virtually unlimited variety of possible conduit 
arrangements, taxpayers can channel through normally high-tax countries 
payments that ultimately are destined for companies in zero- or low-tax 
jurisdictions. For example, a loan might be made from a group member in 
Country L, a zero- or low-tax country, to another group member in Country A, 
which imposes corporate income tax at normal rates. The company in 
Country A might then on-lend the amount of the loan to a group member 
operating in Country B, another country with normal tax rates. Interest paid 
from Country B would theoretically be taxable in Country A, but the interest 
would be deducted when paid from Country A to Country H, thus zeroing out 
the group’s Country A tax liability.169 The net result is the same as if the 
group member in Country B had borrowed money directly from Country L. It 
would be difficult, if not impossible, for lower-income countries to track 
payments made from their jurisdictions to determine whether the payments 
are ultimately bound for zero- or low-tax countries under back-to-back 
arrangements. 
 
Overall, therefore, the difficult problem of avoidance of withholding taxes 
through treaty shopping remains largely unresolved by the BEPS project. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the OECD’s new multilateral instrument (MLI) offers 
                                                 
169  See e.g. Kandev (2017). 
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some potential benefits, but is unlikely to represent anything approaching a 
full solution to the problem of treaty shopping in lower-income countries.170 
Moreover, countries appear not to have available unilateral legislative 
solutions that are likely to be both politically and technically viable. 
 
All things considered, the best policy position available to lower-income 
countries is probably to: (i) participate in the OECD’s MLI project, but to do so 
with caution, recognising that, at best, the project can only provide partial 
protection against treaty shopping; (ii) consider terminating particular treaties 
that appear to be facilitating large volumes of tax avoidance (although there 
is likely to be political resistance to any movements towards termination); and 
(iii) avoid entering into new treaties unless strong protection is included 
against treaty shopping. Even countries that take all these steps, however, 
are likely to experience continuing difficulties in attempting to control BEPS 
through the use of withholding taxes. 
 
The alternative corporate minimum tax (ACMT) 
 
Structure and basic appeal of an ACMT based on turnover 
 
An alternative corporate minimum tax (ACMT) based on a company’s 
turnover can afford countries some degree of control over tax-base erosion. 
In basic structure, a turnover-based ACMT is relatively simple. Assume, for 
example, that a country imposes its regular corporate income tax at a rate of 
30 per cent, and backs up the regular tax with an alternative corporate 
minimum tax of 1 per cent of turnover. Assume further that a particular 
taxpayer has turnover during a taxable year of $10 million, but because of 
high deductions for interest, royalties and service fees paid to related parties 
in zero- or low-tax countries, the taxpayer’s net taxable income is only 
$200,000. The taxpayer therefore faces a regular corporate income tax 
liability of 30 per cent of $200,000, or $60,000. The taxpayer’s alternative 
minimum tax liability, however, is 1 per cent of $10 million, or $100,000. 
Because the ACMT liability is larger than the regular tax amount, the ACMT 
liability becomes the taxpayer’s corporate tax obligation for the year. 
 
The primary appeal of a turnover-based ACMT is ease of enforcement. A 
taxpayer’s liability under a turnover-based tax is unaffected by the kinds of 
tax deduction for interest, royalties and service fees that fuel BEPS planning 
structures. The tax administration therefore does not need to struggle with 
the limitations of existing transfer pricing methods in attempting to control 
these deductions. (It is particularly noteworthy that a turnover-based ACMT 
can compensate for the inability of transfer pricing methods, as described 
above in this chapter, to control taxpayers’ interest deductions.) 
 
Further, in addition to being unaffected by a taxpayer’s deductions, a 
turnover-based ACMT is much less vulnerable than regular income tax to 
                                                 
170  In particular, as discussed in Chapter 4, the MLI affords countries the option to elect anti-treaty-shopping 
provisions based on a difficult-to-enforce ‘principal purpose’ test. Moreover, lower-income countries may 
encounter political difficulty in applying the MLI to some or all of their existing tax treaties. 
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another important kind of BEPS-style tax avoidance. As described in Chapter 
2, this typically involves the below-market pricing of natural resource and 
agricultural products sold to related purchasing companies by corporate 
subsidiaries operating within a country.171 The turnover-based ACMT 
therefore serves effectively as a backstop against BEPS-style tax avoidance 
of all kinds, not only avoidance through the overstatement of deductions. 
 
ACMTs are already fairly widespread among developing countries – although 
many countries base their ACMTs on measures other than turnover, 
including corporate assets and gross income (turnover minus cost of goods 
sold). (Basing an ACMT on assets rather than turnover arguably causes the 
tax to correlate better with a taxpayer’s net income,172 but a turnover-based 
tax should be much easier to administer. Basing an ACMT on gross income 
rather than turnover would appear to introduce administrative difficulties 
related to the definition of cost of goods sold.) A 2015 article reports use of 
an ACMT in some form by 36 countries.173 Based on review of national tax 
summaries in EY’s Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide (EY 2017), I have 
identified 19 countries that appear to impose an ACMT that is based either 
entirely or partially on turnover.174 The details of the taxes vary substantially 
from country to country. For example, as reported in the EY Guide, some 
countries in this group exempt certain taxpayers, like start-up companies, 
from the ACMT. In a few countries the amount of the minimum tax is capped 
at what appears to be a low level.175 
 
Although, as discussed below, the turnover-based ACMT is worthy of much 
more research than has been conducted to date, the limited information that 
is publicly available suggests that where the tax is applied it is likely to 
account for an important component of corporate tax revenue. An analysis of 
a 0.5 per cent turnover-based ACMT in Pakistan found that over half of firms 
were liable for the tax, and that it accounted for more than half of corporate 
tax receipts (Best et al. 2015: 1331-1332). An IMF 2016 study of the tax 
                                                 
171  To see the relative immunity of a turnover-based ACMT to this kind of tax avoidance, consider a mining 
subsidiary in Country X that produces for export and sells to a related purchaser, during a taxable year, ore 
with a true fair market of $10 million. Assume further that the subsidiary’s total deductible expenses, 
including interest, for the year are $9.6 million, so that its properly measured net income is $400,000. 
Finally, assume that Country X imposes a regular corporate income tax of 25 per cent and backs this tax up 
with an ACMT of 1 per cent of turnover.  
If the taxpayer accurately reports the value of the product that it exports, its regular income tax liability will 
be .25 x $400,000, or $100,000. The taxpayer’s ACMT liability for the year will be .01 x $10 million, which 
also equals $100,000. It will not matter, therefore, whether the taxpayer pays the regular tax or ACMT. 
Assume now, however, that the taxpayer reports a slightly below-market value for the ore that it sells, of 
$9.8 million. The taxpayer’s ACMT liability for the year then decreases by 2%, from $100,000 to $98,000. 
The taxpayer’s reported net income, however, is reduced from $400,000 to $200,000, and its regular tax 
liability is reduced by 50%, from $100,000 to $50,000. The regular tax liability is therefore far more sensitive 
to even a relatively small undervaluation of product sold than the turnover-based ACMT. 
172  See generally Thuronyi (1996: 10-14) (generally expressing preference for asset-based approach). 
173  The countries include Argentina, Bolivia, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, India, Ivory 
Coast, Kenya, Laos, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, the 
Philippines, Puerto Rico, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Taiwan, Tanzania, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Tunisia (Best et al. 2015).  
174  Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Equitorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, Madagascar, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Senegal, Tanzania, and Tunisia. This list may not be exhaustive. 
175  Brief descriptions of the minimum tax regimes in each of the 19 countries from the EY summary are 
provided in an Appendix to this chapter. 
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system in Mali reports that the country’s 1 per cent turnover-based ACMT 
was paid by 36 per cent of corporate taxpayers in 2013, and accounted for 
11.8 per cent of corporate tax revenue (IMF 2016: 15). 
 
The relatively high revenue yield of a turnover-based ACMT, and the high 
percentage of taxpayers affected by the tax, are not surprising. Even at a rate 
of 1 per cent, an ACMT based on turnover should in many cases generate 
tax liabilities larger than the regular income tax liabilities of companies that 
make even relatively restrained use of BEPS-style tax avoidance 
techniques.176 This suggests that the rate of an ACMT might be calibrated to 
yield revenue that is higher than that raised under current circumstances, in 
which BEPS is largely unconstrained, but not so high as to place politically 
untenable tax loads on inbound investors. 
 
An argument typically raised against turnover-based taxes, including ACMTs, 
is that a turnover-based tax can undesirably increase investors’ perceptions 
of financial risk. Under a turnover-based tax, a company faces the possibility 
of being subject to taxation even if the company incurs a loss, or earns only 
sub-normal profits. In theory this risk, which is not posed by a net-income-
based tax, should to some extent operate as a disincentive to investment. 
This disincentive undoubtedly involves some social cost, but the higher tax 
collection made possible by the minimum tax provides offsetting social 
benefits. It seems quite plausible that especially in lower-income countries, to 
the extent any disincentive to investment is raised under a turnover-based 
minimum tax, its social detriment would be outweighed by the advantages of 
more adequate corporate tax revenue.177 
 
Another concern is that a turnover-based corporate tax would operate 
similarly to a consumption tax on the goods or services sold by the 
corporation, and therefore might be more regressive in its distributional 
effects than a tax based on corporate net income. Again, however, the low 
rate at which a turnover-based ACMT is likely to be applied, contrasted with 
the much higher rate typical of VAT, suggests that any regressivity 
introduced to a tax system by an ACMT would probably be limited compared 
to the social benefits made available from the additional revenue raised. 
 
Politically, an ACMT, as a broad measure that targets tax avoidance of a 
number of different kinds, should pose an advantage over more narrowly 
directed measures like limitations on interest deductions, royalties or service 
charges. Narrowly targeted restrictions on deductions are likely to be 
opposed especially by companies that make intensive use of the particular 
                                                 
176  e.g. consider a limited-risk beverage distribution subsidiary of a multinational group in a lower-income 
country, which realises $100 million of gross revenue. After deducting its cost of goods sold as well as 
royalties and service fees paid to an affiliate in a zero- or low-tax country, the taxpayer reports on its income 
tax return a net operating margin of 3%, leaving net income of $3 million. Assume also that the subsidiary 
deducts interest at 30% of net operating income, or $900,000, so that taxable income is $2.1 million. If the 
corporate income tax rate is 30%, the taxpayer’s regular corporate income tax liability is $630,000. The 
taxpayer’s alternative corporate tax liability, 1% of turnover, is $1 million. As this amount is higher than the 
taxpayer’s regular tax liability, the taxpayer is liable for the alternative minimum tax rather than the regular 
tax liability. 
177  This is the fundamental argument of Best et al. (2015). 
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deduction being targeted. For example, companies that have historically 
made extensive use of zero- or low-tax lending companies may argue 
particularly strongly against the imposition of limitations on interest 
deductions. An ACMT, on the other hand, which seeks to limit base erosion 
regardless of the particular avoidance technique used by the taxpayer, may 
encounter fewer concentrated pockets of opposition. 
 
Another potential advantage of an ACMT is that its relative administrative 
simplicity, and its tendency to avoid targeting particular taxpayer groups more 
than others, might lend itself well to internationally coordinated adoption, 
perhaps on a regional basis. Coordinated implementation of an ACMT might 
mitigate to some extent the pressure of tax competition that stands at the 
heart of base erosion and profit shifting, and thereby enhance prospects for 
the ACMT’s successful performance. It may not be entirely unrealistic to see 
in the ACMT potential for establishing a norm of tax policymaking for lower-
income countries, coordinated through regional tax compacts.178 International 
agreement might extend to a commitment not to grant exemption from the 
minimum tax, even to taxpayers that are exempted from regular corporate 
taxation under tax holidays or other arrangements. Of course, the political 
feasibility of regionally coordinated ACMT policies remains to be determined, 
but it is a possibility worth exploring. 
Historical lack of attention to ACMTs 
 
Given the already fairly widespread use of the ACMT, and the obvious 
potential for the ACMT to address the kinds of avoidance that motivated the 
initiation of the BEPS process, it is striking that the minimum tax did not 
receive greater attention in the course of the BEPS studies. Early during the 
BEPS process, the IMF raised the potential benefits of AMCTs as a 
component of the effort to control base erosion in developing countries,179 but 
there appears to have been no serious follow-up to the IMF’s suggestion by 
the OECD or any other intergovernmental body. 
 
Possibly the bluntness of the AMCT as an instrument for controlling tax 
avoidance placed it outside the political and intellectual boundaries of what 
the OECD might have been expected to explore during the BEPS process. A 
central implicit element of the historical international consensus is that tax 
authorities should accept the burden of measuring taxpayers’ net income with 
a high degree of precision to prevent subjecting taxpayers to excessive 
                                                 
178  The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) provides member countries with the option of 
including an ACMT in their tax systems. See IMF (2016: 13). 
179  A 2014 IMF staff report observes:  
One possible approach to bolstering the CIT [corporate income tax] base in developing countries is 
through some form of minimum tax (MT). An MT aims to protect revenue by charging tax on something - 
commonly turnover, book earnings or assets - that is less subject to manipulation than is taxable income, 
with overall tax payment then being the larger of liability under MT and under the standard CIT. Corporate 
MTs are already found in over 30 countries. Schemes differ quite widely, and can lead to considerable 
complexity and significant distortion: a charge on net assets, for instance, can reinforce debt bias, while 
one on gross assets may introduce distortions between firms with differing capital structures. 
Nonetheless, MTs have proved both useful and practicable in protecting domestic tax bases, and might 
also be addressed to combating aggressive international tax planning in relation to inward investment. 
They could, for example, address in a simplified, aggregate way the need for increased limitations on 
deductibility of certain cross border payments flowing from developing countries, that is seen by many 
observers (IMF 2014: 36). 
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taxation. Taxes based on turnover contradict this paradigm. Instead, by their 
structure, they appear to elevate the goal of raising revenue above that of 
ensuring corporate taxpayers’ accurate measurement of their net income. 
The BEPS episode nevertheless suggests that some shifting of the historical 
priority, in the direction of certainty in raising public revenue, may be 
desirable in the interest of overall public welfare, especially in lower-income 
countries where the social benefits of enhanced corporate tax collection are 
likely to be especially pronounced. 
 
The need for country-specific research 
 
Not only did the BEPS process give little attention to the ACMT, but the 
scholarly tax literature seems not to have accorded it much detailed study 
and analysis. This may reflect that, from the standpoint of a tax theorist, the 
ACMT is a fairly uninteresting creature. It is not based on the intellectual 
model of optimal taxation that has dominated scholarly tax analysis since the 
1970s. Recently, by analysing quantitatively the trade-off between precision 
and administrability that the ACMT represents, the work of Michael Best and 
others (Best et al. 2015) has not only forged new intellectual ground, but also 
ideally will encourage additional research on the minimum tax. This effect 
would be welcome, since a programme for expanding use of the ACMT in 
lower-income countries and elsewhere should be based on a larger body of 
empirical knowledge than is currently available. 
 
Research should assess the historical performance of the ACMT, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively, on a country-by-country basis. For example, 
in countries that have the tax, what percentage of taxpayers are covered by 
it, and what percentage of revenue is attributable to it? Has the ACMT been 
the subject of political controversy? To what extent if any is exemption of the 
tax afforded to start-up companies, and how have any start-up exemptions 
performed in practice? Under what other circumstances are taxpayers 
exempted from the ACMT (e.g. are companies that are granted exemption 
from regular corporate tax also routinely exempted from the ACMT)? 
Answers to all these questions would provide essential practical guidance 
with respect to whether expanded use of corporate minimum taxes based on 
turnover is likely to be of significant fiscal benefit to lower-income countries. 
 
Additional uses for revenue-based taxes 
 
In exploring above the possible merits of an ACMT based on turnover, I 
described some important general advantages of taxes based on revenue 
instead of net income in preventing base erosion and profit shifting. No 
deductions are allowed under revenue-based taxes, so the taxes are immune 
from profit shifting through payment of interest, royalties and service fees. In 
addition, revenue-based taxes are much less affected than net-income levies 
by the undervaluation of sales revenue, for example in connection with 
purchasing company structures that might be used by natural resource 
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extractors operating in lower-income countries.180 There are economic 
disadvantages of revenue-based taxes, including the risk of imposing tax 
liabilities on investors even if the investors are not operating at a profit. 
Nevertheless, as argued above in connection with the ACMT, there may well 
be situations where the administrative advantages of revenue-based taxes 
outweigh their disadvantages. 
 
In this discussion, I explore some important additional ways that countries 
around the world, including lower-income countries, regularly employ 
revenue-based levies to avoid the administrative shortcomings of net-income 
taxes. These include (i) greater weighting of taxation towards royalties in 
natural resource taxation and (ii) excise taxes for hard-to-tax industries like 
telecommunications, banking and insurance. 
 
Natural resource royalties 
 
The extraction of natural resources – both oil and gas and hard minerals – is 
very important to many developing countries, and revenue from extraction 
sometimes accounts for a large share of some countries’ total government 
receipts.181 Moreover, the natural resources beneath the surface of a country 
are typically owned by the country’s government. When the government 
imposes a tax on a producer that removes and sells part of the country’s 
endowment of non-renewable resources, the government acts, not only 
under its taxing power, but also as proprietary seller of resources on behalf of 
the country’s people. This consideration places a special public policy 
premium on ensuring that taxation of natural resource producers in a country 
occurs effectively, and at a high enough level to reflect the full value of the 
resources that the government is in effect selling to the extractor. 
 
Historically, governments have exacted revenue from natural resource 
producers in two basic forms.182 One form is a royalty, usually expressed as 
a percentage of the fair market value of the product produced. So, for 
example, a royalty charged to an iron-mining company might be set at 10 per 
cent of the fair market value of each ton of iron ore produced. Royalties are in 
effect taxes imposed on a producer’s revenue rather than its net income. 
 
Royalties, however, can be seen as an economically blunt instrument for 
taxing natural resource producers, since they can be imposed on producers 
before they have even begun to realise profits from their extractive activities. 
This risk can discourage companies from investing in extractive projects. To 
counter this effect, it has been customary for many years not to tax natural 
resource producers only through royalties, but instead to apply a ‘fiscal mix’ 
consisting in part of royalties, and in part of taxes based on net income. The 
                                                 
180  See footnote 20 and accompanying text. 
181  e.g. in many petroleum-producing countries natural resource taxes account for well over half of government 
receipts; in Botswana mining revenue accounts for almost 50%, and in Guinea about 30%, of government 
receipts. See Daniel et al. (2017: 1, 2). 
182  The ensuing discussion of natural resource taxation is highly simplified, and is intended to permit readers to 
gain a basic understanding of the topic in a very brief format. Those seeking more complete information 
should see the comprehensive treatment in Daniel et al. (2017). See also Durst (2017b: 1167). 
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net income taxes used might consist of the country’s regular corporate 
income tax, or a special kind of income tax known as the resource rent tax 
(RRT). (Under an RRT, a resource producer is not taxed until the producer 
has earned a specified return on their capital investment in a project; the 
RRT is therefore seen as especially effective in mitigating investors’ risk of 
premature taxation.183 
 
The inclusion of income-based taxes, as well as royalties, in the typical fiscal 
mix for extractive projects has reduced disincentives to investment, but at the 
same time has introduced serious BEPS-related enforcement problems to 
natural resource taxation. Royalties, as a tax on revenue rather than net 
income, are immune from the kind of BEPS-style tax avoidance that involves 
deductions for interest expense, intellectual-property royalties and related-
party service fees. In addition, royalties are much less sensitive than income 
taxes to the understatement of the fair market value of the product that is 
produced.184 In contrast, income-based taxes are highly vulnerable to profit 
shifting through deductible payments. Natural resource projects can be 
heavily debt-financed, raising the possibility of large related-party interest 
deductions.185 Natural resource producers also often incur large costs for 
technical services, equipment and supplies provided by related parties, all of 
which can involve BEPS-style profit shifting. 
 
Plainly, a trade-off is presented between the use of royalties and income-
based taxes in natural resource fiscal regimes. Income-based taxes pose 
less disincentive to investment, but are much more vulnerable than royalties 
to BEPS-style taxpayer avoidance. While views can differ, it is my impression 
that, historically, policy-making in the natural resource sector has tended to 
under-appreciate the revenue losses arising from tax avoidance, and 
therefore to give excessive relative weight to the risk-mitigating advantages 
of income-based taxation. It may well be appropriate for fiscal regimes to give 
greater weight to royalties than they tend to do today.186 
 
In this connection it should be understood that it is possible to structure 
royalties so that they offer investors at least some of the risk mitigation 
afforded by income-based taxes. For example, the rate of a royalty might be 
                                                 
183  For a discussion of RRTs, see Land (2010: 256). 
184  See the numerical example in Section II.A of Durst (2017b).  
The OECD’s report on BEPS Actions 8-10 attempts to alleviate the problem of related-party purchasing 
companies by endorsing the use of a so-called sixth method in valuing natural resource and agricultural 
products for tax purposes. The sixth method accepts, as valid comparable selling price information, publicly 
available posted price data, e.g. the posted prices of particular grades of crude oil or metal ores - see OECD 
(2017b: para. 2.18-2.22). The sixth method, however, is likely to be of only limited use to tax authorities, 
since in many cases the valuation of natural resource product requires difficult adjustments to posted 
product prices for factors like variations in ore or petroleum quality, distance of the mine or well from the 
marketplace, and whether the product is being sold at spot or under long-term contracts. Also, the sixth 
method does not address the problem of verifying the appropriateness of deductions taken by natural 
resource producers for expenses like interest, technical service fees and the cost of equipment rented or 
purchased from related parties. Overall, despite acceptance of the sixth method, the problems of transfer 
pricing enforcement for natural resource producers remain largely unsolved. See also, e.g., Readhead 
(2018). 
185  e.g. see IMF (2014: 20). 
186  See Keen and Mullins (2017: 11, 34): ‘[The availability of tax avoidance] may … mean tilting the balance 
between profit-based taxes and royalties further towards the latter than might otherwise be the case, on the 
grounds that monitoring deductible costs is harder than monitoring revenues’. 
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set to vary with the volume of production from a mine or field, and with the 
price level of the product being produced.187 A variable royalty of this kind 
should be correlated to some extent with the profitability of a project, 
reducing the risk of inappropriately high taxation. Variable royalties, however, 
remain based on revenue rather than net income, so they should remain 
relatively immune to BEPS-style avoidance. Overall, variable royalties might 
be seen as a useful middle ground between royalties and income-based 
taxes. 
 
Other uses of revenue-based levies 
 
Natural resource production is not the only important industry in lower-
income countries for which effective enforcement under an income tax is 
exceptionally difficult. For example, mobile telephone service providers tend 
to play an important economic role in lower-income countries. The 
companies are typically members of multinational groups, and they engage in 
a large variety of transactions with other members of their multinational 
groups, including borrowing, the obtaining of technical services and the 
purchase of equipment. Over the years, many countries have responded to 
the difficulty of taxing telecommunications providers by applying excise taxes 
based on the purchase price of services rendered. Given the difficulty of 
applying income taxes to telecommunications providers, it seems inevitable 
that much of the taxation of the industry will need to consist of excise 
taxes.188 
 
Other kinds of cross-border businesses that rely heavily on information and 
communications technology also pose problems of tax administration similar 
to those posed by mobile telephony. These include, for example, providers of 
software and consulting services online, internet service providers, sellers of 
goods using electronic commerce and social media sites. For these kinds of 
businesses it appears impossible, based on normal transfer pricing analysis, 
to determine satisfactorily how much income should properly be taxed in the 
country where services or goods are consumed, and how much should be 
taxed elsewhere. Currently, much income from these kinds of businesses 
apparently goes untaxed in countries at all levels of economic development. 
 
In Action 1 of the BEPS project, the OECD conducted an extensive review of 
what it labelled ‘the tax challenges of the digital economy’. In large measure, 
the OECD’s Action 1 report, released in November 2015, can be 
characterised as an inconclusive study of whether the concepts of income 
taxation can satisfactorily be applied to digital businesses, or whether much 
of the tax burden of the digital economy must inevitably consist of revenue-
based based taxes. The Action 1 report found no consensus on this question, 
but noted that countries could if they desired experiment individually with the 
use of special measures, including excise taxes in the digital field. 
 
                                                 
187  See Clausing and Durst (2016: 803). 
188  See generally Matheson and Petit (2017). 
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At the time of writing, vigorous debate persists among countries concerning 
possible approaches to taxing the digital economy.189 This debate is not likely 
to be resolved through consensus in the near future. The industries that may 
be subjected to additional taxation wield considerable political power. Also, 
serious questions are raised concerning whether additional taxation might 
unduly discourage desirable innovation, as well as the extension of digital 
services within lower-income markets. It seems unavoidable, however, that if 
the international digital economy is going to be taxed successfully, much of 
the taxation will need to take the form of excise taxes or similar revenue-
based levies. 
 
The extension of the use of excise taxes will involve some costs. First, the 
economic burden of excise taxes probably falls relatively more heavily on 
consumers than corporate income tax. In addition, the targeting of excise 
taxes to particular industries but not others raises a danger of economic 
distortion.190 But the fact remains that in a global economy increasingly 
characterised by the electronic dissemination of services and goods, greater 
use of gross revenue-based taxes by all countries, including lower-income 
countries, appears unavoidable.191 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has described five different initiatives that offer lower-income 
countries realistic promise of greater control of base erosion and profit 
shifting: 
 
1. improvements to transfer pricing rules and administrative practices, especially 
relating to the application of the transactional net margin method (TNMM); 
2. EBITDA-based limitations on interest deductions, as recommended by the 
OECD’s BEPS Action 4 report; 
3. actions to control treaty shopping and thereby prevent the inappropriate 
avoidance of withholding taxes; 
4. expanded use by lower-income countries of an alternative corporate minimum 
tax based on turnover, as a base-protecting overlay on a country’s regular 
corporate income tax; and 
5. greater weighting of royalties in natural resource fiscal mixes, and the use of 
excise taxes in hard-to-tax industries, especially in the digital sector. 
 
All of these measures could, I believe, offer at least incremental revenue 
gains for lower-income countries, and in the aggregate the revenue 
protection afforded by these measures might be substantial. 
 
                                                 
189  See, e.g., Johnston (2018b). 
190  This concern might be seen as especially important where external benefits are seen from the development 
of particular industries, like the provision of internet services in low-income areas. On the other hand, where 
industries generate external costs instead of benefits, as in, say, the tobacco and alcohol industries, the use 
of excise taxes seems especially appropriate, as evidenced by the very wide application of tobacco and 
alcohol levies around the world. See Moore and Prichard (2017: 13). 
191  See generally Durst (2015).  
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An important caution, however, is in order: none of these five measures 
against base erosion is discussed for the first time in this book. All these 
possible base-protection measures have been known to tax specialists for 
years, and in some instances they are already applied by countries in 
practice. 
 
By and large, the fact that these measures are not used more extensively, 
especially by lower-income countries, does not reflect lack of technical 
expertise among tax policymakers and administrators. Instead, the barriers to 
greater protection of the corporate income tax base by lower-income 
countries are rooted in large measure in the political and economic pressures 
of tax competition. 
 
For many years, investing multinationals have been eager to accept tax 
incentives, explicit or tacit, from countries at all levels of development. 
Governments, particularly those of lower-income countries, have in turn 
refrained from erecting formidable barriers to profit shifting, apparently 
fearing the loss of foreign direct investment. The result has been the familiar 
race to the bottom, with countries relinquishing a very large portion of their 
corporate tax base to BEPS-style tax planning. Changing this situation will 
require more than legal and technical capacity in corporate taxation. It also 
will require mitigation of the pressure of tax competition that led to, and has 
sustained, the large incidence of profit shifting from lower-income countries. 
 
As discussed above, recent developments may to some extent be reducing 
the pressure of tax competition on lower-income countries. The reputational 
concerns of multinationals, for example, and enhanced CFC rules around the 
world (including, as described in Chapter 4, the new US GILTI tax), may be 
removing from multinational groups some of the incentive to shift income 
from lower-income countries. These kinds of developments around the world, 
however, are likely to result in only limited reduction in pressure for base 
erosion from lower-income countries. Additional policy actions seem 
necessary if corporate tax revenue is to be increased substantially closer to 
desirable levels. 
 
I am convinced by the history of BEPS, and by the apparent continuing 
pervasiveness of tax competition, that as a political matter lower-income 
countries will not be able to construct adequate safeguards for their corporate 
tax base without some conscious assistance from multinational business 
interests. Today, as well as before the BEPS process, governments are 
unlikely to make a serious attempt to increase corporate tax revenue if they 
fear the cost is likely to be the diversion of inbound investment to competing 
jurisdictions. In particular, as discussed further in the next chapter, I believe 
that satisfactory progress towards desirable levels of corporate taxation in 
lower-income countries will require deliberate forbearance by multinational 
companies from fully exploiting the economic leverage that tax competition 
affords them. For example, multinational companies and their home-country 
governments might refrain from opposing, and even seek to facilitate, 
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moderate base protection measures like low-rate ACMTs in countries that 
are willing to adopt them. 
 
In proposing this kind of forbearance from tax competition, I realise that I am 
raising important questions relating to the appropriateness of corporate 
actors basing their behaviour on considerations other than the maximisation 
of after-tax profits. It is impossible, however, to avoid these issues if the topic 
of corporate taxation in lower-income countries is to be treated frankly and 
realistically. The bottom line is that substantial progress towards additional 
corporate tax revenue in lower-income countries will require mitigation of 
current pressure of tax competition, and there is no realistic alternative to 
some degree of corporate forbearance if that mitigation is to be achieved. 
The next and final chapter of this book will attempt to address this topic, in 
the course of what I hope is a pragmatic discussion of: (i) the ethical 
challenges posed by the problem of corporate taxation in lower-income 
countries; and (ii) the ways both public and private actors might respond 
productively to these challenges. 
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Appendix. Descriptions of Some Alternative Corporate Minimum Tax 
Regimes192 
(Source: EY Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide) 
 
Cambodia 
 
Minimum tax. Minimum tax is a separate annual tax imposed at a rate of 1% 
of annual turnover inclusive of all taxes, except value added tax (VAT). If the 
[regular tax] liability exceeds the amount of the minimum tax, the taxpayer is 
not liable for the minimum tax. 
 
An exemption from the [regular tax] applies to the trigger period plus three 
years plus the priority period. The maximum trigger period is [a] QIP’s 
[Qualified Investment Project’s] first year of profits or the third year after the 
QIP earns its first revenue, whichever is earlier. The priority period, which is 
specified in the Finance Law and varies by project, may have a duration of up 
to three years. The taxpayer is also entitled to an exemption from the 
minimum tax (see Minimum tax) for as long as it retains its QIP status. QIPs 
are also eligible for import duty exemption with respect to the importation of 
production equipment, construction materials, raw materials, intermediate 
goods, and accessories that serve production. 
 
Cameroon 
  
Tax rates. The regular corporate income tax rate is 30% (plus a 10% 
additional council tax). For companies operating under the real earnings tax 
regime, the minimum tax payable is 2% (plus 10% additional council tax) of 
monthly gross sales (turnover). However, for companies subject to the real 
earnings tax regime that are in the administered margin sectors, which are 
the distribution of petroleum, domestic gas, milling, pharmaceutical, and 
press products, the minimum tax payable is 14% (plus 10% additional council 
tax) of the gross margin. The minimum tax payable is 5.5% for companies 
under the simplified tax regime. The minimum tax is creditable against 
corporate tax due for the current financial year. 
 
Operational phase. Incentives available during the operational phase (10 
years for all companies qualifying for the incentives) include exemptions or 
reductions with respect to minimum tax, corporate tax, customs duties on 
certain items, and other specified taxes and fees. In addition, companies may 
carry forward losses to the fifth year following the year in which the losses 
are incurred. 
                                                 
192  The material in this Appendix to Chapter 5 is based on the online EY Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide, as 
accessed in November 2017. Reproduced by permission of EYGM Limited from the EY Corporate Tax 
Guide. Copyright 2017 EYGM Limited. All rights reserved. 
The descriptions are based on an informal review of the Tax Guide and are presented for illustrative 
purposes only. The information presented may be out-of-date or otherwise incorrect or incomplete. 
EYGM Limited also states the following: ‘All information provided is of a general nature and is not intended 
to address the circumstances of any particular individual or entity. Although we endeavor to provide 
accurate and timely information, there can be no guarantee that such information is accurate as of the date 
it is received or that it will continue to be accurate in the future. No one should act upon such information 
without appropriate professional advice after a thorough examination of the facts of a particular situation. All 
information is provided “as is”, with no warranties or representations whatsoever’. 
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Chad 
  
The minimum tax is paid on a monthly basis at a rate of 1.5% of the turnover 
of the previous month. The payment must be made by the 15th day of the 
month following the month of realization of the turnover. 
 
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 
  
The minimum tax payable is 1% of the annual turnover for larger 
corporations. For small corporations with annual revenues of less than 
CDF10 million, the corporate income tax is set at CDF50,000. For average-
sized corporations with annual revenues between CDF10 million and 
CDF200 million, the corporate income tax rate is 1% of the annual revenue 
for sales of goods and 2% for the provision of services. 
 
Congo, Republic of the 
  
The minimum tax payable is 1% of the annual turnover and cannot be less 
than XAF1 million (or XAF500,000 if turnover is less than XAF10 million a 
year). A 2% minimum tax is payable by companies that incur tax losses in 
two consecutive years. It appears that the 2% rate is applied to the sum of 
gross turnovers and products and benefits realized by the company in the 
most recent year in which it earned a profit. In general, the 2% tax is not 
deductible for corporate income tax purposes. However, in the company’s 
first profit-making year after incurring the losses, one half of the 2% tax is 
deductible. 
 
Côte d’Ivoire 
  
The minimum tax is 0.5% of turnover. For oil-producing, electricity, and 
water-producing companies, the rate is reduced to 0.1%. The rate is reduced 
to 0.15% for banks and financial companies and for insurance companies. 
The minimum tax may not be less than XOF3 million or more than XOF35 
million. New corporations are exempt from the minimum tax for their first 
fiscal year, and mining companies are exempt from the minimum tax during 
the exploration phase. 
 
Equatorial Guinea 
  
The minimum corporate tax is 3% of annual turnover for the preceding year. 
The amount of this tax cannot be less than XAF800,000. 
 
Gabon 
  
Tax rates. The standard corporate income tax rate is 30%. However, oil and 
mining companies are subject to tax at a rate of 35%. A reduced corporate 
tax rate of 25% applies to a limited number of companies. The minimum 
corporate tax payable is 1% of annual turnover, but not less than XAF1 
million. The base for the calculation of the minimum corporate tax is the 
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global turnover realized during the tax year. An exemption from the minimum 
corporate tax applies to the following companies: 
 
    Companies exempt from corporate income tax, as provided in the general 
tax code.     
    New businesses. 
 
    Newly incorporated companies or legal entities, for their first two years, 
regardless of their activities. 
 
Guinea 
  
Tax rates. The regular corporate income tax rate is 35%. Since the issuance 
of the amended Mining Code in April 2013, the rate for the mining sector is 
30% (applicable to mining companies only; not applicable to subcontractors). 
The annual minimum tax payable is 3% of annual turnover. However, under 
the 2012 Financial Law, it cannot be less than GNF15 million or more than 
GNF60 million. 
 
Guyana 
  
Commercial companies, other than insurance companies, and commercial 
activities of a company carrying on both commercial and non-commercial 
activities are subject to a minimum tax at a rate of 2% of turnover if the 
corporation tax calculated as payable for the preceding year was less than 
2% of the turnover of the commercial company. If, in any year, the 
corporation tax payable is calculated to be higher than 2% of turnover, the 
tax payable is limited to the corporation tax assessed. Consequently, the tax 
payable by a commercial company or with respect to the commercial 
activities of a company undertaking both commercial and noncommercial 
activities is the lower of 2% of turnover or corporation tax at a rate of 40%. 
 
Hungary 
  
Alternative minimum tax. The alternative minimum tax (AMT) is calculated by 
applying the general rate of 9% to the AMT tax base. In general, the AMT tax 
base is 2% of total revenues, excluding any revenue attributable to foreign 
permanent establishments. The AMT tax base must be increased by an 
amount equal to 50% of additional loans contracted by the company from its 
shareholders or members during the tax year. If a company’s AMT is higher 
than the corporate income tax otherwise calculated or the pretax profit, the 
taxpayer may choose to pay either of the following: 
 
    AMT. 
 
    Corporate income tax otherwise payable. In this case, the company must 
fill out a one-page form that provides information regarding certain types of 
expenses and, in principle, is more likely to be selected for a tax audit. 
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Madagascar 
  
Tax rates. The standard corporate income tax rate is 20%. In general, the 
minimum tax is MGA100,000 plus 0.5% of annual turnover (including capital 
gains) for companies carrying out the following activities: 
 
    Agricultural. 
    Craft. 
    Mining. 
    Industrial. 
    Tourism. 
    Transport. 
 
This minimum tax equals 0.1% of annual turnover for fuel station filling 
companies. For companies engaged in other activities, the minimum tax is 
MGA320,000 plus 0.5% of annual turnover. The minimum tax applies if the 
company incurs a loss or if the corporate income tax calculated using the 
20% rate is less than the minimum tax to be paid as stated above. Individuals 
or companies performing exclusively public market activities are exempt from 
minimum tax. Free zones’ companies. Free zones’ companies are exempt 
from corporate income tax for the first five years of their activities and are 
subject to corporate income tax at a rate of 10% for subsequent years. Large 
mining investments. Mining companies making investments over USD25 
million can benefit from legal and tax incentives if they are eligible under a 
special law called Loi sur les Grands Investissments Miniers (LGIM). They 
are exempt from minimum tax for five years from the beginning of 
exploitation. The corporate income tax rates are 10% for owners of mining 
permits and 25% for the transformation entities. 
 
Mauritania 
  
Tax rates. The regular corporate income tax rate is 25%. The minimum tax 
(impôt minimum forfaitaire, or IMF) is 2.5% of turnover. However, the tax may 
not be less than MRO750,000. Profits realized in Mauritania by branches of 
foreign companies are deemed to be distributed and, consequently, are 
subject to a branch withholding tax of 10% on after-tax income. The new 
investment code provides for a preferential tax regime, which is available to 
companies producing goods or services for export exclusively and 
companies working exclusively for them. 
 
Morocco 
 
The minimum tax equals the greater of the minimum fixed amount of 
MAD3,000 and 0.5% of the total of the following items: 
 
    Turnover from sales of delivered goods and services rendered. 
    Other exploitation income (for example, directors’ fees received when the 
company acts as an administrator of another company, revenues from 
buildings that are not used in the company’s activities, and profits and 
transfers of losses with respect to shared operations). 
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    Financial income (excluding financial reversals and transfers of financial 
expenses). 
    Subsidies received from the state and third parties. The rate of minimum 
tax is reduced to 0.25% for sales of petroleum goods, gasoline, butter, oil, 
sugar, flour, water, and electricity. 
 
The minimum tax applies if it exceeds the corporate income tax resulting 
from the application of the proportional rates or if the company incurs a loss. 
New companies are exempt from minimum tax for 36 months after the 
commencement of business activities. Before January 2016, if minimum tax 
is applied because of the incurrence of tax losses or because the minimum 
tax amount exceeded the corporate income tax, the minimum tax could be 
offset against the corporate income tax due in the following three years. 
Effective from 1 January 2016, the minimum tax can no longer be offset 
against corporate income tax. Nonresident contractors may elect an optional 
method of taxation for construction or assembly work or for work on industrial 
or technical installations. Under the optional method, an 8% tax is applied to 
the total contract price including the cost of materials, but excluding VAT. 
 
Nigeria 
  
Minimum tax. Companies are required to pay minimum corporate tax if the 
minimum tax is greater than their actual tax liability. If a company’s turnover 
is NGN500,000 or less, the minimum tax is the highest of the following: 
 
    0.5% of gross profit. 
    0.5% of net assets. 
    0.25% of paid-up capital. 
    0.25% of turnover of NGN500,000. If turnover is higher than NGN500,000, 
the minimum tax equals the amount computed in the preceding paragraph 
plus 0.125% of the turnover exceeding NGN500,000. 
 
The minimum tax does not apply to companies until the fifth year after the 
commencement of business. Companies engaged in an agricultural trade or 
business and companies with at least 25% imported equity capital are 
exempt from the minimum tax requirement. 
 
Pakistan 
  
Minimum tax. Resident companies and nonresident banking companies are 
subject to a minimum income tax equal to 1% of gross receipts from sales of 
goods, services rendered, and the execution of contracts, if the corporate tax 
liability is less than the amount of the minimum tax. The excess of the 
minimum tax over the corporate tax liability may be carried forward and used 
to offset the corporate tax liability of the following five tax years. 
 
Senegal 
 
Tax rates. The corporate income tax rate is 30%. The minimum tax (impôt 
minimum forfaitaire, or IMF) payable equals 0.5% of the turnover for the 
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preceding tax year. The minimum tax may not be less than XOF500,000 or 
more than XOF5 million. 
 
Tanzania 
  
Alternative minimum tax. Companies reporting tax losses or utilizing loss 
carryforwards for three consecutive years must pay an alternative minimum 
tax at a rate of 0.3% on the annual turnover in the third loss year. 
 
Tunisia  
The minimum tax payable is 0.2% of annual local turnover and 0.1% of 
taxable exportation turnover. The 0.2% minimum tax paid in 2014 may be 
credited against the corporate income tax payable for the next five financial 
years, but it is not refundable. The 2015 Financial Law eliminates the 
possibility of deducting the 0.2% minimum tax in the fifth year. Tax benefits, 
such as exemptions from certain taxes and duties, may be granted to 
companies established in a Tunisian Free Zone and to companies engaged 
wholly or partly in exporting.  
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Chapter 6 BEPS in lower-income countries: a 
social responsibility perspective 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The preceding chapters of this book have sought to explore the historical, 
economic and political background of base erosion and profit shifting in 
lower-income countries, and to offer suggestions regarding the kind of policy 
initiatives that might be most effective in enhancing corporate tax revenue in 
these countries. This sixth and concluding chapter expands the discussion by 
addressing some questions of an ethical nature. The chapter first addresses 
whether, as a general matter, the persistence of BEPS in lower-income 
countries poses a problem of a kind that those involved in the international 
tax system have an ethical obligation to address. The chapter then considers 
how major categories of actors in the area of corporate taxation in lower-
income countries – including multinational businesses, international 
organisations like the OECD, UN, IMF and World Bank, and national 
governments of countries at different levels of economic development – 
might effectively respond to the ethical challenges that appear to be raised. 
The discussion will focus on four topics, which I think are of especially high 
practical importance in the short and medium term. In particular, the 
discussion below will: 
 
(i)  comment on the efforts of multinational businesses, under the rubric of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), to articulate standards for socially 
responsible tax planning; 
(ii)  argue that intergovernmental organisations in the area of international 
taxation face an ethical obligation to maintain in-house sources of 
intellectual challenge to conventional wisdom and the status quo; 
(iii)  argue that the world’s capital-exporting countries face an ethical 
imperative to collaborate on the enactment of robust controlled foreign 
corporation (CFC) rules (or similar rules like those that might be 
modelled on the recent US GILTI rules); and 
(iv)  argue that the governments of lower-income countries face an urgent 
ethical imperative to ensure transparency and orderly legal procedure in 
the award of explicit tax incentives, such as tax holidays; and that 
governments should give close attention to the maintenance of the data 
necessary to evaluate the performance of tax administrations in their 
jurisdictions. 
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Roots of the ethical challenge 
 
The preceding chapters of this book interpret continuing shortfalls of 
corporate tax revenue in lower-income countries as both a manifestation of 
current conditions of poverty and a cause of perpetuation of that poverty. The 
problem centres on the pressure of tax competition, to which lower-income 
country governments typically feel especially vulnerable. Wealthier countries, 
which offer relatively appealing environments for inbound investment, 
generally can afford to place significant constraints on erosion of their tax 
bases even in the face of international tax competition. This is evidenced, for 
example, by the recent tightening of limitations on interest deductions among 
many relatively wealthy countries, the diverted profits taxes (DVTs) of the 
United Kingdom and Australia, and by the recently enacted BEAT minimum 
tax on income from related-party transactions in the US.193 
 
Lower-income countries, however, often can offer investors only limited 
advantages in terms of local business infrastructure and a well-educated 
workforce. These countries, therefore, often see themselves as required to 
offer inbound investors very low effective corporate tax rates, either explicitly 
through tax holidays or other exemptions, or implicitly by leaving their tax 
bases vulnerable to BEPS-style tax planning. The result is a vicious circle of 
poverty. The failure to collect corporate tax deprives lower-income countries 
of revenue that could be used to meet immediate humanitarian needs, and 
also to improve infrastructure and standards of education that might render 
the countries less vulnerable to international tax competition in the future. 
 
The role of BEPS in perpetuating poverty in itself raises a moral imperative to 
try to curtail base erosion and profit shifting. A general social duty to alleviate 
poverty is widely acknowledged; although the duty can usefully be the 
subject of philosophical analysis,194 it seems reasonable to treat it for present 
purposes as axiomatic. It also can, I think, be taken as axiomatic that one’s 
duty to relieve the suffering of others is enhanced, to the extent that one is in 
a position as a practical matter to render aid. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
conclude that those actors who participate most directly in the international 
corporate tax system – including multinational companies, intergovernmental 
organisations and national governments – possess especially clear duties to 
act, within their power, to reduce the incidence of BEPS in lower-income 
countries. 
 
 
                                                 
193  See Chapter 4. 
194  For an important survey of the large body of philosophical inquiry regarding the source and extent of a moral 
duty to redress poverty, see Sen (2009). For a more recent survey of the philosophical literature in the 
specific context of international taxation, see Dagan (2018: 185-212). 
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Ethical duties of multinational businesses: corporate social 
responsibility 
 
The early polarisation of the BEPS debate 
 
As described in Chapter 1, the early objections to international profit shifting, 
as voiced by NGOs and others following the 2008 financial crisis, often took a 
pejorative tone towards multinational companies and rhetoric tended to 
become polarised. Several events in the UK illustrate the polarisation. First, 
late in 2012, in the course of a UK parliamentary hearing, MP Margaret 
Hodge responded to the insistence of corporate executives that their BEPS-
style tax planning was legally permissible under the laws of affected 
countries. Ms. Hodge replied, ‘We are not accusing you of being illegal, we 
are accusing you of being immoral’ (BBC 2012). 
 
Then, in 2013 Starbucks was faced with substantial public hostility in the UK 
for apparently having paid no corporate income tax in the country for several 
years.195 As a result, in a highly publicised move Starbucks committed itself 
to making voluntary tax payments to the UK of up to £20 million during 2013 
and 2014, regardless of whether the company was legally obligated to do so. 
This episode was met by alarm among many tax practitioners and 
commentators as it raised the prospect of a tax system based, not on the 
boundaries of law, but on the vagaries of popular political pressure.196 
 
These events promoted a kind of all-or-nothing dialogue concerning whether 
it is appropriate for companies to refrain from taking favourable tax positions, 
even when those positions are legally permissible under the laws of the 
countries that would be affected. On one hand it was argued that a 
company’s fiduciary obligation to its shareholders generally requires the 
company to take the most favourable tax position legally available to it. 
Against this, it was argued that a company acts immorally by participating in 
tax planning corresponding to the BEPS pattern, even if the company 
believes that the planning is legally permissible in the countries that will be 
affected. 
                                                 
195  See generally Christians (2013). 
196  Professor Allison Christians wrote at the time: ‘Activists have shown that they cannot be dispensed with by 
platitudes about legal compliance. They have flagged higher tax payments as a major component of 
multinationals’ global social license to operate, even if they have not yet articulated the precise amount to 
be paid. What is certain is that the price for Starbucks’s social license to operate is above that apparently 
required by current law. The same appears to be true for many other multinationals that provide popular 
services and products around the world. If governments don’t make tax reform changes that meet the 
demands of activists, multinationals face the very real risk of a conflicting plurality of legal requirements and 
extralegal standards. For multinationals, that makes for an uncertain future: one in effect shaped by activist 
vigilantism’ (Christians 2013). 
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This argument proved largely unproductive as it involved an 
oversimplification of the company’s fiduciary obligation. It is true that, as a 
general matter, a corporation is required in its decision-making to act in the 
shareholders’ interest, and in some circumstances doing so might involve 
taking advantage of legally available routes towards tax reduction. But the 
corporation’s fiduciary obligation to its shareholders does not require that 
every business decision taken by the corporation must be designed to 
maximise the shareholders’ short-term pecuniary interests. Instead, the 
corporation is free to forgo opportunities for short-term advantage if doing so 
will promote the interests of the shareholders in the long term. 
 
Therefore, if corporate management believes that engaging in a particular 
instance of BEPS-style tax planning may ultimately cause harm to the 
corporation, for example, by damaging the company’s reputation, by violating 
management’s own standards of ethically permissible behaviour, or both, the 
company is free to decide not to engage in the planning.197 Indeed, if the 
company’s management believes that it is in the company’s best interest, all 
things considered, to refrain from engaging in a particular tax-advantaged 
transaction, then management can be said to face a fiduciary duty to refrain. 
 
Corporate social responsibility 
 
This kind of reasoning has become well-accepted around the world over the 
past half-century in areas of corporate activity other than taxation. In the 
areas, for example, of labour protection and environmental regulation, lower-
income countries have sometimes been perceived as unable to enforce 
reasonable, minimal levels of protection. One result of this circumstance has 
been the CSR movement, under which businesses engaging in cross-border 
activities adopt voluntary codes of conduct requiring the maintenance of, say, 
particular standards of employee or environmental protection, even if 
governments are not successfully enforcing those standards.198 At the heart 
of CSR is the principle that a company’s obligation to its shareholders is to 
promote the company’s interests as broadly defined, and that this obligation 
does not in every instance require maximisation of the company’s short-term 
financial results. Instead, corporate management may validly take actions 
that are designed to increase the wellbeing of employees, customers and 
others affected by their activities, even if there is no identifiable financial pay-
off for doing so. 
                                                 
197  See Farrer & Co. LLP (2013), (concluding that there is no fiduciary obligation to minimise tax liabilities); 
William Underhill (2013) (disagreeing with elements of the Farrer & Co. opinion, but agreeing there is no 
duty to minimise liabilities if other elements of corporate welfare would be adversely affected). See generally 
Chafee and Davis-Nozemack (2017). 
198  For background on CSR, see Crane et al. (2008) and Carroll (2008), both in The Oxford Handbook of 
Corporate Social Responsibility. For a useful and comprehensive reflection on CSR in the developing 
country context, see Ruggie (2013). 
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The notion of CSR has been criticised as counterproductively confusing the 
different social obligations of the public and private sectors. Arguably, overall 
social well-being is best served when society’s rules of behaviour are set 
through formal political processes, and when business limits its role to 
maximising economic value-added within the bounds of those rules.199 
Proponents of CSR acknowledge the validity of this concern, and concede 
that it is difficult to reconcile the concept of CSR rigorously with conceptual 
models of the public-private distinction.200 Nevertheless, it is argued that in 
practice if companies operated only according to the standard of the law’s 
minimal requirements, without taking additional voluntary initiatives, serious 
damage would be inflicted on individuals in a wide range of areas. As a 
matter of pragmatism if not of social theory, the principle of CSR has become 
well accepted within the international business community. 
 
The post-crisis years have witnessed numerous discussions of the potential 
role of CSR in defining companies’ ethical obligations towards the 
persistence of BEPS.201 In February 2018, a group of business leaders and 
multinational companies calling itself ‘the B Team’ published a plan for 
implementing the principles of CSR in the context of international taxation.202 
The principles espoused by the group include: (i) accepting tax incentives in 
countries only under conditions of transparency and regular legal process;203 
(ii) refraining from using corporate structures that do not promote a non-tax 
business purpose;204 and (iii) engaging only in tax planning that is more likely 
than not to be upheld as legally permissible.205 In addition, the signatories 
                                                 
199  See e.g. Friedman (1970): ‘[T]he doctrine of “social responsibility” taken seriously would extend the scope of 
the political mechanism to every human activity. It does not differ in philosophy from the most explicitly 
collective doctrine. It differs only by professing to believe that collectivist ends can be attained without 
collectivist means. That is why, in my book Capitalism and Freedom, I have called it a “fundamentally 
subversive doctrine” in a free society, and have said that in such a society, “there is one and only one social 
responsibility of business - to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so 
long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without 
deception or fraud”. 
200  CSR therefore has been called ‘an essentially contested topic’ (Crane et al. (2008: 5) quoting Moon et al. 
(2005). 
201  See e.g. Christian Aid et al. (2015). See generally Desai and Dharmapala (2006); Avi-Yonah (2014); Chafee 
and Davis-Nozemack (2017: 1474-1479). 
202  The B Team (2018). Companies participating in the B Team include Allianz, BHP, Maersk, Natura, Repsol, 
Safaricom, Shell, Unilever and Vodafone. In explaining the new document, Bob Collymore, CEO of 
Safaricom, said: ‘Taxes don’t just build schools and transport systems. They also create the conditions for 
responsible investment and sustainable growth, which will be key to meeting the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals. We need to build a new business consensus around responsible tax practice, and 
communicate that clearly and proactively’ The B Team 2018: 2). 
203  The B Team (2018: 4): ‘Where we claim tax incentives offered by government authorities, we seek to 
ensure that they are transparent and consistent with statutory or regulatory frameworks’. 
204  The B Team (2018: 4): ‘We will only use business structures that are driven by commercial considerations, 
are aligned with business activity and which have genuine substance. We do not seek abusive tax results’. 
205  The B Team (2018: 4): ‘We aim for certainty on tax positions, but where tax law is unclear or subject to 
interpretation, we evaluate the likelihood and where appropriate seek an external opinion, to ensure that our 
position would, more likely than not, be upheld’. This language is included as subsidiary to the B-Team’s 
Principle 2: ‘We comply with the tax legislation of the countries in which we operate and pay the right 
amount of tax at the right time, in the countries where we create value’. 
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agree not to use tax haven entities to separate the taxation of income from 
the business activities that generate it.206 
 
Substantively, the B-Team principles depend heavily on tests like economic 
substance and business purpose, the subjectivity of which historically has 
contributed to the development of BEPS. As discussed in Chapter 3, these 
and similarly subjective tests remain important in international tax law, and 
the B-Team drafters had no real choice but to refer to these tests in stating 
their commitment to complying with applicable laws. Presumably, however, 
the B-Team’s commitment to a more-likely-than-not test in tax planning will 
involve restraint in pushing the boundaries of the subjective legal tests. 
 
The B-Team principles are notable for their frank use of the term tax 
haven,207 language that often is avoided in discussions among tax 
specialists. This choice of words suggests that the B-Team document is 
intended for reading by consumers and other members of the general public, 
as well as by tax specialists. Indeed, the B-Team principles can be seen in 
part as an appeal to public opinion – the drafters have offered criteria for 
judging multinationals’ tax behaviour that they hope members of the public 
will accept as sound. To facilitate public scrutiny, the B-Team principles 
promise to provide ‘regular information to our stakeholders, including 
investors, policy makers, employees, civil society and the general public, 
about our approach to tax and taxes paid’.208 The drafters promise that the 
information will include indications of the companies’ tax payments in 
different countries where they conduct business,209 as well as information on 
tax incentives received by the companies.210 It remains to be seen how 
comprehensive and detailed the various disclosures will be in practice. 
Nevertheless, the B-Team principles seem to provide a framework on which 
might over time be built a durable system for transparency and public 
accountability with respect to companies’ international tax planning practices. 
 
 
 
                                                 
206  The B Team (2018: 5): ‘We do not use so-called ‘tax havens’ in order to avoid taxes on activities which take 
place elsewhere. Entities which are based in low or nil-rate jurisdictions exist for substantive and 
commercial reasons’. The B-Team lists this commitment as a component of the general principle that ‘[w]e 
will only use business structures that are driven by commercial considerations, are aligned with business 
activity and which have genuine substance. We do not seek abusive tax results’. 
207  Note 13 above. 
208  B-Team principles (The B Team 2018: 8). 
209  The participating companies commit to releasing ‘[a]nnual information that explains our overall effective tax 
rate and gives information on the taxes we pay at a country level, together with information on our economic 
activity’ (The B Team (2018: 8). 
210  The participating companies agree to provide ‘[i]nformation on financially-material tax incentives (e.g. tax 
holidays), where appropriate, including an outline of the incentive requirements and when it expires’ (The B 
Team 2018: 8). 
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The possibility of CSR-based lobbying 
 
An intriguing element of the B-Team principles is a commitment to ‘engage 
constructively in national and international dialogue with governments, 
business groups and civil society to support the development of effective tax 
systems, legislation and administration’ (The B Team 2018: 8). This is to 
include the offering of ‘constructive input to industry groups, governments 
and other external bodies (e.g. OECD and the EU) and engag[ing] with civil 
society on tax issues in order to contribute to the development of future tax 
legislation and practice’ (The B Team 2018: 8). 
 
Conceivably, these principles could be applied by groups of companies, 
perhaps working through large international bodies like the Business and 
Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) or the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC), to advocate that lower-income countries adopt as best 
practice base-protection measures that many countries appear reluctant to 
adopt for fear of tax competition. For example, BIAC or the ICC might issue a 
statement to the effect that the organisation views EBITDA-based interest 
deduction limitations, conforming to Action 4 of the OECD’s BEPS 
recommendations,211 as appropriate for countries at all levels of economic 
development, and as consistent with a welcoming stance towards inbound 
investment. 
 
Of course, these kinds of lobbying efforts by business groups might not in 
themselves provide lower-income country governments with the confidence 
needed to enact effective base-protection legislation. Nevertheless, these 
efforts, when combined with advocacy from other groups, including, for 
example, the OECD, UN and international lending agencies, could help to 
bring about an environment in which the adoption of specified base-
protection measures is accepted as best practice among lower-income 
countries, just as the OECD’s EBITDA-based interest limitations have 
recently been embraced by many of the world’s wealthier countries.212 
 
CSR and explicit tax incentives 
 
The B-Team’s list of ethical commitments is also noteworthy for its inclusion 
of a promise to seek to ensure that any explicit tax incentives, like tax 
                                                 
211  See Chapter 4. 
212  I use EBITDA-based interest limitations as an example of a measure for which businesses might lobby, 
because these limitations today seem to be relatively non-controversial among businesses and tax 
specialists. Depending on the development of consensus over time, it might be possible for businesses to 
support other base-protection measures for use in lower-income countries, e.g. simplified means of 
identifying appropriate comparables for use in applying transfer pricing methods (see Chapters 4 and 5). It 
is conceivable as well that businesses might have a role in promoting more ambitious base-protection 
regimes, like the alternative corporate minimum tax discussed in Chapter 5. 
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holidays, are offered transparently and in accordance with statutory or 
regulatory frameworks.213 The B-Team document also commits to public 
disclosure of financially material tax incentives that a company receives.214 
 
Transparency with respect to explicit tax incentives is crucial to raising the 
likelihood that reductions in base erosion and profit shifting in a country will in 
fact result in net increases in tax revenue. Implicit tax reductions that 
governments provide investors by tolerating BEPS, and explicit tax incentives 
like tax holidays, are at least to some extent substitutes for one another. If 
the substitution is perfect – that is, if a given reduction in BEPS results in an 
equivalent or even greater increase in the allowance of explicit incentives – 
then reducing BEPS will not increase tax revenue on a net basis. The 
discussion in Chapter 2, however, posits that the granting of explicit 
incentives is likely to be more constrained by local political oversight than the 
implicit allowance of tax incentives by tolerating BEPS-style planning. 
Therefore, increases in revenue through the curtailment of BEPS are unlikely 
to be offset fully by increases in explicit incentives. 
 
This desirable effect can prevail, however, only if the issuance of explicit tax 
incentives is in fact subject to reasonably effective political constraints. This 
requires transparency in the granting of explicit incentives, including 
transparent statutory and regulatory procedures for evaluating requests for 
exemptions, and for monitoring compliance with the conditions (like 
maintaining specified levels of employment) that might be attached to 
exemptions. To promote this transparency, it is important that CSR efforts 
include a commitment to participate in tax incentive regimes only under 
conditions of transparency, and with clear legal authorisation.215 
 
Ethical obligations of international organisations 
 
Inevitability of interpretive communities 
 
There can, I think, be little denying that around complex and important areas 
of economic regulation like taxation, communities of insiders (sometimes 
called interpretive communities) tend to coalesce, with a natural tendency 
                                                 
213  The B-Team principles include this commitment: ‘Where we claim tax incentives offered by government 
authorities, we seek to ensure that they are transparent and consistent with statutory or regulatory 
frameworks’ (The B Team 2018: 7). 
214  The B-Team report calls for disclosure by companies of ‘[i]nformation on financially-material tax incentives 
(e.g. tax holidays), where appropriate, including an outline of the incentive requirements and when it 
expires’ (The B Team 2018: 8). A B-Team spokesperson explains that the modifier ‘where appropriate’ is 
used to address situations where the terms of agreements require confidentiality. 
215  There seems to be broad consensus on this point among both businesses and civil society groups. See 
generally ActionAid et al. (2018). 
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towards retention of the legal and regulatory status quo.216 The 
disproportionate influence of established interpretive communities on legal 
and regulatory decision-making, often called capture, is inevitable in 
connection with a high-stakes legal and administrative system like that of 
international taxation.217 
 
One reason for the coalescing of interpretive communities is that the effects 
of regulation tend to be concentrated on relatively small groups of actors. 
Specifically in the area of international taxation, corporate taxpayers have 
much more concentrated interests in the lawmaking process than members 
of the general public. As a broad matter, taxpayers can be expected to have 
a bias towards retention of those existing legal structures that facilitate tax 
avoidance, especially if the legal structures are relatively non-transparent. 
 
Moreover, taxpayers are not the only parties likely to display a political bias 
towards the retention of existing legal structures. Tax advisers, government 
officials and experts in international organisations like the OECD and UN 
have all accumulated human capital based on their expertise with respect to 
current legal structures. To say this is not to impugn policymakers’ 
commitment to objectivity in their work. The bias of interpretive communities, 
to the extent it is present, may be largely unconscious. Moreover, interpretive 
communities are not always monolithic, and not all members generally 
necessarily will act in role with respect to every policy question. 
Nevertheless, as a longtime observer of (and sometimes participant in) 
legislative and regulatory processes in taxation, there seems to me little 
doubt that communities of insiders tend to coalesce around complex and 
important areas of economic regulation like taxation, with some degree of 
overall bias towards the retention of existing legal and regulatory structures. 
 
Measures to promote transparency and critical review 
 
The inherent vulnerability of regulatory bodies to bias towards the status quo 
places upon them a social responsibility of transparency in their operations 
and voluntary exposure to critical review. This means, I believe, that technical 
research performed by the OECD, the UN Tax Committee and other 
international organisations should be conducted transparently, in consultation 
with outside experts. It is important, in particular, that deficiencies in current 
rules and procedures be frankly identified and discussed publicly. The fact 
that base erosion and profit shifting were basically unknown to the public 
prior to the 2008 financial crisis testifies to the historical insufficiency of 
                                                 
216  e.g. see Picciotto (2015) (referring to interpretive community in field of international corporate taxation); see 
also Langbein (2010). 
217  The classic academic statement of the theory of regulatory capture is found in Stigler (1971). 
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transparent self-critical discourse within the OECD and other international 
organisations involved in setting rules for international taxation. 
 
The need for a high degree of transparency also counsels, I believe, for both 
external and internal checks and balances on the OECD. With respect to 
external checks and balances, although it should not be expected for the UN 
to supplant the OECD’s lead role in international tax policymaking, it should 
be seen as essential that the UN Tax Committee be provided with an 
enhanced budget, and ideally upgraded to an intergovernmental 
organisation, to afford the Committee strengthened political standing.  
 
A strengthened UN tax committee should not be expected routinely to take 
positions contrary to those of the OECD. As discussed at many points in this 
book, developing and industrialised countries have numerous interests in 
common with respect to taxation, so that a UN-OECD relationship should not 
be adversarial on many points. Also, there are likely to be some biases 
towards the status quo in both organisations. It therefore would be unrealistic 
to envision the UN as performing a fully-fledged watchdog role with respect 
to the OECD. Nevertheless, there may be natural competitive tension 
between the two organisations as centres of thought leadership, and in an 
area as predictably controversial as international taxation it seems imprudent 
to allow any single intergovernmental organisation a monopoly over 
authoritative analysis. The UN therefore can be expected to play a critical, 
albeit imperfect, role as a counterweight to the OECD. 
 
The OECD also should consider whether it is possible to build into its own 
organisational structure what would amount to an independent evaluation 
office, charged specifically with reviewing the performance of various aspects 
of OECD tax guidance in actual operation around the world, including the 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines. To promote independence, this office would 
report, not to the head of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs who oversees the 
Guidelines, but instead to a senior official elsewhere in the OECD 
Secretariat. The work product of this office would be available to the public. 
The presence of this office might lead on occasion to disruptive controversy 
within the OECD, but the scrutiny the office affords should lead over time to 
more satisfactorily performing policy instruments (including better-functioning 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines). 
 
In sum, there are many predictable forces that can lead to bias, within 
regulatory bodies like the OECD towards the retention of current legal and 
administrative structures. The OECD and other organisations engaged in 
formulating rules for international taxation face a social responsibility to 
anticipate the possibility of this bias, and to build into their procedures the 
means for ensuring transparency in their research and deliberations, as well 
as internal and external sources of criticism and review. 
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Continuing role for NGOs and the press 
 
The implementation of new checks and balances within policymaking bodies 
should not be seen as substituting for the role of non-governmental 
organisations and journalists, as in effect watchdogs on international tax 
policymaking. The leading role played by NGOs and the press in initiating the 
recent BEPS efforts is in itself testimony to the cruciality of truly independent 
sources of commentary and criticism. The OECD, UN and other policymaking 
bodies should continue their longstanding practice of soliciting comment 
from, and otherwise engaging with, NGOs and the press, even when the 
engagement adds contentiousness to the policymaking process. 
 
Ethical responsibilities of national governments 
 
Introduction 
 
The OECD is not a legislative body – its role is limited to recommending the 
use of particular policy instruments as best practice, with the decision 
whether to adopt the recommended measures left in the hands of national 
governments. The analysis of BEPS in lower-income countries in the first five 
chapters of this book suggests several initiatives that should, I think, be 
recognised as especially pressing ethical obligations on the part of national 
governments. These include: 
 
(i)  a renewed attempt by capital-exporting countries, probably through the 
OECD, to agree upon standards for effective controlled foreign 
corporation (CFC) rules or similar measures; 
(ii)  in all countries, the establishment of a high degree of transparency and 
the articulation of clear legislative and administrative procedures with 
respect to the granting and oversight of explicit tax exemptions like tax 
holidays; and 
(iii)  the stepping-up of efforts by national governments, including those of 
lower-income countries, to generate and maintain data of the kind 
necessary to evaluate the effectiveness and integrity of tax 
administration, including tax enforcement, in their jurisdiction. 
 
CFC rules and similar legislation 
 
As explained in Chapters 3 and 4, by adopting strong CFC rules or similar 
legislation, governments can remove from their multinationals some of the 
financial incentive to engage in BEPS-style tax planning around the world, 
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including in lower-income countries. A robust global network of CFC or 
similar rules therefore might result in significant reductions in the incidence of 
profit shifting from lower-income countries. 
 
At the outset of the BEPS process, it appeared that the OECD might be 
heading for a strong statement in favour of a global network of CFC rules in 
BEPS Action 3.218 Apparently, however, political consensus could not be 
raised in favour of that position, and the final report on Action 3 contains only 
mild language pointing to the potential benefits of an effective global network 
of rules, without offering specific recommendations. The failure to agree on 
international standards for CFC rules must be seen, I believe, as a missed 
opportunity among the OECD countries to take one of the most feasible 
initiatives available to reduce global demand for profit shifting from the 
world’s lower-income countries. 
 
The OECD should, as a matter of social responsibility, resume efforts to 
reach international agreement on standards for CFC rules or similar 
legislation, ideally through the processes of the Inclusive Framework so that 
the views of both capital-exporting and capital-importing countries are 
represented. The model rules adopted should be capable, as a practical 
matter, of significantly reducing demand for BEPS planning around the world. 
Therefore, for example, the rules should not depend heavily on subjective 
tests like business purpose or economic substance for their implementation, 
but instead should target for taxation all income that is shifted to countries 
with corporate tax rates below specified levels.219 Success in this effort would 
send a strong signal of global commitment to redressing the problem of profit 
shifting from countries at all levels of economic development. 
 
Although in several parts of the world, as described in Chapters 4 and 5, 
some strengthening of CFC rules has occurred (e.g. through the new US 
GILTI rules), the political barriers facing multilateral agreement on effective 
CFC or similar rules should not be underestimated. Strengthened CFC rules 
in effect result in a redistribution of resources from multinational companies, 
which tend to be based in capital-exporting jurisdictions, to the governments 
of capital-importing countries (including lower-income countries) where the 
multinationals conduct business. This kind of redistribution might in itself 
raise political resistance in some countries to strengthened CFC rules. 
Indeed, political resistance of this kind may account in part for the often weak 
state of CFC rules around the world today. It remains to be seen whether a 
re-invigorated effort to establish effective global norms for CFC rules, 
motivated explicitly by concerns of social responsibility with respect to 
capital-importing countries, might lead to more substantial results than were 
                                                 
218  See Chapter 4. 
219  See the discussion of CFC rules in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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reached in the BEPS Action 3 Report. Efforts in this direction, however, seem 
clearly indicated as a means of removing incentives to taxpayers for profit 
shifting from all countries, including lower-income countries. 
 
Transparency with respect to explicit tax incentives 
 
An especially urgent need is for governments of countries at all levels of 
economic development to afford a high level of transparency to the 
evaluation and granting of explicit tax incentives, like tax holidays. As 
discussed above,220 if efforts to control BEPS are to result in significant 
revenue increases for lower-income countries, it is essential that there be 
effective political controls on the issuance of explicit tax incentives, so that 
revenue gained from the curtailment of BEPS is not simply offset by 
additional governmental largesse in the allowance of explicit incentives. 
 
It is evident that many countries today do not have in place the kinds of 
transparent procedural mechanisms that are necessary to afford effective 
political control over the granting of incentives.221 Governments should act 
promptly to enact clear standards for transparency, and legislative and 
regulatory process, in the granting and oversight of tax incentives. This work 
ideally should occur under the auspices of regional tax organisations in order 
to mitigate to some extent the pressure of tax competition. The use of 
regional organisations would also facilitate efficient assistance from 
international organisations or other sources of technical support. 
 
It is important to be realistic about the prospects of curtailing explicit tax 
incentives in lower-income countries. The pressure of tax competition is 
almost certain to remain influential in those countries, and even with a high 
degree of transparency and clear political and administrative processes, 
governments will continue to grant incentives. Moreover, tax incentives 
typically have strong supportive constituencies within countries. Politicians 
and others often perceive they can achieve popular acclaim if they are seen 
as attracting new investment and employment. Also, there surely are some 
instances in which the granting of tax incentives involves rent-seeking 
opportunities that beneficiaries will not want to give up. 
 
Nevertheless, achieving greater control over the issuance of explicit 
incentives is essential to the process of raising additional corporate tax 
revenue. It is to be hoped, moreover, that greater transparency will result not 
only in limitations on the volume of incentives, but also improvements in the 
                                                 
220  Notes 22-24 and accompanying text. 
221  See IMF (2015). 
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economic efficiency of those incentives that are provided.222 In any event, 
until effective political brakes can be applied to the granting of additional 
explicit tax incentives, efforts to increase corporate tax revenue in lower-
income countries through reducing the incidence of BEPS will remain 
seriously impeded. 
 
Transparency with respect to tax administration 
 
The BEPS recommendations already envision enhancements to 
transparency in international tax policymaking – particularly in the report on 
BEPS Action 11,223 which addresses the topic of measuring changes in the 
extent of base erosion and profit shifting over time. Action 11 recommends 
that national governments and the OECD maintain data on changes over 
time in the quantitative extent of BEPS, including items like the volume of 
royalty income accumulated in zero- and low-tax jurisdictions, and the ratio of 
taxpayers’ interest deductions to their income. The information needed to 
perform these analyses is to come from a variety of sources, including (i) 
detailed revenue data, generally based on filed tax returns, which is compiled 
by national governments and international organisations; and (ii) additional 
data that is expected to become available in the future, especially from the 
country-by-country transfer pricing documentation that governments are now 
beginning to require from taxpayers under BEPS Action 13 (OECD 2015d: 
249 ff). The kind of information envisioned, on changes over time in the 
incidence of BEPS, should prove valuable in assessing the effectiveness of 
countries’ efforts to curtail BEPS. 
 
The Action 11 recommendations, however, generally do not address a 
particular category of information that is, I believe, essential for well-informed 
lawmaking in international taxation – detailed information on the extent and 
outcome of tax audits of local affiliates of multinational groups. Studies 
conducted over the years in the US by the Treasury Department and the 
oversight office of Congress, comparing the claims made by examiners in 
transfer pricing audits with the adjustments ultimately upheld after 
administrative and judicial appeal, illustrate the kind of studies that I believe 
would be useful.224 It is only by direct observation of the performance of 
enforcement activities that the efficacy of important components of the tax 
law, like transfer pricing methods and limitations on the deduction of interest, 
can be satisfactorily evaluated. In addition, monitoring of the conduct of 
particular tax audits and other enforcement-related contacts with taxpayers is 
necessary in order to ensure employee integrity. 
                                                 
222  For discussion of the relative efficiency of different kinds of incentives, see IMF (2015) 
223  See OECD (2015c). 
224  See the discussion of these studies in Chapter 3. 
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Not all countries currently maintain, or are likely in the foreseeable future to 
begin maintaining, the detailed records of tax examinations and other 
administrative actions that are necessary to maintain and evaluate tax 
enforcement programmes effectively. Nevertheless, the goal of additional 
transparency with respect to audits – particularly through the collection and 
evaluation of case-specific data – seems essential to significant progress in 
the control of BEPS, and indeed to the basic integrity of the tax system, in all 
countries. Governments of countries with currently limited data availability 
should take prompt steps to build capacity in this area, with technical and 
ideally financial assistance from international organisations and national tax 
authorities with well-developed data systems. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This book has interpreted the persistence of BEPS in lower-income countries 
in large part as a manifestation of the continuing strong pressure of tax 
competition, which affects lower-income countries especially intensively. The 
pressure of tax competition will not dissipate overnight. Significant 
improvement is likely to be possible only gradually through a combination of 
factors. These include the reduction of international demand for profit shifting, 
both through taxpayer restraint and CFC rules and similar measures; a 
stiffening of political resolve in lower-income countries to enact base-
protection measures, perhaps through regionally coordinated action; greater 
political control over the granting of explicit tax incentives; and upgraded 
processes of tax enforcement and administration. Through actions and 
policies likes these, it may become possible for lower-income countries to 
raise the revenue needed to build both economic and educational 
infrastructure, thus reducing their vulnerability to international tax 
competition. 
 
This chapter has argued that various actors in the international tax 
community – multinational companies, intergovernmental organisations and 
national governments – all face social responsibilities in assisting lower-
income countries to break the cycle of tax competition. Much of this book has 
explored the technical challenges that must be met if lower-income countries 
are to substantially increase the revenue that they raise from corporate 
income tax. The main barriers to success in this effort, however, are not 
technical in nature. They instead have to do with the resolve of the various 
parties who are in a position to decide whether to expend the material and 
political capital needed to reduce the pressure of severe tax competition on 
lower-income countries. It is only with the necessary commitment of 
knowledgeable and concerned actors, expressed through both political 
processes and corporate initiative, that substantial reduction of base erosion 
and profit shifting in lower-income countries will prove realistic.
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